Boyd v. Lepera & Ward, P. C.Boyd v. Lepera & Ward, P. C.
Aрpeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Teresi, J.), entered August 3, 1999 in Albany County, which, inter alia, denied a cross motion by defendants Constance Jones and E. Stewart Jones, Jr. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them.
In August 1995 plaintiff, a carpenter, allegedly sustained various injuries while performing certain renovation work on a building owned by defendant Constance Jones. On the day of
Plaintiff thereafter commеnced this action against Jones and her spouse, defendant E. Stewart Jones, Jr. (hereinafter collectively rеferred to as defendants), together with defendant Lepera and Ward, P. C. (hereinafter the architect), a firm that had been retained to provide architectural services for the project, alleging violations of Labоr Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and § 241 (6). The architect answered, cross-claimed against defendants for indemnification and moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants answered, cross-claimed against the architect for contribution and indemnification and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Finding that the architect did not have the authority to direct or control the method or manner of the injury-producing work, Supreme Court granted the architect’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court also denied defendants’ cross motion in its entirety, prompting this appeal by defendants.
As a starting point, we reject defendants’ assertion that Supreme Court erred in granting the architect’s motion fоr summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. Contrary to defendants’ argument, the record as a whole simply does not raise a question of fact as to, inter alia, whether the architect directed or controlled the injury-producing work (see generally, Johnson v Packaging Corp.,
In this regard, the architect’s contract with defendants plainly provided that it would “not have control over or charge of and [would] not be responsible for construction means, methods, techniques, sequences, or procеdures, or for safety precautions and programs in connection with the [w]ork since these [were] solely the Cоntractor’s responsibility under the [c]ontract for [c]onstruction”. A similar provision was embodied in the construction сontract. Additionally, although plaintiff testified that he, his supervisor and Vincent Lepera (one of the architect’s principals) had a general discussion as to the need to preserve and brace the hearth in question, plaintiff could not recall the particulars of this conversation. Notably, plaintiff could not recall if Lepera, who was not present at the time ff
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) claims against the architect. Both Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 expressly exempt from the liability imposed thеreunder architects “who do not direct or control the work for activities other than planning and design” (Labor Law § 240 [1]; § 241 [9]). As should be apparent from the foregoing discussion, the architect’s activities on the project at issue did nоt extend beyond planning and design and, hence, Supreme Court properly dismissed such claims on this basis. Defendants’ assеrtion that liability may be imposed upon the architect based upon its status as a contractor or agent оf defendants is equally unpersuasive, as the record does not support a finding that the architect was “generally responsible for the coordination and execution of all the work at the worksite” (Feltt v Owens,
As to the remaining arguments raised by defendants, only one has merit — namely, that Supreme Court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claim against them. Plаintiff testified at his examination before trial that defendants, who were not present on the day of the accident, did not have any input as to the bracing of the hearth, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that defendants had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition alleged. As such, Supreme Court should have dismissed plаintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claim against defendants. Defendants’ remaining contentions, including the assertion by E. Stewart Jones, Jr. that he is nоt an “owner” within the meaning of the Labor Law, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.
Spain, Mugglin, Rose and Lаhtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied the cross motion by defendants