3 N.J. Misc. 225 | N.J. | 1925
Each of these suits, was brought to recover compensation for personal injuries received by the respective plaintiffs. In the first suit compensation was also' sought for damage done to an automobile owned by TTallie Boyd. The injuries and damage alleged were received in a collision between an automobile belonging to Halide Boyd, in which both of the plaintiffs were riding, and a car belonging to the defendant. Hosted. The collision occurred at the intersection of üvo roads in Gloucester county. The two cases were tried together, and the .trial resulted in 'verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs. Hpon application of the defendant, each of: the rules how before us was allowed. The first ground upon which we are
The next ground'for making these rules absolute is that each of the verdicts, as the defendant contends, is excessive. We do not think the contention is justified by the fact. The a,war'd-to Hallie-Boyd was $1,250, and that to Mary E. Boyd was $2,500.' The jury was justified in finding that Hallie Boyd was quite seriously hurt; that she suffered, not. only from braises which were -the direct result of the collision, but also from shock, which so affected her nervous condition that she has not yet recovered therefrom. She was confined to her bed for a week after the accident, and was compelled to spend about $185 in having her car repaired. As to Mary E. Boyd, the jury was justified in finding that she received a severe cut upon the head, leaving an ugly scar as the result thereof, and ■ that the head injury has caused persistent headaches, from which she still suffers. Se was confined to her bed for four weeks 'and was compelled, to spend $158 for medical attendance and nursing.
The next contention is that the trial judge improperly refused to permit the defendant to' ask the twelve jurors, after they had been drawn and taken their places in the jurabox, but before airy of them had been sworn, whether any of them had been sitting on any case that had been tried during the term with Miss Hallie Boyd, who was a member of the general panel, and also1 whether any of them was acquainted with Mr. Marshall, the attorney of the plaintiffs, or had had business dealings with his office. It is argued that the right to question jurors in the manner indicated is conferred upon a party to a litigation by section 23 of “An act concerning jurors,” passed in. 1911. Comp. Stat. Supp., p. 841. But, in our opinion, the section appealed to has not the scope attributed to it. It provides that “either party, or his attorney.
The only other ground upon which we are asked to set these verdicts aside is that this court erroneously refused to grant a continuance of the causes until a later time, because of the fact that Miss Hallie Boyd was a member of the then present panel. The granting or refusing of such an application is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and we cannot say that this discretion was abused by the refusal to grant the continuance. On the contrary, in our opinion, the action of the trial judge in this respect was entirely proper.
The rules to show cause will be discharged.