OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, who are wheat farmers in the United States, bring this putative class action alleging that defendants AWB Limited and AWB (U.S.A.) Limited (collectively, “AWB”), 1 who exported Australian-grown wheat to Iraq under the United Nations Oil for Food Program, participated in a bribery and money laundering conspiracy “to achieve, maintain, and exploit a monopoly on wheat sold in Iraq,” and “to foreclose the market to U.S.-grown wheat.” (ComplY 2.) Although none of the named plaintiffs claim to have sold or attempted to sell wheat to or in Iraq, plaintiffs allege that AWB’s conduct injured them and other similarly situated wheat farmers by causing a “decrease in the prices at which U.S. wheat farmers were able to sell their wheat in the United States.” (Id.) The complaint alleges that AWB violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). (Compl.f 3.) Defendants move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. The motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the complaint, except where noted. All factual allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion.
See Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc.,
I. The Global Wheat Market
The world wheat trade is dominated by the United States, Australia, the European Union, Canada, and Argentina, which together supply approximately 80% of the 100 million metric tons (“mmt”) of wheat traded globally each year. (Compilé 43, 50.) The United States, the world’s largest exporter of wheat, produces a number *240 of different wheat types, including hard red winter wheat. (Id. ¶ 52.) From 1996— 2000, the United States exported approximately 31.1 mmt of wheat annually, of which 13.8 mmt was hard red winter wheat. (Id.) The primary competitor of U.S.-grown hard red winter wheat in the export market is a hard wheat grown in Australia. (Id. ¶ 53.) The major export markets for both U.S.-grown hard red winter wheat and its Australian equivalent are countries in the Middle East and Asia. (Id.)
The complaint alleges that, “[bjecause of the global nature of the wheat trade, supply and demand forces in any given geographic sub-market are interrelated with those in every other sub-market.” (Id. ¶ 54.) Wheat prices in the United States are thus “directly affected by market conditions and events in those sub-markets around the world into which the U.S. exports its wheat.” (Id. ¶ 55.) According to the complaint, the “main determinant” of domestic wheat prices is the projected “Ending Stocks” — ie., “the supply of wheat in the U.S. that remains unsold at the end of a current crop year.” (Id. ¶ 57.) When Ending Stocks are lower because of higher exports of U.S.-grown wheat, the prices of wheat futures contracts traded on commodity exchanges rise, 2 and because the “prices paid to U.S. farmers for their wheat move in parallel to prices on the commodity exchanges,” the prices paid to U.S. wheat farmers also increase. (Id. ¶¶ 56-58.) Conversely, when exports of U.S.-grown wheat decline in a particular export market, excess Ending Stocks “cannot simply be diverted to another export market because of a number of factors, including the lack of substitution between wheat classes, the inelasticity of demand, and transportation costs.” (Id. ¶ 59.) Higher Ending Stocks thus result in lower prices for wheat futures contracts, and correspondingly lower prices paid to domestic farmers for their wheat. (Id. ¶ 58.) The complaint thus asserts that “where market conditions dictate an increase or decrease in the amount of U.S.-grown wheat purchased in a particular export market, wheat prices in the U.S. are directly, proximately, and foreseeably affected.” (Id. ¶ 60.)
II. The Iraqi Wheat Market
Iraq imports approximately 3 mmt of wheat per year and, historically, its purchases of wheat have been limited to hard red winter wheat from the United States and its primarily Australian equivalents. (Id. ¶ 61.) During the 1980s, U.S.-grown wheat comprised 29% of the Iraqi wheat market, second only to Australian-grown wheat, which had a 38% share. (Id. ¶ 62.) Because of U.S. sanctions on Iraq, U.S.grown wheat was not sold to Iraq from 1990 to 1997. (Id. ¶ 63.) In the absence of competition from U.S.-grown wheat, Australian-grown wheat came to dominate the Iraqi wheat market, with its market share rising to 73%. (Id.) In 1997, however, U.S.-grown wheat re-entered the market under the United Nations Oil for Food Program (“OFFP”), and by 1998, had regained a 6% share in the market. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 67.) According to the complaint, U.S.-grown wheat was “the only real competitive threat to the Australian wheat monopoly” in Iraq. (Id. ¶ 68.)
III. AWB’s Alleged Conspiracy to Monopolize the Iraqi Wheat Market
The allegations against AWB in this action are based largely on reports doeu- *241 menting the Iraqi government’s manipulation of the OFFP. 3 Under the terms of the OFFP, the Iraqi government was permitted to sell oil and use the proceeds to purchase food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods. (Id. ¶ 63.) Because direct financial transactions with the Iraqi government were prohibited, Iraqi proceeds from the sale of oil were deposited into a U.N.-controlled escrow account in New York, which the Iraqi government could then use to pay suppliers for food and other approved goods. (Id. ¶ 64.) With regard to Iraq’s wheat purchases, the Iraq Grain Board (“IGB”) advertised tenders for contracts and forwarded bids to the Ministry of Trade, which invited bidders to Baghdad to negotiate contracts with the IGB. (Id. ¶¶ 65, 71.) The wheat contracts would then be submitted to the U.N. for approval. (See id. ¶ 81.) Wheat shipped into Iraq under the OFFP was inspected and certified at the border by U.N. inspectors. (Id. ¶ 66.) Upon certification, the U.N. would issue a letter of credit in favor of the wheat supplier to be drawn from the U.N.-controlled escrow account. (Id.)
The complaint alleges that beginning in 1999, through its participation in the OFFP, AWB allegedly entered into a conspiracy with the Iraqi government and various intermediaries “for the purpose of securing and maintaining AWB’s monopoly” in the Iraqi wheat market. (Id. ¶ 69; see id. ¶ 91.) Specifically, plaintiffs contend that AWB “began paying kickbacks to the Iraqi Government in an elaborate conspiracy whereby U.S. dollars in the [U.N.-controlled] escrow account were tunneled and laundered through AWB’s bank account in the United States and its co-conspirators, and ultimately paid to the Iraqi Government.” (Id. ¶ 69.) Plaintiffs allege that beginning in June 1999, AWB received wheat tender offers from the IGB that, unlike previous tenders under the OFFP, “required AWB to pay the cost of transporting the wheat by road from the point of entry into Iraq ... to the various governorates throughout Iraq.” (Id. ¶ 70.) Plaintiffs contend that these “newly imposed inland transportation fees were not, in fact, designed to cover the costs of transportation inside Iraq, but instead were illegal payments to the Government of Iraq,” and that AWB recognized that it had to pay these fees “in order to secure its monopoly and avoid losing its market share in Iraq.” (Id. ¶ 72.)
To effectuate this alleged bribery scheme, AWB and IGB purportedly agreed to include the “inland transportation fee” in their contractual price for wheat. (Id. ¶ 76.) Because the fee was not denoted as a separate line item on the wheat contracts, the U.N. failed to discover the fees and approved the contracts “without question.” (Id. ¶ 81.) Following delivery and certification of AWB’s wheat shipments to Iraq, the proceeds from the sale, which included the alleged kickbacks to the Iraqi government, were deposited from the U.N.-controlled escrow account directly into the U.S. dollar account maintained by AWB with the Bank of New York in New York. (Id. ¶ 76, 81.) AWB then allegedly conspired with various intermediaries, including a Jordanian trucking company and certain ship owners, to disguise its payment of the illegal fees by transferring those funds from its New York bank account to the co-conspirator *242 intermediaries, who then funneled the payments to the Iraqi government. (Id. ¶¶ 81-89.) Through twenty-one separate wheat contracts between July 1999 and March 2003, AWB allegedly transferred over $224 million from the U.N.-controlled escrow account to the Iraqi government. (Id. ¶ 90.) Plaintiffs contend that this conspiracy had “the intended effect of maintaining AWB’s monopoly in the market for wheat in Iraq.” (Id. ¶ 91.) According to plaintiffs, during the 1999-2000 season, AWB sold 98% of the wheat imported into Iraq, and for the remainder of the OFFP, which ended in 2003, U.S.-grown wheat was completely foreclosed from the Iraqi market. (Id.)
Plaintiffs filed this putative class action seeking treble damages under the antitrust laws and RICO on behalf of “[a]ll persons and entities that grew and sold hard red winter wheat in the United States from the period June 1, 1999 until at least March 20, 2003.” (Id. ¶ 32.) See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Although plaintiffs do not claim that they themselves sold or attempted to sell wheat to Iraq, they allege that AWB’s conduct foreclosed U.S.-grown wheat from the Iraqi market, and that because of “the global nature of the wheat pricing mechanism,” this foreclosure resulted in higher Ending Stocks and a corresponding “decrease in prices at which Plaintiffs and members of the Class were able to sell their wheat in the United States.” (CompUffl 93-94.)
DISCUSSION
AWB moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ antitrust and RICO claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). These arguments will be addressed in turn.
I. Antitrust Claims
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of persuasion.
See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp.,
1. Sherman Act Claims
Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6a, to clarify the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 5 The FTAIA provides, in relevant part:
*243 [The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless—
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations [ie., domestic trade or commerce], or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States [ie., on an American export competitor]; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the Sherman Act], other than this section.
15 U.S.C. § 6a. Through this statute, Congress intended to “make clear to American exporters (and to firms doing business abroad) that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from entering into business arrangements ..., however anti-competitive, as long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets.”
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
Under the FTAIA’s statutory framework, all conduct involving non-import foreign commerce is excluded from the scope of the Sherman Act unless (1) the alleged conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on “American domestic, import, or (certain) export commerce;” and (2) the effect is “of a kind that antitrust law considers harmful,
ie.,
the effect must give rise to a Sherman Act claim.”
Id.
at 162,
*244 Defendants contend that the Court lacks subject jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims because, inter alia, AWB’s alleged conduct did not have a “direct” effect on American domestic commerce. (D. Mem. 4, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l).) Although plaintiffs argue vigorously to the contrary, it is undisputed that the alleged effect on domestic commerce in this case — ie., a “decrease in prices at which Plaintiffs and members of the Class were able to sell their wheat in the United States during the Class Period” — occurred only as a result of the “global nature of the wheat trade.” (CompUf 54, 110) Specifically, plaintiffs allege that
(1) because of the alleged conspiracy between AWB, the IGB and others between 1999 and 2003 ([id] ¶ 69); (2) the Iraqi Government purchased little or no U.S.-grown wheat (id ¶ 91); (3) which caused there to be higher “Ending Stocks” in the U.S. (id ¶¶57, 93); (4) which caused wheat future contracts to trade on various U.S. commodity exchanges at lower prices (id ¶¶ 56-57); (5) which caused the price of wheat in the United States to decrease (id ¶¶ 57, 93); (6) which caused plaintiffs to be unable to sell their wheat in the United States for as much money as they would have otherwise been able to (id. ¶ 94).
(D. Mem. 6; see P. Mem. 8.)
Although the complaint’s description of “the global nature of the wheat pricing mechanism” (ComplJ 93) may paint a plausible scenario by which AWB’s conduct in Iraq might well have been a factual, or “but for,” cause of a drop in domestic wheat prices, such “ ‘but for’ causation is not the type of
direct
causation contemplated by the FTAIA.”
In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig.,
Given the multitude of “intervening developments” that simultaneously affect projected Ending Stock levels, the claimed drop in domestic wheat prices could very well have resulted from factors wholly unrelated to the alleged conspiracy.
Id.; see In re Intel Corp.,
Although plaintiffs cite numerous district court decisions from other circuits to support their contention that the foreclosure of the Iraqi wheat market directly caused domestic wheat prices to fall, these cases are all either inapposite or *246 distinguishable on their face. 9 (See P. Mem. 9-11; D. Reply Mem. 8 n. 9.) In the absence of supporting case law, plaintiffs quote a 1987 law review article which stated that “[w]hen one firm gains sales over another through bribery, the effect of lost exports is about as direct as can be.” (P. Mem. 9 (emphasis added), quoting Franklin A. Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 Va. J. Int’l L. 211 (1987)). Plaintiffs in this case, however, are domestic wheat farmers, not exporters, and even if the alleged bribery conspiracy may have had a “direct” effect of “lost exports,” plaintiffs’ asserted injury is a drop in domestic wheat prices, not lost exports. Indeed, as discussed below, plaintiffs’ injury is, at best, merely derivative of the injury suffered by domestic wheat exporters. 10 Finally, plaintiffs’ citation to a Congressional Research Service report on wheat exports to China, which contains no legal analysis but happens to use the phrase “direct effect” (P. Mem.9), simply has no bearing on the application of the FTAIA to the facts of this case.
In sum, although plaintiffs may have alleged a plausible theory of causation based on the global interrelatedness of the wheat markets in Iraq and the United States, AWB’s extraterritorial conduct in Iraq was, at most, only a “but for” cause of the alleged drop in wheat prices in the United States. Plaintiffs thus have failed to demonstrate that AWB’s conduct in Iraq had the kind of “direct” effect on domestic commerce that could give rise to an antitrust claim within the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act. 11 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims must be dismissed.
2. Clayton Act Claims
AWB contends, and plaintiffs apparently concede, that the FTAIA’s jurisdictional limitations also apply to plaintiffs’ Clayton Act claims. (D. Mem. 4 n. 7; P. Mem. 7 n. 6.) In particular, AWB cites
Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V.
for the proposition that courts have applied the FTAIA “to decline jurisdiction over Clayton Act claims.” (D. Mem. 4 n. 7, citing
Nevertheless, pursuant to the express terms of the statute, subject matter jurisdiction is lacking over plaintiffs’ Clayton Act § 3 claim. Section 3 of the Clayton Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of ... commodities ... for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any ... other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, ... on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the ... commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14. The jurisdictional reach of § 3 thus extends only to sales of commodities for “use, consumption, or resale within the United States.” Id.; cf. XTV Areeda ¶ 2316b, at 52 (characterizing analogous requirement of “use, consumption, or resale within the United States” in § 2(a) of Robinson-Patman Act as “jurisdictional”); IB Areeda, ¶ 272i, at 289 (explaining that the “proscriptions of the Clayton Act generally do not reach foreign commerce at all” because, inter alia, § 3 requires “that the covered commodities be ‘for use, consumption, or resale within the United States,’” quoting 15 U.S.C. § 14). Nothing in the complaint remotely suggests that the transactions between AWB and the Iraqi government involved the purchase or sale of any wheat or other commodity that was bound “for consumption, use, or resale within the United States.” 15 U.S.C. § 14. Accordingly, as with their Sherman Act claims, plaintiffs’ Clayton Act § 3 claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
3. Robinson-Patman Act Claim
AWB also contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c). (Compl. ¶¶ 140-46; D. Mem. Reply 6 n. 7.) Section 2(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
15 U.S.C. § 13(c). As the Supreme Court explained in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc.,
“the explicit reach of [the Robinson-Patman Act] extends only to persons and activities that are themselves ‘in commerce,’ the term ‘commerce’ being defined in § 1 of the Clayton Act ... as ‘trade or
*248
commerce
among
the several States and
with
foreign nations.’ ”
The “commerce” at issue in this case involves the shipment of Australian-grown wheat to Iraq pursuant to a contractual agreement between AWB, an Australian corporation,
12
and the government of Iraq. AWB asserts that such activity constitutes “wholly foreign” commerce beyond the jurisdictional reach of § 2(c) and cites a Ninth Circuit case,
Rotec Industries, Ine. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,
to support this contention. (D. Reply Mem. 6 n. 7.) In
Rotee,
the Ninth Circuit observed that defendants’ “allegedly unlawful payments occurred completely outside the United States between a Japanese corporation ... and a Chinese corporation,” and that “[t]he money was to be transferred to a bank in Hong Kong.”
In contrast to
Rotee,
then, AWB’s use of a United States bank facility was integral to its scheme to pay kickbacks to the Iraqi government, and those kickbacks, in turn, allegedly enabled AWB to secure the wheat contracts necessary to maintain its monopoly in the Iraqi wheat market. As a result, even though AWB did not ship any wheat into or from the United States, its use of a bank located within the United States clearly occurred “within the flow of’ its commercial transactions with Iraq.
Gulf Oil,
In sum, the majority of plaintiffs’ allegations against AWB involve conduct outside the reach of United States antitrust laws. Specifically, plaintiffs’ antitrust claims pursuant to §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (Counts I and II), and § 3 of the Clayton Act (Count III), must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and only their Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c) claim (Count V) may proceed on the merits.
B. Antitrust Standing
Although plaintiffs’ remaining antitrust claim alleges a violation of § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), the private right of action for such a claim is provided by § 4 of the Clayton Act,
id.
§ 15(a);
see Blue Tree Hotels Inv., Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.,
To establish antitrust standing, a private plaintiff must both allege “antitrust injury” and establish that it is an “ ‘efficient enforcer’ to assert a private antitrust claim.”
Port Dock,
(1) whether the violation was a direct or remote cause of the injury; (2) whether there is an identifiable class of other persons whose self-interest would normally lead them to sue for the violation; (3) whether the injury was speculative; *250 and (4) whether there is a risk that other plaintiffs would be entitled to recover duplicative damages or that damages would be difficult to apportion among possible victims of antitrust injury.
Port Dock,
As explained above,
14
given the multitude of factors affecting projected Ending Stocks, and hence wheat prices, in the United States, AWB’s conduct was, at most, only a “but for” cause of plaintiffs’ asserted injury as it is entirely “possible that the ... [decreased domestic wheat] prices for the specified period of time were due to factors wholly unrelated to defendants’ transactions” with the Iraqi government.
Ocean View Capital, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.,
No. 98 Civ. 4067,
In addition, plaintiffs — who are domestic wheat
farmers
who did not sell wheat to Iraq or even participate in the OFFP tender process — are not “efficient enforcerfs]” of the antitrust laws in this case, because,
inter alia,
“there is an identifiable class of other persons whose self-interest would normally lead them to sue for the viola
tion”
— ie., domestic wheat
exporters
who actually attempted to sell wheat to Iraq through the OFFP but were precluded from doing so as a result of AWB’s conduct.
Port Dock,
In sum, plaintiffs can demonstrate neither that they suffered antitrust injury nor that they are “efficient enforcerfs]” of the antitrust laws in this case.
Paycom,
II. RICO Claim
In addition to alleging violations of the antitrust laws, plaintiffs also allege that AWB violated the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), by engaging in an “enterprise” which was allegedly “designed to and did unlawfully funnel U.S. dollars to the Government of Iraq and achieve, maintain, and exploit AWB’s monopoly position in the Iraqi wheat market.” (Comply 130.) As with plaintiffs’ antitrust claims, AWB moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ RICO claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In
North South Finance Corp. v. Al-Turki,
the Second Circuit held that
*252
while foreign entities are not, due to their foreign status alone, shielded from RICO’s reach, the statute’s extraterritorial application is limited.
As explained above, the purported domestic “effect” of AWB’s extraterritorial
conduct
— i.e., a decrease in the prices at which plaintiffs could sell their wheat in the United States — was simply not a “direct” result of that conduct.
Nasser,
Plaintiffs thus cannot satisfy either the effects or conduct tests for the extraterritorial application of the RICO statute. Accordingly, their RICO claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant AWB’s motion to dismiss the consolidated class action complaint (Doc. # 13) is granted in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. AWB Limited, an Australian corporation, "is the exclusive manager and marketer of all bulk wheat exports from Australia,” and AWB (U.S.A.) Limited, a Delaware corporation, is a subsidiary wholly owned and controlled by AWB Limited. (Compl-¶¶ 12-13.) All references to the complaint in this opinion are to the Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Doc. # 6).
. Wheat futures contracts are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade, the Kansas City Board of Trade, and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange. (Complri 56.) According to plaintiffs, "[ajlthough each exchange focuses on different classes of wheat, prices on each exchange tend to move together.” (Id.)
. The complaint references two independent reports, one commissioned by the United Nations and the other by the Australian government, detailing the illicit activities of the Iraqi regime in relation to its participation in the OFFP. (Compl-¶¶ 99-101.) The Court has considered these reports in assessing the instant motion to dismiss.
See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,
. In contrast, where a defendant challenges the factual basis for subject matter jurisdiction, a court is "not obligated to accord presumptive truthfulness to the allegations of the complaint” and "may weigh the evidence on the record accompanying the Rule 12(b) (1) motion, or hold an evidentiary hearing, and decide for itself the merits of the jurisdictional dispute.”
Dow Jones,
. Prior to the FTAIA's enactment, courts commonly applied the "effects test,” developed by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Alu
*243
minum Co. of America (“Alcoa”),
. Although the Second Circuit in
Filetech
characterized the FTAIA’s limitations as a constraint on courts’ "jurisdiction,”
. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, A Global Need for Grain That Farms Can’t Fill, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2008, at A1 (noting that global prices for wheat have recently “tripled, partly because of a drought in Australia and bad harvests elsewhere and also because of unslaked global demand for crackers, bread and noodles").
. In 1998, immediately prior to the alleged market foreclosure, Iraq purchased 6% (or 0.18 mmt) of its wheat from the United States. (ComplA 67.) United States wheat exports during that same time averaged 31.1 mmt annually, of which 13.8 mmt was hard red winter wheat. (Id. ¶ 52.) Iraqi purchases of U.S.-grown wheat thus constituted 0.58 percent of total U.S. wheat exports and 1.3 percent of total U.S. hard red winter wheat exports. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 61, 67.) Although it is possible that U.S-grown wheat could have captured more than a 6% share of the Iraqi wheat market had the market remained open to U.S.-grown wheat from 1999 to 2003, any estimate of the market share U.S.-grown wheat would have had absent the alleged conspiracy would be inherently speculative, particularly given the deteriorating relations between the two countries that ultimately led to the invasion of Iraq by U.S. forces in March 2003.
.Specifically, plaintiffs’ citation to
Daishowa International v. North Coast Export Co.,
No. 81 Civ. 574,
. See infra at 250.
. Because plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficiently "direct” effect on domestic trade or commerce, the Court need not address whether that effect was "substantial” or "reasonably foreseeable,” 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l), or whether that effect properly "gives rise” to a Sherman Act claim, id. § 6a(2).
. Although one of the defendants in this action is AWB (U.S.A.) Limited, a Delaware corporation that is wholly owned and controlled by defendant AWB Limited, an Australian corporation (Compl.OT 12-13), plaintiffs do not allege that the American subsidiary engaged in any independent commercial transactions with the government of Iraq.
.
Gulf Oil
explained that, in contrast to § 1 of the Sherman Act, the "in commerce” language of the Robinson-Patman Act extends only to persons or activities "within the flow” of commerce among the states or with foreign
nations
— i.e., "the practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services for interstate [or foreign] markets and their transport and distribution to the consumer”— and does not extend to all activities that “affect” such commerce.
Gulf Oil,
. See supra at 245-46.
. Indeed, plaintiffs’ claimed injury in this case is significantly more indirect than the injury alleged by the plaintiffs in
Illinois Brick Co.
v.
Illinois,
. Plaintiffs contend that wheat exporters are inferior antitrust plaintiffs because "unlike American wheat farmers, who actually manifested direct ‘out of pocket’ losses when they sold their wheat at depressed prices, any injuries claimed by the exporter would be highly speculative,
i.e.,
the profits it would have made had it been able to procure and deliver the wheat for less than its winning bid price.” (P. Mem. 18.) Plaintiffs’ argument rests on their factual contention — advanced for the first time in their opposition brief (and not in their pleadings) — that "[wjhen an exporter bids on a wheat tender, it does not actually possess the wheat that it offers to sell. Instead it merely offers a price at which it believes it could procure and deliver the wheat.”
(Id.)
Thus, according to plaintiffs, "[a]n exporter may profit or lose money on any contract, depending on whether and how much wheat prices have gone up between the bid on the tender and the actual purchase of the wheat.”
(Id.)
Even if plaintiffs’ description of the export tender/bidding process is accurate, the injuries suffered by wheat exporters are certainly no more speculative than plaintiffs' claimed injuries, which would require the Court to engage in "hopeless speculation concerning the relative effect of an alleged conspiracy in the market [for wheat in Iraq] on the price of [wheat in United States], where countless other market variables could have intervened to affect those pricing decisions.”
Reading Indus., Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
. For the same reasons, even apart from the jurisdictional infirmity of plaintiffs' Sherman Act and Clayton Act claims, those claims would still have to be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for lack of antitrust standing.
See Blue Tree Hotels,
. Although
Al-Turki
characterized the limit on RICO's extraterritorial application as a constraint on courts’ “subject-matter jurisdiction,”
. Although the Second Circuit recognized that the application to RICO of these two tests, drawn from the securities and antitrust contexts, may not be appropriate,
see
. The Second Circuit in
Al-Turki
also described a slightly different version of the effects test based on the antitrust laws.
See Al-Turki,
. See supra at 245-46.
.
Ayyash,
. As a result, even if plaintiffs could overcome AWB's jurisdictional challenge, their RICO claim would still be dismissed for lack of standing because their injury was not "proximately caused” by defendants’ acts.
Baisch,
