36 Ala. 533 | Ala. | 1860
The law existing at the husband’s death must govern the question of the widow’s right to dower. It is competent for the legislature to modify the law on the subject of dower, in a manner unfavorably affecting the wife, after her marriage, and after the acquisition by the husband of the land in which dower is claimed. In doing so, the legislature would neither impair the obligation of a contract, nor deprive the wife of any right of property vested in her.
Dower by the common law, which, of the five species of dower known in the old English law, is the only one recognized in this country, does not result from a contract. It is given by the law to the widow, “for the sustenance of herself, and the nurture and education of her children;” and is called in the old law, udos mulieris secundum consuetudinem anglicanum.”' — 1 Thomas’ Coke, 655. It is an estate, which “ arises solely by operation of law7, and not by force of any contract, express or implied, between the parties; it is the silent effect of the relation entered into by them ; not as in itself incidental to that relation, or as implied by the marriage contract, but merely as that contract calls into operation the positive
The wife has no property in the husband’s lands, pending the coverture. Three things are necessary to the perfection of the right of dower. These three thiugs are, marriage, seizin, and the husband’s death. Before the husband’s death, the wife has not a contingent right. Her attitude is that of a party in whose favor two pre-requisites to the existence of a right have'occurred, and a remaining one is wanting. She has a mere expectancy, resting upon the probability that the remaining requisite may, at some future time, come into existence. The expectancy being clothed with the quality that no contract can defeat it without her assent, it is an incumbrance upon the husbaud’s title. This quality, -attached by the subsisting law, has given rise to some looseness of expression in describing the wife’s attitude in reference to the lands of a living husband, which is calculated to lead to the erroneous conclusion, that the wife has, before her husband’s ¿leath, a title. — Park on Dower, 237. If the wife basa right of property, depending upon the contingency other surviving, as some loose expressions would seem to indicate, then she would have a contingent remainder in all her husband’s lauds, and would be a necessary party in all suits pertaining to the husband’s title. Such a propo- • sition has no sanction in the law; but, on the contrary,
The question which we are considering, has been the subject of adjudication several times in this country; and it has been decided, in every case, that the wife has not, during her husband’s lifetime, an interest in his lands, which is beyond the control of legislation. We subjoin a list of the cases. — Moore v. Mayor, &c., 4 Seldon, 110; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. 193; Moore v. Mayor, &c., 4 Sandf. Sup. Ct. 456: Leavins v. Sleator 2 Iowa, 604; also, Sleight v. Read, 18 Barb. 159 ; Blood v. Humphreys, 17 ib. 660. In the case of Reynolds v. Reynolds, Judge Bronson, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ While the husband lives, the wife has no right, interest, or estate in the land. She has nothing but a mere capacity to take in the event of her surviving her husband — she is dowable. It is not until she becomes a widow that she is entitled to dower.” The authorities and, arguments adduced fully sustain his position, and wo refer to that opinion for an able discussion of the entire subject.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.