78 Fla. 70 | Fla. | 1919
Lead Opinion
— Upon the first hearing of this cáse we affirmed the decree of the Chancellor by applying the rule so often announced by this' court that the findings Of the Chancellor on the evidence will not be disturbed unless such findings of fact are clearly shown to be erroneous. We stated in the opinion that there was much apparently credible positive evidence in the record to the effect that the signatures to the two documents involved were genuine. Both the rule and the statement of fact are correct, but the error in the conclusion arrived at upon the first hearing consisted in treating the testimony of the witness, William J. Kinsley, the expert on hand writing, as merely opinion evidence.
It was said in Gordon’s Case, 50 N. J. Eq. 397, 26 Atl. Rep. 268: “Handwirting is an art concerning which correctness' of opinion is susceptible' of demonstration.” The learned'Judge writing the opinion said: “I am fully convinced that the value- of the opinion of every handwriting expert, as evidence must depend upon the clearness with which the expert demonstrates its correctness.” The demonstration, when the signature of- a person since deceased is attacked as a forgery, consists- as in this case of an accumulation of a great mass of facts relating to the formation of letters, the field covered by both the admittedly genuine and questioned signatures; the spacing of the Tetters, both capitals and small letters; the angles on which they were formed; their relative positions' in the signatures; their proportions, slant, alignment and outline; the surface of the paper which under the microscope shows whether the line upon which the-questioned signature rests was drawn before or after the name was-
In Osborn’s Questioned Documents, page 281, the author says: “No two genuine signatures can be exactly alike, but such a statement should be understood to be true, speaking microscopically, and not as the carpenter measures, because by examining a great number of genuine signatures of certain exceptional writers’ signatures can be found which are nearly identical.”
It is not contended that the two signatures of W. T. Boyd to the documents of December 4, 1911, and February 25, 1912, are microscopic duplicates of each other, but there is such great similarity in proportions, spacing, slant, alignment and outline as to convincingly show that the two signatures were the work of a copyist, one who drew from a model, and when these signatures are compared under a magnifying glass with the signture of W. T. Boyd upon the back of the note for $1000.00 dated 12/4-1911, and signed by L. M. Gosser — complainant’s exhibit XX16 — the conclusion becomes irrefutable.
The improbability that a man of Mr. Boyd’s education, business training, habits and physical infirmities which the evidence showed him to be, could on three different times at dates covering a period of about two and oüe
The comparison of handwriting for the- purpose of ascertaining the characteristic or structural differences is one of the recognized means of arriving at the truth when the question is the genuineness of the signature. And it is generally conceded that if one signature coincides with another, one of them is a drawing or tracing, something made according to pattern or a model; and as a man when signing his name to a contract never takes-such- pains with his signature, certainly in this case there is no evidence .that Boyd did, it follows that one of the signatures at least is not. the writing of the person whose signature it purports to be. See Ames on Forgery, Chap. IY. See also the views upon this proposition as expressed by Professor Benjamin Pierce, formerly of Harvard College as reported in 4 American Law Review, p. 649.
So we have in this case upon the one side the law of mathematical probabilities, and upon the other.the law of moral probabilities. “Preponderance of the evidence” is a phrase which in its last analysis means probability of its truth. In a cause where there is- conflicting-moral evidence, the jury in the one case, the Chancellor in the other, is required to decide accordingly -as .the weight of the evidence preponderates in favor of one proposition or the other. That is to say, having no personal
In the use of demonstrative evidence one relies upon the evidence of 'his own senses. It is therefore evidence of the highest rank. It is the ultimate test of truth. To this class belongs mathematics, because a proposition in mathematics may be' established by the evidence of one’s own sénsés. Moral evidence depends for its value upon veracity on the one hand and credulity upon the other; so in testing the truth of a witness’ statement one must therefore draw upon his fund of common knowledge and experience of men‘and affairs, if like a prudent man who “looketh well to his going,” he would decide in accordance with that which seems most probable.
In the case at bar we have the uncontraclicted evidence of the expert on handwriting. The questioned signatures and photographs of them are before the court as Well as signatures admittedly genuine, and photographs of them. Some enlarged for convenience of comparison, and the means were at hand for measurements and other comparisons embracing the whole field of examination. So that the facts to which the expert witness testified concerning the characteristics and construction of the signatures are matters within the field of demonstrative evidence. These facts being established by evidence of the first rank are strongly presumptive óf the further fact that the signatures in question are tracings or drawings by a hand other than the person whose signatures thej purport to be, and this presumption is supported by the mathematical law of probabilities as well as the common experience
So the decree is reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. — The Chancellor specifically found “that W. T. Boyd, in his life time, made and entered into the two contracts in writing with the complainant,” and “that the complainant, in the life time of the said W. T. Boyd, made to • him the payments in the said bills of complaint alleged.” While the evidence on these material points is conflicting, there is ample evidence to sustain the specific findings, and such findings do not clearly appear to be contrary to, but to be in accordance with, the preponderating weight and probative force of the evidence considered as an entirety. As a necessary consequence, the de: cree appealed from is “such a decree as the court below .ought to have given,” within the requirements of Section 1707, General Statutes, 1906, Florida Compiled Laws, 1914.
dissenting. — Applying the well-settled rule that the findings of the Chancellor on the evidence will not be disturbed unless such findings of fact are clearly shown to be erroneous, I am still of the opinion that there is ample evidence in the record to support the decree of the Chancellor as was held in the original opinion and therefore dissent from the opinion filed upon the rehearing in the case.