FRED LAMAR BOYD, Plaintiff, v. MR. HELNISKI and D. SMITH, Defendants.
NO. 5:19-CT-3020-FL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION
September 28, 2021
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN, United States District Judge
This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, commenced this action by filing complaint on January 14, 2019, asserting claims for violations of his civil rights pursuant to
Following a period of discovery, defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment, relying on a memorandum of law, statement of material facts, and appendix of exhibits thereto, comprising the following: 1) Wake County Sheriff’s Office ( WCSO ) booking report; 2) WCSO inmate log; 3) excerpts of transcript of plaintiff’s deposition; 4) affidavits of WCSO detention deputy director Mildred Drayton; 5) affidavit of defendant Helniski; and 6) affidavit of defendant Smith. That same day, the court notified plaintiff that a motion for summary judgment had been filed and provided plaintiff with instructions regarding how to respond to the motion pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). As noted above, plaintiff did not respond to the motion.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The factual background, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawn from his verified compliant, may be summarized as follows. Following his arrest on criminal charges, plaintiff was housed at a pretrial detainee at the Wake County Detention Center ( WCDC ) between October 2018 and March 2019. (Am. Compl. (DE 11) at 4–6).2 As noted above, defendants were correctional officers at the WCDC. (Id.). Plaintiff attests that defendants placed a white powdery substance in his food tray on October 30 and 31, 2018, again on December 3, 2018, and a final time on March 30, 2019. (Id.). He did not, however, consume the meals
COURT’S DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Only disputes between the parties over facts that might affect the outcome of the case properly preclude entry of summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (holding that a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit and genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party). [A]t the summary judgment stage the [court’s] function is not [itself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249. In determining whether there is a genuine issue for trial, evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
Nevertheless, permissible inferences must still be within the range of reasonable probability, . . . and it is the duty of the court to withdraw the case from the [factfinder] when the necessary inference is so tenuous that it rests merely upon speculation and conjecture. Lovelace v. Sherwin–Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 241 (4th Cir. 1982) (quotations omitted). Thus, judgment as a matter of law is warranted where the verdict in favor of the non-moving party would necessarily be based on speculation and conjecture. Myrick v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc., 395 F.3d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 2005). By contrast, when the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a [triable] issue is created, and judgment as a matter of law should be denied. Id. at 489–90.
B. Analysis
Plaintiff’s allegations of food tampering in effect assert a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4th Cir. 1985) ( It is well-established that inmates must be provided nutritionally adequate food, prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well-being of the inmates who consume it. ). The Fourteenth Amendment analysis of plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim is coextensive with the Eighth Amendment standard applicable to convicted prisoners. See Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300–02 (4th Cir. 2021). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, in turn, requires
Here, as to the objective component, plaintiff asserts that he developed chest pain and high blood pressure around the time that defendants placed the powdery substances in his food. Plaintiff, however, provides no competent medical or other evidence identifying the powdery substance or establishing that it caused these symptoms. And plaintiff’s medical records establish that medical personnel did not attribute plaintiff’s chest pain to ingestion of a specific medication or other foreign substance. (Drayton Aff (DE 49-4) ¶¶ 13–14 and Exs. F, G (documenting that medical personnel were unable to find a cause of plaintiff’s chest pain)). Plaintiff’s mere incantation of chest pains and high blood pressure – without any attempt to identify the powdery substance or show that it caused his symptoms – is insufficient to establish defendants’ alleged
Furthermore, plaintiff testified at his deposition that he did not consume the meals defendants allegedly tampered with. (Pl’s Dep. (DE 49-3) at 6:14-16, 10:14-11:4). If he did not consume the meals, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a serious or significant physical or emotional injury or substantial risk thereof. And plaintiff’s unsupported speculation that defendants tampered with other meals that he consumed is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact on summary judgment. Wai Man Tom v. Hospitality Ventures, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining conclusory allegations . . ., without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion ). Accordingly, plaintiff fails to establish a triable issue of fact as to the objective component of his Eighth Amendment claim.3
The court next turns to plaintiff’s official capacity claims. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985). Under the doctrine of Monell liability, a local governmental entity is subject to Section 1983 liability only when its policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the plaintiff’s injury. Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A governmental entity may be held liable pursuant to
(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifests deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens ; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Here, where plaintiff fails to establish a triable issue of fact with respect to his underlying Eighth Amendment claim against defendants in their individual capacities, the official capacity claims likewise fail. See id. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to the official capacity claims.
Finally, to the extent plaintiff’s complaint should be construed to raise any state law claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent state law claim if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DE 46) is GRANTED. Any state law claims asserted in the amended complaint are dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff pursuing such claims in state court. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
United States District Judge