16 N.Y.S. 10 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1891
It is established by the evidence, and found by the learned county judge at the trial, that prior to December 3, 1888, the defendant Bassett and the defendant Esterheld entered into a contract in writing, by the terms of which Esterheld agreed to do the carpenter work and painting, and furnish the necessary materials therefor, in the construction of a certain house for Bassett, situated on the corner of William and George streets, in the city of Rochester, for which he was to receive as compensation the sum of $1,050. On the 3d day of December, 1888, Esterheld had furnished labor and materials amounting to $800, including in such sum the value of certain lumber, amounting to $244.60, furnished by the plaintiff to the contractor, upon which the sum of $11 had been paid. This action was brought to foreclose the lien created by the act of 1885, c. 342. The defense to the action is that the contractor, Esterheld, entered into an agreement with the owner, Bassett, on the 8th day of December, 1888, to abandon the contract. The defense was so far found to be correct by the county judge as that he found the fact of such agreement, but held that the same was entered into for the purpose of defeating the plaintiff’s claim. The conclusion reached by the county judge is well supported by the testimony; for Mr. Esterheld testifies, with a high degree of circumstance, that the appellant advised him to throw up the contract in order that he (the owner) might defeat the plaintiff’s liens. It is true that the appellant denies this evidence; but the circumstances attending the transaction go far to corroborate the contractor in his testimony.
Aside from the merits of the evidence, an argument is now made, apparently for the first time, that the plaintiff’s lien cannot be enforced, because of the defective verification made to the statement of his claim as filed with the county clerk. In this contention, also, we think the counsel for the appellant is in error for two reasons: First. Ho objection to the verification was made, so far as we can ascertain, except upon this appeal. The fifth item named in the appellant’s answer does not include such a defense. If the owner intended to make any objections of this technical nature, it was his duty to interpose them before entering upon the trial of the case upon the merits, and probably