Aрpellee, L. D. Oliver, instituted this suit against appellant, V. C. Bos, in the district court of Limestone county, Tes., Seventy-Seventh judicial district, to enjoin him and all peace officers of the state of Texas, whose names werе alleged to be unknown to appel-lee, from arresting, attempting to arrest, or prosecuting appellee for any violation of chapter 277 of the general laws enacted by the Legislature at its regular session in 1931 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 911b, § 1 et seq.). Said act provides for control and regulation by the railroad commission of motor-propelled vehicles used in transporting property for compensation or hirе' over the public highways of this state. Appellee alleged that he resided in Limestone county, and that аppellant was the regularly elected, qualified, and acting sheriff of Robertson county, Tex. Ap-pellee presented his petition, duly verified, to the judge of the district court of said county in chambers. Said judge, upоn consideration thereof, made an order restraining appellant and all other peacе officers of the state of Texas, and each of them, from arresting or attempting to arrest apрellee, or from in any manner interfering with him for any violation of the provisions of the act aforesaid. By the terms of said order, said restraint was to continue pending further order of the court. Appellee gavе an injunction bond in the penal sum fixed by the court and made the same payable to appellant аlone. A temporary writ of injunction returnable to said court was issued in pursuance of said order on Octоber 19, 1931, but no service thereof is shown. Appellant, on .the 26th day of October, 1931, perfected an appeal from said order.
Opinion.
Appellant contends that the district court of Limestone county was without authority tо grant such temporary injunction, and, further, without authority to make the same returnable to said court. The avеr-ments of appellee’s petition show affirmatively that appellant is the duly qualified and acting sheriff of Robertson county, and that he is sued in such capacity. I-Iis official authority to arrest or attempt to arrest appel-lee for alleged violations of the provisions of said act is necessarily cоnfined to the limits of said county. Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. 1,
Appellee contends that the district court of Limestone county had jurisdiction of this suit and authority to issue the temporary injunction, and tо make the same returnable thereto, on -the ground that notwithstanding appellant alone was named as defendant therein, he complained in his petition of all the peace officers of the state, alleging that their several names were unknown to him, and that he thereby made all the same parties defendant herein. He further contends in this connection that this court judicially knows that peace officers reside and function in said county and that such peace officers, .though not named in his petition, were nevеrtheless parties defendant herein within the meaning of article 4656 above cited. As above stated, appellee did not recognize any other defendant in this suit than appellant when he made and filed his injunctiоn bond herein. Were we to concede that appellee’s petition is sufficient, under the doctrinе of representation, to sustain an order restraining not only appellant, but also all the other peace officers in the state, such concession would not show the authority of the court to grant the tеmporary injunction herein and make the same returnable thereto, because only the persons named in the record in a class suit are parties thereto. Others of such class, although interested in the subject-matter of the litigation, are not parties thereto. City of Dallas v. Armour & Co. (Tex. Civ. App.)
Since the court did not have authority to grant the injunction complained of herein, the same is here dissolved.