BOYD v. THE STATE.
S19A0018
Supreme Court of Georgia
June 24, 2019
306 Ga. 204
WARREN, Justice.
Kevin Boyd was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Ray Murphy.1 On appeal, Boyd contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdicts, the evidence presented at trial showed the following. On the night of August 10, 2013, Ray Murphy and his friend Eric Mann went to a house at 718 Reed Street in Monroe, Georgia, to purchase methamphetamine. Earlier that day, Murphy had contacted B. J. Crutchfield to arrange the buy. Rather than conduct the drug deal himself, Crutchfield passed it off to Kevin Boyd and Blake Harris. Boyd then spoke on the phone with someone about a drug deal. According to Adrian Ansley, Boyd‘s girlfriend at the time, she, Boyd, Harris, and Crutchfield were all members of the 9 Trey Gangstas, a sub-group of the Bloods gang.2 Sometime after overhearing Boyd‘s phone discussion, Ansley drove Boyd and Harris to pick up the drugs and, after that, drove them to Reed Street. At some point, Boyd told her that he was going to give the purchasers less drugs than the
The house on Reed Street was Jurshia Jones‘s, who was at that time pregnant with Boyd‘s child. Boyd arrived while Jones was in the shower, and, shortly after that, he told Jones‘s young daughter to leave the living room and go to Jones‘s room. Around this time, Murphy and Mann showed up; Mann‘s wife had driven them there.
Boyd exited the house and approached the car to escort Murphy and Mann inside. Once inside the house, they all sat down in the living room. While conversing with Murphy, Boyd pulled out a bag and at least twice said the phrase “baby mama” as an apparent signal to Harris because Harris (not Jones, who was pregnant with Boyd‘s child and whom he would refer to as “baby mama“) then entered the room and pointed a gun at Mann and Murphy. Boyd then said, “y‘all already know what it is,” which Mann understood as meaning that he and Murphy were being robbed.
According to Mann, Boyd and Harris started digging through
Upon hearing the gunshot, Murphy tried to escape by jumping through a window. According to Mann, Harris turned to Murphy and shot at him, hitting him in the buttocks. Mann then escaped through the door and ran toward his wife‘s car. Shots were being fired at Mann as he ran away, but he made it to the car without being hit and his wife drove away quickly. Murphy, already wounded, made it out of the house, but Harris followed him into the yard and shot him in the shoulder.3 Harris attempted to get money
After the shooting, Boyd‘s cousin drove Boyd and Harris to a night club in Monroe, then to a night club in Gwinnett County. From there — and at the behest of Terry Brown, who described himself as having “seniority over” Boyd within the 9 Trey Gangstas — Boyd and Harris went to a house in Atlanta that was a Bloods “hang out,” where Boyd stayed to “get away” from Monroe until being arrested three days later. Harris returned to Monroe before Boyd‘s arrest. Ansley also went to the Atlanta house and stayed there until she
At trial, Brown testified that Boyd called on the night of the shooting and told him that he needed to get out of Monroe because he had “committed murder.” Brown told Boyd to come to Atlanta to stay in a house there, which he (and Ansley) described as a “hang out” for members of the Bloods. Brown testified that when Boyd showed up, Boyd had a gun and was nervous like “his mind was somewhere else.” According to Brown, Boyd‘s version of events
Brown also testified about the gang affiliations of Boyd, Harris, Crutchfield, and Ansley. He testified that Boyd and Ansley were members of the 9 Trey Gangstas, a sub-group of the Bloods. According to Brown, Harris was a member of a different Bloods sub-group, and Crutchfield was not a member of the Bloods, but was a friend of the gang. Crutchfield denied any gang affiliation and testified that he did not remember any of the relevant events. However, investigators discovered on Boyd‘s cellular phone a text message that Crutchfield had sent Boyd hours before the drug deal
1.
Boyd first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. For the reasons explained below, we disagree.
When evaluating challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (820 SE2d 696) (2018). We leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences derived from the facts. Jones, 304 Ga. at 598. “As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State‘s case, the jury‘s verdict will be upheld.” Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 199, 200 (695 SE2d 246) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).
(a) To support Boyd‘s conviction for felony murder, the State was required to prove that Boyd proximately caused, either directly or as a party to the crime, Murphy‘s death while in the commission of aggravated assault. See
The evidence presented at Boyd‘s trial showed, among other things, that he agreed to sell methamphetamine; possessed a Smith & Wesson 9-millimeter handgun, which he gave to Harris on the way to the drug transaction; and escorted Murphy and Mann into the house where Harris remained out of sight until Boyd verbally signaled for him to appear. Boyd then said to Murphy and Mann, “y‘all already know what it is,” which Mann understood to mean they were being robbed. Boyd and Harris then emptied Murphy‘s and Mann‘s pockets at gunpoint, telling them to “give it up,” before Harris, Boyd, or both men shot Murphy and shot at Mann. Boyd and Harris left the scene together, and after Boyd telephoned Brown — a more senior 9 Trey Gangstas member — and told him that Boyd had “committed murder,” Boyd and Harris traveled to the Atlanta safe house together, where Boyd remained until his arrest three
(b) Count 8 of the indictment alleged that Boyd was “associated with ‘9 Trey Gangsters[,]’ a criminal street gang,” and that he “participate[d] in criminal gang activity through the commission of the offense of Armed Robbery and Aggravated
The State was required to prove four elements to establish that the defendant violated the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act as alleged in the indictment: (1) “the existence of a ‘criminal street gang,’ defined in
With respect to the first element, we have explained that “the commission of an enumerated offense by the defendant is not itself
Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the State presented witnesses who testified about the following gang-related evidence: the 9 Trey Gangstas were a gang and sub-group of the larger Bloods gang; Boyd, Harris, Ansley, and Crutchfield, who were all involved in the drug deal or predicate offenses, were either members of, or affiliated with, the 9 Trey Gangstas; and members were “jumped in” to the 9 Trey Gangstas gang. The State also tendered a photograph of Boyd and another gang member “throwing up” 9 Trey Gangstas gang signs. Although the State did not offer a gang expert or elicit other testimony or evidence to establish the relatively straightforward proposition that the 9 Trey Gangstas or Bloods engaged in criminal gang activity as a general matter, the State did present sufficient evidence that Boyd, Harris, Ansley, and Crutchfield were part of a group that conspired to engage in “criminal street gang activity” as defined by
To satisfy the fourth and final element of a violation of the Gang Act, the State must prove that “the commission of the predicate act was intended to further the interests of the [gang].” Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 134 (816 SE2d 663) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Rodriguez, 284 Ga. at 807 (“[T]here must be some nexus between the act and an intent to
Here, although Brown claimed that the drug deal was not done for the Bloods’ benefit, the State presented other evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer a nexus between the predicate crimes and an intent to further the interests of the 9 Trey Gangstas, or of the Bloods (of which 9 Trey Gangstas was a sub-group) more generally. That evidence included that Crutchfield texted the gang‘s oath to Boyd in the hours before the drug deal and armed robberies, aggravated assaults, and murder. See Nolley v. State, 335 Ga. App. 539, 543 (782 SE2d 446) (2016) (evidence that “connected the
To be sure, some evidence — such as Mann‘s testimony — could have been construed to suggest that Boyd and Harris simply planned to rob Mann and Murphy without ever conducting the drug transaction in the first place, and that Boyd and Harris therefore were not working at the behest of the gang when they committed the charged crimes. But other evidence presented at trial indicated that Boyd and Harris actually intended to carry out the drug deal — though perhaps a “dirty” version of it where they shortchanged the buyers — and that the deal took an unplanned, but reasonably foreseeable, violent turn. That evidence included that Boyd and Harris asked Ansley to drive them to pick up the drugs for the deal; that Boyd told Ansley that he planned to shortchange the deal (as
Finally, Boyd‘s actions after the crimes provide further evidence of nexus between the crimes and the gang‘s interests. In the hours after the crimes, Boyd called Brown, a more senior gang member in 9 Trey Gangstas, seeking help, and Brown directed him and Harris to a Bloods “hang out” in Atlanta, where Boyd went to “get away” — a location where Boyd remained, along with Ansley, until their arrests days later. See Morris, 340 Ga. App. at 300-301 (evidence of fellow gang member‘s actions days after predicate attempted armed robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery that related to those offenses provided sufficient evidence
2.
Boyd contends that the trial court erred when it denied a motion for directed verdict on Count 8, the violation of the Gang Act. The basis of Boyd‘s motion was that the State had failed to offer evidence that the alleged crimes were “furthering any gang activity.” “A directed verdict of acquittal should be entered where there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence demands a verdict of acquittal with all reasonable deductions and inferences.” Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 536 (807 SE2d 899) (2017) (citing
3.
Boyd contends that the trial court erred by charging the jury on conspiracy over Boyd‘s objection because there was no evidence that Boyd and Harris had any discussions about committing the crimes. We disagree.
If “slight evidence tends to show a conspiracy,” then it is not error to charge the jury on conspiracy. Brown v. State, 304 Ga. 435, 441 (819 SE2d 14) (2018). A jury charge on conspiracy “can be supported by evidence of a common design as well as an express
there is no evidence of an express agreement, an inference that two or more people tacitly came to a mutual understanding to commit a crime can be drawn from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances.
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). We conclude that the evidence presented at trial and recounted above provided more than slight evidence tending to show the common design, agreement, or understanding necessary to warrant a conspiracy charge, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving that charge over Boyd‘s objection. See, e.g., Brown, 304 Ga. at 441; Shepard v. State, 300 Ga. 167, 170-171 (794 SE2d 121) (2016).
4.
Boyd argues that the trial court erred by making an
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To support his argument that the trial court violated former
If [the prosecutor] is correct, that parties to a crime means that anybody involved, like prosecutorial buck shot, it catches everybody in your path, anybody involved at all even if you didn‘t have knowledge and even if you didn‘t aid and abet. If that‘s true, then count malice murder would make sense, but it‘s not. And also even if it was true, I‘m sorry, it would not make sense because if you think about this, malice has to be formed by the person doing it or somebody setting up a murder. That‘s not
what happened even by the wildest stretch of imagination.
The trial court then interrupted, telling counsel he was “getting on kind of dangerous grounds” because there were “two theories in this case: conspiracy and parties to a crime,” and the way counsel was arguing was “diminishing those theories legally where they can‘t be diminished that way.” After a brief colloquy, the trial court warned counsel against trying to “explain the law to [the jury] that‘s contrary to what they are going to be given in the law.”
Counsel proceeded with his closing argument and began talking about the felony murder counts in the indictment, saying “felony murder, while in the commission of an armed robbery . . . did cause the death of Ray Murphy . . . by shooting him with a pistol. Okay. You can count that off. [Boyd] didn‘t shoot a pistol.” At that point, the trial court excused the jury and told counsel he was “simply misstating the law” and misleading the jury by implying that if Boyd did not pull the trigger then he could not be found guilty of the charged crimes. Counsel acknowledged that a defendant
The trial court repeated that counsel could not instruct the jury on the law or mislead them about it, and told counsel not to “refer to the indictment in its literal sense” like counsel had done. The trial court also said that when the jury returned the court would explain that there were “two theories in this case, parties to the crime and conspiracy, that do not need to be included in the indictment.”
When the jury returned and counsel continued his closing argument, he said, “[p]arties to a crime is a theory of prosecution that anyone who had knowledge and aided and abetted . . . .” The trial court interjected again, saying, “It‘s not a theory of prosecution. It‘s the law. He didn‘t make that up.” Addressing the jury, the trial court continued:
Parties to a crime is a legal concept. It‘s the law, and you‘ll be given the law by me at the conclusion of these arguments. What these attorneys say are not evidence and not to be considered by evidence to you. What they say about the law --- what I say about the law trumps
them. Is that clear to everybody?
Trial counsel completed his closing argument without further interruption or objection.
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Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided June 24, 2019.
Murder. Walton Superior Court. Before Judge Ott.
Anthony S. Carter, Allison K. Parrish, for appellant.
Layla H. Zon, District Attorney, W. Cliff Howard, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.