*1 320 v. JACOBS BOWSER REDD MILLER v. v. BLACK PAYNE Opinion of the Court Purpose. Vehicle Accident Claims Act — Automobiles —Motor 1. Claims is purpose Vehicle Accident Act The of the Motor damage un- who suffer attributable to relief to those render meaningful recovery (MCLA no and who have insured motorists seq.). et 257.1101 § Classification—Legislative 2. Statutes — Discretion. given great drawing Legislature is latitude classifications regulatory legislation. social, economic, or effect Act —Work- Vehicle Accident Claims 3. Automobiles —Motor Compensation Law. —Statutes—Constitutional men’s Vehicle Accident Claims Act which Motor The section apply- from prevents those covered workmen’s payment Claims Eund for ing Vehicle Accident to the Motor being injured by an uninsured motorist damages after in- discriminatory, in several other unconstitutionally because indem- persons to reach alternative the act allows other stances (MCLA prohibiting recovery from the fund nities without seq.). et 257.1101 § by Levin, Law. 4. Statutes —Classification—Constitutional discrimination is not an invidious a statute A classification compelling merely lacks the because force of classification [1, [2, 4-8,12-15] 16 Am [16] Unsatisfied 3, 7-11,14,15] tion §301. 16 Am claimant provisions Jur References claim and 2d, Constitutional Law Am Jur other Jur judgment deduction for Points 2d, sources. 2d, Constitutional Law Automobiles and statutes; from awards of sums ALR3d 836. Headnotes Validity Highway et collectible construc- seq. Traffic v. logic incongruous; or is unless the invidious, classification legislative judgment. the courts with the interfere Legislative Judgments. 5. Statutes — *2 The courts have not been commissioned substitute their con- cepts legislative practical and common sense the of fairness for judgments compromises which must be made in order to legislation problems enact innovative addressed to the social times; courts, passing our the when the constitutional- of if ity ignore statutés, rough accomodations, such the need of for may discourage Legislature dealing courts the the with from problem a at all. Statutes—Classification—Equal 6. Constitutional Pro- Law — tection —Constitutional Standard. Equal A does not violate this state’s Protection classification classification; clause there is reasonable basis the the if for reasonable it basis test must be used is the because most recent pronouncement Supreme the United States Court and because of Michigan Supreme previously the Court has declared that the Michigan Equal thing Protection clause means the same as the Equal Federal Protection clause. Vehicle Automobiles —Motor Accident Claims Fund —Work- Compensation men’s —Classification—Constitutional Law. statutory prevents by The that those covered work- classification compensation applying men’s the Motor Vehicle Acci- from payment being dent Claims Fund in an involved auto- after mobile accident with an uninsured motorist must be sustained classification; there is reasonable basis the the Court if light Appeals must, in the decisions the United States of of of Michigan Supreme Courts, proceed assumption on the competing interests, comparing not balance the the rela- importance governmental tive to the discriminated class the of denied sup- and the asserted state interest advanced in benefit port (MCLA seq.J. the § 257.1101 et of classification — — 8. Automobiles Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act Work- Compensation — — — men’s Classification Reasonableness Burden of Proof. state, claimant, showing has the burden of precluding reasonableness those entitled classification compensation recovering to workmen’s the Motor from frém Vehicle Accident Claims Fund on an account accident with motorist; an uninsured the burden is on the state because of universality sought problem to be dealt social Act,
With the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims the omni- general presence ameliorated, the risk breadth of of recovery right residents, and the narrow state exclu- —all employ- in the course their sion—those residents they ment so that are covered (MCLA seq./ 257.1101 et Vehicle Accident Claims Act —Insurance 9. Automobiles —Motor Coverage Purpose. Motorist Code —Uninsured — amending Act and the act Motor Accident Claims Vehicle protecting policy person providing insurance code against personal injury protects also caused loss from protection motorist unless uninsured motorist has uninsured rejected materia; pari are in the amendment been sought encourage purchase uninsured insurance code coverage thus, and, motorist reduce number claims Vehicle Accident Claims Fund. the Motor 10. AUTOMOBILES' —MOTOR ACCIDENT ACT-WORK- VEHICLE CLAIMS Recovery Purpose. Compensation — —Exclusion MEN’S *3 barring by legislative purpose in The those covered workmen’s compensation recovery the Vehicle Accident Motor from from damages by an caused uninsured motorist Claims Fund for already policy employees not the had was based on the recovery, adequate only the minimum source because of group having recovery a collateral source barred from of proceeding against injured employees the were entitled fund (MCLA compensation seq./ to workmen’s 257.1101 et Act —Work- Vehicle Accident Claims 11. Automobiles —Motor Recovery Purpose. Compensation from — men’s —Exclusion Legislature’s purpose prohibiting employees who are compensation suing by the covered Motor from by injuries uninsured Vehicle Accident Claims Fund caused for by simply exposure the elimina- was reduce motorists fund’s ting potential who, readily group claimants identifiable of protection (MCLA-§ arguably, in less 257.1101 were need of seq./ et Law. 12. Statutes —Classification—Constitutional may public policy grant The state sound reasons benefits for of deny to some like to others. benefits Basis, 13. Statutes —Classification—Rational objective A in a the statute which does classification foster impelled which it is not rational. Bowses v. 14. Automobiles —Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act —Work- prom Compensation Becovery men’s —Exclusion —Beasonable- ness. barring
The reasonableness the claims dam- of classification for ages against uninsured motorists the Motor Vehicle Ac- from by employees cident Claims Fund entitled to workmen’s com- pensation judged light objective sought must be in the the by to be preservation served classification —the soundness; bears no reason- fund’s financial if classification relationship able purpose protecting to the fund’s soundness, actuarial is irrational. classification 15. Automobiles —Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act —Work- Compensation prom Becovery men’s —Exclusion —Beasonable- ness. questioning constitutionality barring the_provision Actions suing those covered workmen’s the Motor from injuries Vehicle Accident Claims Fund caused uninsured taking motorists must be remanded evi- additional dence, showing present condition, because fund’s financiad constitutionality provision depends on whether it is reasonably preservation related to the actuarial fund’s (MCLA seqj. 257.1101 et soundness Changed 16. Statutes —Constitutional Law — Conditions. change conditions, facts, A or circumstances render un- constitutional a valid statute when enacted. Appeals Wayne, George Bowles, E. Horace Gilmore, W. and. Thomas D. Ronmell, JJ. Sub- mitted Division at Detroit. February 2, 1971, (Docket Nos. 8353, 8464.) Decided October 19, 1971.
Complaint John Anthony Paul *4 Jacobs, E. Furtaw, Charles of Secretary and the Director State, as of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims for Fund, injuries for damages received an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. Summary judgment granted defendant Secretary State. Plaintiff (No. appeals. 8197.) 36 Mich op Opinion the Court against
Complaint Miller, Jr., E. Charles injuries damages received for for Redd James Secretary as State, The an automobile accident. Claims Fund, Accident the Motor Director of Vehicle Secretary State’s as a defendant. intervened judgment summary denied. The Secre- motion for (No. 8353.) appeals. tary of State Payne Harvey Dorothy Complaint by Ann injuries damages for for Black Black and Charles Secretary The accident. in an automobile received Accident of the Motor Vehicle Director State, Secretary as a defendant. Fund intervened Claims judgment summary denied. motion for State’s (No. 8464.) appeals. Secretary of State for Reversed and remanded consolidated. Cases plaintiff for trial as Bowser; remanded trial as Payne. plaintiffs Miller and (Theodore Rosenberg, Miller M. Sheldon L. plaintiffs. counsel), Attorney Kelley, A. General, Robert
Frank J. Joseph Derengoski, Bilitske B. General, Solicitor Attorney Carlsen, General, K. Assistants and Carl Special Attorney Botvin, John F. Assistant Secretary defendant State. General, B. and R. J., Before: C. Burns Lesinski, Levin, JJ. are In the before us we cases
Lesinski, C. determining squarely ality the constitution- faced with portion Accident Vehicle of that Motor (hereinafter Act) prevents which Act Claims covered those *5 Opinion op the Court
applying to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims (hereinafter Fund) payment. Fund MCLA seq. (Stat § § et Ann 257.1101, 1968 Rev et 9.2801, seq.). adjudication question,
To facilitate of this this captioned ordered that the Court three causes above presently All be consolidated. cases before factually plaintiffs us are operators identical: are taxicab scope while
who, in course and of their employment, were automobile accidents allegedly by plain- caused uninsured motorists. The brought tiffs the instant actions the various Secretary uninsured motorists and the State representative capacity his as administrator of the Secretary, relying Fund. In each of the cases, sought on against Act, dismissal of the action way by summary
the Fund of motion judgment. Plaintiffs resisted these motions con- tending that the section In was unconstitutional. upheld § the Bowser case, the trial court 29 as con- granted Secretary’s stitutional and motion. In Payne, Miller the trial courts struck down the Equal section as violative Protection clause of the Federal and State Constitutions; these lower Secretary’s preju- courts denied the motions with dice. recovery by 29 of
Section
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injured person
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Fund if the claimant respect
covered workmen’s
with
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such
Plaintiffs assert that
this
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classification is
and con-
Equal
travenes the
Protection clause. The Secre-
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purpose
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Jersey
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1New
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research,
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damage
is to render
relief
those who suffer
at-
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who have no
meaningful recovery),
Legislature’s
classifica-
prohibiting
tion
covered
those
workmen’s com-
pensation
proceeding against
the Fund is a
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given weight by reference to decisions from the
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of other
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states.
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Corp.
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Life
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576);
It remains axiomatic that is to given great drawing latitude in classifications regulatory legislation. to effect social, economic, Employment Security supra; Fox v. Commission, Levy (88 (1968), v. Louisiana 68 US CtS 436). L 20 Ed 2d This holds true for uninsured or judgment unsatisfied fund statutes as well. See Allied American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Com (150 missioner Motor Vehicles 219Md 607 421). A2d See, also, Naudzius Lahr Mich 216, 223. Opinion op the Court persuaded by Secretary’s argu- would be tbe
We were it for the ment, fact that, several other persons Act instances, the allows other to reach prohibiting recovery alternative indemnities without from the Fund. availability any totally injured party looking bars to the recovery 22(4) Fund amount.2 But (Stat § 257.1122(4) Act, MCLA Ann 1968 Rev [4]), permits § 9.2822 the beneficiaries of a in- life policy surance to recover from the Fund for the person death of a caused an uninsured motorist. Certainly may be said that the existence of life compensate adequately insurance could survivors persons for their loss. The Act allows these incongruously, employee recover and, refuses an §¿3(2) look to the Fund for relief. Furthermore, (Stat § 257.1123(2) MCLA Act, Ann 1968Rev [2]), permits apply payment 9.2823 one to out *7 exhausting coverage of the Fund even after one’s private policy (pre- aon of automobile insurance sumably coverage existing uninsured motorist in many policies). such App
In Green v. Blicharski 32 Mich plaintiff injured by was an uninsured motorist. private Plaintiff owned a automobile insurance policy coverage. with uninsured motorist Plaintiff’s paid plaintiff plaintiff insurer $7,250 after the insurer then arbitrated claim. Plaintiff sought damages from the uninsured motorist and plaintiff judgment the Fund; obtained a for $16,000. workmen’s which made, is Rev damages For would 9.2829) unable to sue the example, inflieted compensation go indicates uncompensated. upon a reading him award that Fund, regardless by of MCLA an uninsured motorist and to with employee present 257.1129 who suffers value $30,000 (Stat in damages $50,000 $20,000 Ann whom a Opinion op Court Secretary held in that the
This that case Court was judgment pay- liable the excess of the over the plaintiff ment made the insurer. had However, compensation the Green case received workmen’s he have been $7,250, award would unable to se- cure paid amount from Fund in excess employer
to him or his workmen’s compensation carrier. legislative legislation, aim this social compensate injured by
noted is to those above, unin- sured tortfeasors who would otherwise have had no recovery. source as we have But, some seen, persons recovery who have available avenues are permitted injured employees to reach the Fund but agree Leg- are not. We are that the constrained arbitrarily islature has carved out this class from who those have recourse to Fund. This classifi- compelling cation is one made without the force of logic; unconstitutionally discriminatory. we find Employment Security
In Fox v. Commission, supra, examples several similar of discrimination challenged. weekly unemploy- were In case, were ment benefits denied statute those receiv- ing permanent, partial permanent, tempo- total rary disability compensation payments workmen’s receiving weekly as well as to those workmen’s compensation per- benefits. However, the statute recipients compensation mitted death, workmen’s “specific benefits, benefits, loss” and those who had accept elected their “lump unemployment award sum” to receive *8 compensation. Noting object of the statute preclude possibility duplication was benefits, Court held the distinctions to arbi- trary persons since some were because of the able, Bowser v. 329 by Levin, J. statutory unemployment to reach scheme, benefits similarly and others situated were not.3 We reverse and remand the Bowser case with proceed order the trial court to trial for a liability. determination Payne in Miller remand
We cases with try liability. orders to the cases so as to fix public question being No costs, involved. J., R B. Burns, concurred. (dissenting). Although I am in com-
plete sympathy by my with the result reached beyond colleagues, presented the record our legislative authority challenged to declare the clas- sification unconstitutional. again
Time we been have instructed that “the Legislature recognize degrees adapt of evil and legislation ( accordingly” [1915], its Truaxv. Raich [36 131]), 239 43 L 33, US S 60 Ct Ed that it 7, need possible (Pat “the not cover whole abuses” field Pennsylvania [1914] [34 sone 138, v. 232 144 US 539]), “logical appro 281, Ct 58 L Ed 5 and priateness objects of the inclusion or exclusion of * * * persons required. is not At exact rate, adaptation wisdom and nice are remedies required by (Heath the Fourteenth Amendment” Milligan Manufacturing Company & Worst [28 338, 207 US 52 L [1907], 354, 114, Ct Ed S 236]). (1931), Accord: v. Lahr Naudzius Mich City 216; Mutchall v. Kalamazoo Mich 215, Tracer 227; 291; v. Bushre People Chapman (1942), 301 Mich unconstitutional carrier a derivative cause of action. We need not grants pass upon employer question or his workmen’s whether declaring *9 36 Mich by Levin,
Dissent symmetry A “lack of does not abstract matter. question practical Patsone The one”. Penn sylvania, supra, p Merely because classifica may colleagues my argue, tion lack, this case compelling logic” “incongruous” “the force or is accomplishes does not mean that it an “invidious challenged discrimination”. unless And, dis properly crimination is invidious, we inter legislative judgment. fere with the Wolodzko v. Wayne Judge Circuit 528, 534 (discussed infra) in fn ; see, also, cases cited and part discussed I, infra.
Logic reasoning carry and inductive can one down path: a false
(a) majority points § out that 22(4) provides Motor Vehicle Accident Act1 Claims policy amounts recoverable under of life insur- any policy, agreement ance or under contract or providing payment any hospital for the or medi- expenses determining cal are not deducted in liability of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims majority preferential Fund. The use this treatment argument of such insurance recoveries as an challenged their buttress conclusion that the classi- distinguishing injured persons between fication— uninsured they based
motorists on are en- whether titled to receive workmen’s benefits injuries illogical, on account of their without —is appreciating logic Surely where their takes them. Legislature clearly the fund—which the intended ordinarily only would be liable extent the damages forthcoming are “excess” of amounts recovery from other sources not now be —is placed par potentially on a with all others who are possible, liable in order to if achieve, MCLA 257.1122 et seq. (Stat Ann 1968 Rev 9.2822 et seq.) v. by .Levin, J. persons logical symmetry for all in- abstract jured by vehicles in relation to those of uninsured injured persons are entitled to who recover such hospital expense or medical life insur- insurance damages. proceeds account of their ance (b) we be those Nor should troubled that persons carry who uninsured motorist insurance *10 may protection also from the if their recover fund damages exceed the amounts received from their Dairyland As in insurers. observed Oatis v. own Company (1969), App Insurance 20 Mich 367, 372, Legislature encouraged “with the statute has purchase coverage”. of uninsured motorist If possible any- not to it were from the recover fund damages excess of the suffered over the amount from one’s own insurer, recovered there would purchase little incentive uninsured motorist cov- erage. reject policyholders Informed unin- would coverage knowledge sured motorist secure in the they damaged by that were if an uninsured motorist they against proceed could and all fund recover they they purchase could recover were unin- coverage. motorist sured
(c) injured Persons who are who motorists liability $10,000 are insured cannot recover Surely prepared all from the fund. at we are not to declare that limitation unconstitutional because persons injured who are uninsured motorists and carry protection $10,000 who uninsured motorist may proceed against both their insurers the fund.
(d) majority’s employees Under the decision in- jured by can uninsured motorists now collect from though they the fund even are entitled to recover benefits, without, would appear, reduction on workmen’s com- account by Levin, infra). pensation paid (see part VI, benefits This “illogical” inequity employees between creates injured by employees vehicles and uninsured motor injured by or insured other vehicles some manner regards employers’ rights subrogation in re- spect by employees recoverable to amounts third-party tortfeasors. apparent likely
It are more we than Legislature fully sym- harmonious achieve legislation metry legislation. prop- Before can erly be must declared unconstitutional we be able point shortcoming overriding sig- to a of more “compelling logic” nificance than mere lack of “incongruity”. We have not been commissioned to concepts substitute our of fairness and common practical legislative judgments sense for compromises which must be made order to enact legislation prob- innovative addressed to the social ignore rough lems of times. If our we the need for discourage Legisla- we accommodations well fearful that ture, we will extend its work into areas *11 beyond dealing problem intention, its from awith at all. plaintiffs
The in actions, these consolidated on appeal, injuries are taxicab drivers who suffered in automobile collisions that occurred in the course employment by company. of their a cab Workmen’s compensation paid benefits were them.
They commenced these actions the drivers owners other vehicles in involved the claiming And, collisions. the other vehicles they Secretary uninsured, were the served of State as director Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund. Secretary party
The as a State intervened separately defendant and moved in each action for v. by Levin, summary judgment on the of 29 of the basis act establishing the fund: respect
“Any person injury to such covered with compensation by workmen’s or law or death representative person personal permitted of such not be shall property except from the to recover fund age.”2 dam motions heard circuit
The were three different judges; judgment summary was entered favor fund in Bowser v. Jacobs, and denied #8197, Payne Miller Redd, Black, #8353, and #8464. question presented legislative
The is whether the barring person §in set forth classification 29, under covered the workmen’s law seeking from the accident claims de- fund, benefits prives equal those in the excluded class protection of the laws.
Although my I cannot to the subscribe view colleagues logic” “compelling lack of “in- congruity” challenged in classification renders may, it unconstitutional its classification face, indeed, the total factual be unconstitu- context, length For set tional. senting reasons forth at in this dis- opinion I would hold that constitution- ality classification be determined on cannot presented taking the record and remand for the finding. additional evidence fact further I. Michigan Supreme has Court declared that scope right equal pro- and nature of Michigan tection of the is the laws same under the (Const 2)§ Constitution art as it is under *12 2 MOLA Ann (Stat Supp 257.1129 9.2829). 1971 Cum 320 by Levin, Amendment to the Fourteenth United States Constitution.3 Supreme adopted frequently Court has and Our statutory the standard which
reiterated as challenged is tested, classification when as a equal protection principles denial of the laws, Supreme in 1911 the United summarized States Lindsley Company Court in v. Natural Carbonic Gas (31 (1911), 220 L 61, 337, US S Ct Ed 369), upheld validity where Court case prohibiting drilling in an act classifications mineral natural waters. Lindsley
In declared Court that the state power classify adoption exercise a in the “police laws” and that a classification not is inequality invalid merely in because it results some in practice. Only those classifications which have no purely “reasonable basis and, are arbi therefore, trary” deny equal protection of the laws. A any assume court will the existence of state of facts reasonably that can be conceived which will sustain the classification who and assails the classifica he carry proving tion must burden of does upon any essentially not rest reasonable is basis, but arbitrary.5
having some reasonable laws, but admits of take who merely in reasonable can be of facts at the time the law was enacted bell, Wyant 3Naudzius v. Lahr such a practice “1. The See Naudeius v. assails the Wyant from the regard, because it & conceived that would sustain Cannon law basis, it results equal protection & Cannon state the classification called in Foundry Company, supra, avoids is not made with Lahr, supra, pp 222, therefore the exercise of a Foundry some power what basis does not offend question, clause 253 Mich inequality. is done Company purely such classify if mathematical it, the 14th only arbitrary. 216, 222; wide law 223; Gauthier v. must be assumed. 3. When the classification in state of facts p when it must existence scope 514. Amendment 360 Mich adoption Gauthier v. nicety, carry of discretion is A of that state classification without that clause the burden reasonably Campbell, does because 4. One Camp police 514. any in *13 335 v. by Levin, Dissent J. the Michigan More Court re recently, Supreme its assimilation Federal affirmed of “reasonable adopted standard when a basis” rearticulation of by the United Supreme that standard States Court Maryland 366 420, 425, in McGowan v. US (1961), 6 L 1101, 2d a where (81 426 S Ed case 393), Ct a in law Sunday closing containing classifications 6 numerous were sustained. As earlier exemptions another still formulation indicated, by United of the reasonableness Supreme States Court basis standard been our adopted Supreme has Court: of “The prohibition equal goes clause protection no further than the invidious discrimination.”7 showing upon any basis, it does not is rest reasonable but Lindsley essentially Company arbitrary.” Natural Carbonic Gas 78, (31 337, 220 (1911), 61, 369). US 79 55 L Ed S Ct 6 proposition “The standards under which is this to be evaluated many precise set Although have been forth times this Court. no developed, has formula been the Court has held that the Fourteenth permits scope enacting Amendment States a wide in of discretion groups differently laws which affect some of citizens than others. safeguard only The constitutional is offended if the classification rests grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s ob- jective. legislatures presumed State are to have acted within their power despite that, practice, constitutional result the fact in laws their inequality. statutory in some A discrimination will not be set reasonably if justify aside state of facts be conceived to Maryland 420, it.” McGowan v. (1961), 425, 366 (81 US 426 S Ct 1101, L 393), quoted Wayne 6 Ed approvingly 2d in Wolodzko v. Judge Circuit (1969), 528, 382 533, Mich 534. Wayne Judge In Wolodzko v. Circuit 528, 382 533, Mich 534, Michigan Supreme validity provi- Court sustained the of a permits sion code company insurance which an insurance authorized to do of stay business this a state to obtain of execution judgment against the entire of a amount one its insureds even though the company’s liability amount insurance under the policy less judgment. than the amount of the The declared Court desirability carrying liability protec- “[t]he insurance for the public, statutory amount, tion of the encouragement some and the thereof which provision] nonarbitrary [the exhibits” reason special provided treatment insurance carriers. Optical Williamson Oklahoma, v. Lee Inc. (1955), 483, 348 US (75 489 v. S 461, L quoted Ct 563), Ed approvingly in Wolodzko Wayne Judge, supra, Circuit Through Levy p 534, fn Similarly, see Charity Hospital Louisiana Louisiana at New Orleans Board (88 Administrators 391 US S Ct L 436). Ed 2d by
II. Lindsley that a doctrine classification chal- lenged upheld upon will be if invidious it rests arbitrary reasonable basis—if it is not invidious or person challenging —and that the classification reasonably must hypothesized that no show state of facts can justify that would the classification has years in recent been re-examined United Supreme States Court.
In a considerable number cases the Court has “any-rationale-basis-for-the-elassi- declared that the analysis, appraising legislation fication” utilized in regulating industry, business does not circum- inquiry scribe the where the classification is “sus- pect” or the discrimination concerns a “fundamental right” “very that in and a such case the a burden, heavy justification”, burden must be carried legislation contending the state that the is valid.8 (1968), (89 In Williams v. Rhodes 393 30 23, US 24), voting rights S 21 L Ed 5,Ct a 2d the case, generalized Court moved a more toward one test, require reviewing weigh which a would court to interest of the individual and the interest of the 8 Loving Virginia (1967), 1, v. 8, (87 1817, 388 9 18 L US S Ct 1010) (statute prohibiting Ed 24 person marrying any a white from person v. invalid). other a person Similarly, than white see Skinner (1942), 535, Oklahoma (62 1110, 1655) 316 541 S 86 L US Ct Ed invalid; (statute providing for sterilization of habitual criminals held scrutiny” “strict of the classification in a sterilization law is essen ; tial) (65 Korematsu v. United 214, States 323 216 US S 193, L 194) (exclusion Japanese Ct 89 Ed of citizens of extraction beginning from certain areas coast with west at the the war Japan power; held to have been a valid exercise of but the the war Court legal rights observed: “All restrictions which curtail the civil * * * single immediately of a group suspect. racial are [T]he subject rigid Harper courts scrutiny.”); must them to the most v. Virginia (86 State Board 663, Elections S US 1079, 16 L Ct 2d 169) (poll invalid; Ed tax held “Where fundamental rights Clause, and liberties are the Equal asserted under Protection might closely classifications which scrutinized and invade or restrain must be them carefully confined.”) by Levin, “importance” making matter turn on the state, the interests at stake: to each firmly “It that Court has true this established Equal principle that the Protection the not Clause does every application make minor difference groups a different of our of laws to violation Con- many But we have also held times stitution. ‘invidious’ cannot be enacted without distinctions Equal Protection In deter- violation of Clause. mining Protection Equal whether or not state law violates the must consider the Clause, we facts law, circumstances behind which interests protecting, State claims interests disadvantaged by those who are of tion.” classifica- (Emphasis supplied.)9 Shapiro Thompson (1969),
In 618, US (89 600), L ruling Ct S Ed 2d recipients equal protection welfare are denied one-year residency the laws classification, which impinging right had the effect of to travel their constitutional freely state state, Court de- clared : reject appellants’
“At argument the outset, we *15 showing that a relationship mere of a rational be- waiting period tween the admittedly and these four permissible objectives justify state will suffice to Lindsley the classification. See v. Natural Carbonic Company [31 Gas 220 [1911], 61, US 78 S Ct 337, Flemming L 55 369, Ed 377]; v. Nestor [1960], 363 [80 603, US 611 S L Ct 4 Ed 1367, 1444]; 2d 1435, Maryland [81 McGowan 366 [1961], 420, US 426 399]. waiting-period Ct 6 L S Ed 1101, 393, 2d provision eligi- denies welfare benefits otherwise applicants solely they recently ble because have jurisdiction. moving moved into the inBut [395] 9 Similary, see Kramer v. Union Free US 621 (89 S Ct 1886, [23] L Ed 583). School District No. 15 320 338 by Levin, J. appellees to District Columbia or state state right, exercising clas constitutional were penalize exercise of to serves sification which promote necessary right, to be shown unless compelling governmental is unconstitutional. interest, [1942], v. Oklahoma 316 US
Cf Skinner . [62 1660]; 86 L Ed Kore 1110, 1655, 541 S Ct 535, [65 323 214, 216 [1944], matsu v. United States US Bates Little 194, 198]; L Ed Rock Ct 193, S [80 4 L 412, 516, 361 US S Ct Ed 2d [1960], 398, [1963], v. Verner US 486]; Sherbert 480, 406 971](Emphasis [83 L Ed 2d 1790, 10 965, S Ct Court.) by the Court said:
Later the on the here fun- classification touches “Since the right its constitu- movement, interstate damental judged by tionality the stricter must standard compelling promotes interest.” state of whether it Court.) (Emphasis by the Dandridge recently, in v. Wil more
However, (90 25 L 2d liams Ed US S Ct (90 491), L 2d 26 Ed reh den 398 S Ct US Supreme upholding 80), Court, the United States validity Maryland Depart regulation of a placing limit ment of Public absolute Welfare grant per month the amount of a under $250 program regardless size of the the AFDC family its adherence and its actual reiterated need, enunci traditional reasonable basis standard Lindsley, acknowledging did so ated “dramatically difference” was a real factual there was evolved— between cases which that standard mainly regulation concerning of busi cases “State presented industry” case there ness —and public wel which concerned administration economic fare most and hence “the basic assistance *16 v. by Levin, 3. beings”. impoverished human needs of Court declared: “In the and welfare, area economics social Equal violate the
state does not Protection Clause merely because the classifications made its laws imperfect. If the classification ‘rea are sonable has some
basis’, it not does offend the Constitution simply the classification ‘is not because made with nicety practice mathematical in or in because it results inequality’. Lindsley some Natural Carbonic supra, p (Emphasis supplied.) Co., Gas ridge 78.” Dand supra, p Williams, Mr. Harlan Justice concurred with the reserva- opinion, in rationality tion his that, standard of governs regard of classification in all cases without to the nature of the classification interest involved exception with the sole of racial classifications, higher legislative where a standard limits action, suggest and, he would thus, not different might apply standard if the interest was involved in the not area of “economics social welfare.”10 Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Brennan, majority explaining dissent, chided the for not why legislation a classification in “social welfare” judged developed should be the same standard regulation (p 520): in “economic” cases “We are told no more than this case falls ‘the area implica- of economics and social welfare’, with the tion that from They there the answer is obvious”. expressed evolving the view that the distinction equal protection cases between “fundamental” rights rights and other kinds of as to the standard validity which the of a classification would be judged They was not workable was valid. 2d 10Dandridge 80), 25 L Harlan, Ed 2d v. Williams J., 491), concurring. reh den 398 US 397 US (90 471, S 489, Ct (90 L S Ct Ed *17 by Levin, J. Dissent analysis “equal protection of this that said the case priori appreciably a is not advanced the defini- ‘right’, of a or otherwise. tion fundamental Rather [they supra] relying Rhodes, on Williams v. said, placed upon the concentration must be character of importance question, relative in classification in the class discriminated to individuals governmental they benefits that do not receive, support and the asserted State in interests classification”.11 pronouncement subject,
In on latest its Richardson 365, Graham v. 403 US 371, 372 (91 541), holding L29 Ed 2d 1848,1852; S Ct 534, Equal clause violative Protection state stat- denying welfare to utes benefits resident aliens or not resided in the aliens who have United States specified years, number of Court declared: equal protection principles, “Under traditional classify long a state broad discretion as retains [Cita as its classification has a tions basis. reasonable omitted.] so in This is ‘the area of economics Dandridge social and welfare.’ Williams But 397 US 471, Court’s decisions have alienage, established on that classifications based nationality like those race, based are inher subject ently suspect Aliens judicial scrutiny. and to close prime example class are of a ‘discrete (see minority and insular’ States United v. Carolene [58 Products [1938], 152, 153, Co. n. 4 144, US 1242]) 784; S Ct 82 L 778, 783, Ed heightened judicial appro whom such solicitude is priate.” apparent It is that the traditional stated in test, Lindsley regulation in a business case, has been 11Dandridge Williams, supra, pp 520, 521, Marshall, J., dis- senting. v. Jacobs by adequate many to deal with the varied
found kinds regulations with which the statutes courts confronted. No one formulation are now verbal adequate judge likely to and decide be all cases. by Michigan Supreme The statements Court Equal that the Protection clause means the same thing Michigan Constitution as it means made the Federal Constitution were at times when complete unanimity relatively there was Lindsley simplistic permit apropriate test would likely presented. resolution all cases Now propounded ap- other standards been have *18 by plied Supreme in cases some the United States running itself and in Court there is a debate that applied the Court as to standard or standards to be particular Michigan Supreme in cases, the Court might well conclude that to make has choice competing between the formulations. Michigan Supreme until
However, the de Court application Equal in the cides, of the Protection Michigan explicate clause in the to Constitution, and develop diversified standards unconstrained the Federal standards, we controlled arewe must, as attempt apply the doctrine of stare decisis,12 pertinent pronouncement the most recent of the Supreme United States Court as best we can. And appear Dandridge that would in be the statement v. Williams. It would seem that if the traditional governs reasonable propriety basis test the of a regulation controlling the distribution state funds recipients, to welfare that no a test more restrictive legislative power classify ap of state would plied by Supreme the United in States deter Court mining propriety exception the in a state affirming See Farrell (1969), Abendschein v. 382 Mich Abendschein v. Farrell App 662; 11 Mich Maxwell v. Maxwell (1969), 15 App 607, 614; Mich Hollerud v. Malamis 20 Mich App 748, 758. by Levin, against claims providing indemnification statute motorists. uninsured proceed deciding must case we this in
Thus, assumption balance com- we that importance comparing the relative peting interests, govern- of the class discriminated to the state interest and asserted denied, mental benefit support must classification. of the We in advanced if is a reasonable there classification sustain for it. basis Dandridge Supreme states in Court
While language Linds- governing does in as test the same Shapiro Dandridge, significant in ley, it is require persons Thompson, did not the Court negative any challenging classification to rea- sonably of facts that would sustain conceivable state The Court scru- classification as reasonable. justification regulation advanced tinized the finding concluded it substantial the state, rationally per month limitation was based the $250 points This free from invidious discrimination. adopt decisionally path which we should this case. right
Although
case is not
involved
this
(Williams
right
important
as the
to vote
as
Rhodes)13
*19
right
state
to travel from
to state
or the
(Lov
Thompson)
right marry
(Shapiro
the
v.
or
8),
ing
Virginia,
the classification
see fn
v.
nationality, race
us is
like one based on
before
not,
Virginia;
(Loving
inherently suspect
alienage,
v.
(such Graham
a classification
v.
Richardson),14
carving
challenged)
entire
of the
out
the one here
group
population Michigan
relatively
of
of
small
Chicago.
Ct
557, 21 L
But
Similarly,
(1969),
potential closely claimants should be more scruti repeatedly nized than the kinds classifications challenging approved leg in cases classifications in regulating industry. islation business and the Motor Under Vehicle Accident Act, Claims injured Michigan hy resident state this may, motor uninsured vehicle to the extent he does damages, from other sources for his not recover recourse to have the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims up $10,000 Fund for indemnification unless—the challenged injuries preclusion here were suf —his employment fered the course of his he is so that compensation entitled to workmen’s benefits.15 Un der accident if the claims the collateral act, source recovery is a source other than workmen’s com pensation collaterally the amount mere recovered is ly required to be deducted from amount of the damages may suffered before had recourse be fund; if but, the collateral source is workmen’s compensation, no recourse whatsoever had though damages fund even suffered sub stantially exceed the benefits allowed under the act.
Having legislation mind of the nature be- universality problem sought fore us, social omnipresence with, to be dealt of the risk amel- legislation, gen- iorated this breadth right recovery: Michigan, eral all residents of preclusion: and the narrowness of the residents employment, in the course their state, precluded pre- not the must citizen, show that the clusion is reasonable. emphasized departure
It should be that no governing standard is ultimate intended. The Ann MCLA Rev 1971 Cum §§ §§ 9.2807, 257.1107, 257.1122, 257.1123, Supp 9.2822, 9.2823, 9.2825) ; 9.2829). MCLA 257.1129 257.1125 (Stat (Stat Ann *20 320 344 by J. Dissent Levin, question the Is the remains same: classification conversely rational;16 stated, or reasonable is arbitrary? adopt only I classification or invidious approach consistently followed United Supreme (including recent cases States Court all Dcmdridge case) involving regulation not industry. or business cases cited in fn 38. See, also, the reasonableness a classification in When general legislation nature and breadth this legislation challenged, explicate is the State must factually support, may rely and the courts conjure justification up, the asserted for the reviewing It is classification. then court justification determine whether the asserted explicated supported, so classification, rea- arbitrary. sonable, not invidious or III. Under Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, in 1965,17 enacted recourse be had to the fund per- established under act recover for death, injury, damage property sonal suffered Michigan resident18 in this occasioned state uninsured vehicle,19 motor motorist,20 an unidentified fication legitimate at for the Rev other § § 257.1125 257.1107 257.1113 [16] New Orleans PA § See The act provided by MCLA 257.1106 MCLA 257.1112 states et 9.2801 wrongful is invidious.) Levy children, (Stat (Stat (Stat § § protects only Louisiana v. which recourse of a No seq.). this Ann 1968 Rev Board Ann 1971 Cum Supp Ann death of their mother is not rational and the classi but act (Stat (Stat precluding MCLA Through Rev § Administrators, afforded to residents of residents of Ann 1971 Cum Supp Ann 1971 Cum § § 9.2825). 9.2807). 257.1101 et substantially illegitimate 9.2813). Charity Hospital Michigan supra Supp seq. children, similar (a Michigan. § § (Stat 9.2806); 9.2812); law residents character authorizing Ann 1968 Louisiana MCLA MCLA MCLA suing by vehicle the owner’s
or motor driven without con- *21 sent.21 deemed uninsured unless
A vehicle is there is in liability policy requirements meeting force a of responsibility policy motor vehicle lim- law with injury person, $10,000for to death one its or persons any for or $20,000 two more one acci- property damage.22 for dent, $5,000 and upon licensing To the fund, finance the annual required paid, a fee insured vehicle to an be $1 a an and fee of for uninsured In vehicle. $35 operation years of first five the State collected greater required pay amounts far than to claims expenses. Early year, and an sur- this accumulated plus Legislature, act was, transferred as a loan from the general to accident claims fund the state’s (see 37),
fund fn fee was eliminated $1 effective October-November, 1971, and for succeed- years report ing preceding period if the for the surplus equal shows that the fund has free to or greater gross than of the combined claims 40% expense claim and the for reserves, fee uninsured motor vehicles was increased to $45.23 liability of the fund is to $10,000 limited for injury person, or death of one for $20,000 two persons any or more one $5,000 accident, damage.24 property potential decreasing against
With a view to claims provided judgment may fund, it that no be (Stat MOLA 257.1115 Ann 1968 9.2815). Bev § § 22See (Stat MOLA 257.1102 9.2802); Ann 1968 Rev MOLA § § (Stat 257.501-257.532 Ann par 9.2201-9.2232), Rev §§ §§ ticularly MOLA (Stat 9.2220). gen 257.520 Ann 1968 See, Rev § § erally, Bennett 530; v. Pitts App 31 Mich Allstate Insurance Company Company v. Motor State Insurance 33 Mich PA 19, 63, Nos 257.1103, (Stat MOLA 257.1103a Ann §§ 9.2803, [1]). Curr Mat 9.2803 §§ (Stat 24MOLA 257.1123 Ann 9.2823). 1968 Bev App has an brought unless claimant action paid against all persons may whom he reasonably con action.25 sidered to have an The $10,000/$20,000/ on the $5,000 limitations fund’s monetary liability are claim the excess or applicable judgment over amount from any (a) recovered any other source in partial discharge of or damages (b) paid payable or insurer (except pursuant policies hospital life insurance or or medical poli person or other cies)26 pursuant policy of insurance, or agreement arrangement “providing payment compensation, or indemnity other An insurer benefits”.27 or other person whom such contractual or compensation, indemnity, other benefits are recoverable not, directly *22 recover from the indirectly, fund.28 At same the the legislative session which acci- dent claims was act enacted, Legislature the the amended insurance code that provide to unless a insured person under an automobile policy rejects uninsured motorist coverage any protecting policy him against liability his shall personal injury be deemed also to him from protect loss caused by uninsured motor vehicles.29
The two acts, the act the insurance amending code the accident claims are mater act, pari ia30
It is that the the apparent Legislature sought, by amendment made to encour- code, insurance App 335; App 367, 372. erally, 500.3010 [27] [25] [28] [26] MCLA MCLA PA MOLA 257.1122(5) MCLA v. Woods Wilson v. Steel Oatis (Stat § § § § 257.1122(2), 257.1122(4) 257.1107 No Progressive Ann Dairyland (1971), adding (Stat (Stat (Stat Cum (3) Mutual [29] Ann Insurance (Stat Supp § Ann 1968 Rev Ann Mich Insurance [1968] Ann 1968 Rev 1968 Rev 24.13010). Company Rev insurance § § Co. § 9.2822[5]). 9.2822[4]). 9.2807). § 9.2822[2], code, See, gen 20 Mich MOLA [3]). by Levin, purchase age unin- owners and drivers to insured protection, and that this insurance motorist sured reducing number with view done was against Accident Claims Motor Vehicle claims Fund.31
IV. legislative purpose that state contends The provide enacting act was to accident claims injured persons recovery minimum source of employees injured and that so motorists, uninsured compensation are entitled to recover who against proceeding from were barred benefits legislative judgment in- was that fund because adequate jured employees already minimum had recovery in the form of workmen’s com- source of argues pensation this The was benefits. state injured excluding employees a reasonable basis claims act, from the benefits of accident against the discrimination them that, therefore, not invidious. argument premise rests
The state’s on the Legislature persons having barred collateral recovery from recourse to the It sources of fund. only group having collateral did not. source adequate recovery, minimum, or otherwise, barred proceeding fund em- ployees entitled who are to workmen’s *23 benefits. person joint by
A iswho one tortfeasors, or more of whom is or another insured solvent and may recourse to fund for uninsured, háve what- portion judgment any of obtained that is not ever joint from an insured recovered or solvent tort- 31 Dairyland Company, supra. See Oatis v. Insurance App 320 348 Mich by under of feasor.32 life payable policy Proceeds or contract, agreement insurance or under a policy, hospital for tbe of or providing payment any med- ical need not be deducted from the expense ag- damages before recourse to the grieved person’s purchase fund.33 Insured drivers or owners who if may, uninsured motorist insurance their damages limits of their uninsured policy exceed motorist insurance have recourse to the fund protection, the excess.34
But could be argued, so, correctly sound reason owners and drivers allowing who motorist purchase uninsured insurance recover for the is that excess otherwise there would no be to purchase incentive uninsured motorist insurance. purchasers of uninsured motorist Permitting insur- ance to recover from the fund excess their damages over amounts under recoverable their policies mo- encourages purchase of uninsured Secretary 388; See Steel Wilson App v. Basch Mich State App Mich 459. 7(3) provides: Section the act secretary “The pay shall any out of the fund in respect amount judgment judgment given unless the in brought was an action persons against applicant all might reasonably whom the having prosecuted against be considered as in respect a cause of damages action question every person such judgment or dismissal.” MOLA 257.1107(3) (Stat Ann 1968 Rev 9.2807 § § [3])- 23(2) Section provides: the act any “Where any amount is recovered from in partial other source discharge for judgment, of the claim or or where judgment a claim or damages by provided paid by reduced payable or amount an insurer person, or other 22(2) (3) act, section or of this then the limitations set forth in subsection of this section shall applicable judgment to the excess claim or over the amount judgment which partially the claim or or is satisfied reduced 22(2) (3). section Any paid under amount out the fund excess of the amount authorized this section be recovered brought by secretary.” action MOLA 257.1123(2) (Stat Ann § [2]). 1968 Rev 9.2823 § 257.1122(4) MOLA (Stat Ann 1968 Rev 9.2822[4]). Dairyland Company, Oatis supra; Insurance Green v. Blicharski (1971), 32 *24 by Levin, Dissent J. long insurance torist and run serves to reduce aggregate against claims filed the fund. There argument goes, thus, so is, a reasonable basis classification; for the the classification achieves an overall reduction amounts of claims filed against the fund owners and drivers insured against loss caused uninsured motorists. general
If the pol- accident claims act reflected a icy barring having those a collateral source of recovery proceeding against from the fund with exceptions encourage purchase such as would protection that would constitute collateral question presented. source, then a different be would persons injured by since However, a solvent or in- joint purchase sured tortfeasor or who various kinds or, insurance indeed, who have collateral recovery except compensation, source of may proceed against unpaid their fund for dam- ages, rightly say we could not that discrimina- against injured employees tion to entitled work- compensation legislative men’s benefits based on persons having determination that a collateral recovery permitted pro- source should not be to against except ceed the fund extent that allow- ing exception encourage purchase would protection. collateral injured employee may,
An recover work indeed, regard men’s benefits without to his contributory negligence proving own and without employer his at However, be fault. in order to collect from the accident fund an claims employee every must, like other establish claimant, he was free of fault the uninsured at motorist fault. It not make sense, was does would distinction rational, draw a between group one another based whether in order prove they must a collateral source collect everyone fault when who free wishes themselves *25 proceed claims fund accident must of prove fault, himself free that the he was that that the amount motorist was at fault and uninsured damages the amount forth exceeds of the claimant’s coming source.35 from a collateral argument Legislature has determined that the adequate injured employees have an minimum that recovery in of workmen’s com- source the form of ap- pensation a certain while it has verbal benefits, clearly something peal, for a rationalization that Legislature If the was done for another reason. adequacy really of the com- was concerned with injured pensation paid employees it would not have altogether coverage of them from the excluded of accident claims act. The structure the accident anyone such from claims act is who recovers inadequate the accident claims fund received has recovery recovery no collateral from whatever open may employee, An be to him. sources everyone only like if can from the fund else, recover damages amount his of exceeds the amount forthcoming sources; collateral discrim- against injured employees designed ination is not compensation. redundancy to avoid
V. legislative purpose in dis- I am satisfied that the criminating against injured employees are en- who compensation titled to receive workmen’s benefits simply exposure by elim- was to reduce fund’s potential inating group readily of identifiable arguably, claimants were in less need who, persons holding can recover from Moreover, other life, their collateral groups health, medical potential sources expense, or accident without claimants proof of fault. insurance. the fund E.g., v. by provided protection legislation under consideration. When accident claims act was great there was concern that enacted the fees charged would not be sufficientto assure its actuarial Legislature, looking soundness. The means strengthening adopted expedient the fund, excluding injured employees who are entitled to recover benefits. Could it constitutionally do so? depends
That on the facts not facts, record. relatively Merely group because, here, small does not in excluded, itself demonstrate long that the classification is invidious. It has been recognized the state sound reasons of grant public policy deny benefits to some and like Op in Williamson benefits others. Lee Thus, (75 tical Oklahoma US S Ct *26 563), Supreme 99 L Ed United States Court, language adopted by Supreme also our de Court, clared : may “Evils the same field ofbe different dimen- proportions, requiring
sions and different remedies. Legislature [Citation may omitted.] so the Or think. step Or the reform at take one a time, address- ing phase problem itself to of the which seems legislative [Citation most acute to the mind. omit- ted.] Legislature may phase The select one of one apply remedy and neglecting field there, others.”36 Campbell, Wyant
In Gauthier v. & Cannon Found ry Michigan Co. 360 Mich 510, 517, Su preme unanimously Court sustained the constitu tionality of the placed $6,000 limitation then compensation workmen’s for industrial silicosis vic- Wayne Judge, supra, approvingly in Wolodzko Circuit Quoted p 534, fn 4. equal pro- history f.ims. reviewed The Court compensation legisla- workmen’s attacks on tection sustaining a decisions to earlier and referred tion employers than with less exempting classification employees and classifications specified number of a exempting and laborers, farm servants, household it had employees. observed that The Court casual become Legislature could established “firmly having its statu- evils without
attack one or several attack all of the it did not tory fail because effort in the field. evils whether, absent are led to wonder we “Indeed, exemption exception power legislative and this legislation any great social classification, upon the have written could ever been of our time
books.” pointed original Court out that Gauthier provision compensation made no act progressive
occupational and diseases protection provided for been sili- amendment had with a limitation of later victims, $3,000, first cosis subsequently $10,500. It $6,000 raised passage years after had taken 31 the work- act to secure sort cover- men’s foundry monetary age without a workers and Legislature probably not, would be- limitation the impact for the on the of concern economic cause industry possibility that foundries would jobs, pro- their would lose have close and workers *27 any protection at all. vided allowing impact industry re- on the of full The prior exposure covery, of the accumulated because resulting employees “ac- the disease and repercussions liability”, and the attendant crued employment already suffer- of workers current by stage ing some from disease, was, said the imposing a reasonable and Court, rational basis for dollar limitation on the amount recoverable though victims even no silicosis like limitation cir- cumscribed the amount recoverable victims of injuries compensable other or diseases. significantly relevantly
The added Court disposition (pp 524): our of this case suggest “There are facts in no this record which complained that the classification of was ‘obsolete’ * * * decedent at the as to time of his disablement. “Any argument that the scheme is now ‘obsolete’ toas future disabilities must wait consideration on presents which record some facts from which it might legislative reasoning be deduced that the had passage change all lost value with of time and circumstances”. Gauthier,
In unlike this case, record showed a substantial economic reason for the discrimination. nothing In this there ease, in the record to sub- legislative stantiate the decision that, order to preserve the actuarial soundness of the fund, reasonably necessary injured employees to foreclose proceeding against from the fund for excess damages their caused an uninsured motorist over the amount compensation. recoverable as opinion (last
Earlier in par- I this observed three agraphs part supra) having II, that, in mind the legislation nature of the before us, the breadth of general right recovery and the narrowness preclusion (employees course employment), precluded of their the state, not the preclusion citizen, must show is reasonable. provides The accident claims act the fees required paid to be collected motorists shall be into fund under established the act. act *28 Mich by
Dissent J. provide funding of not the deficits does which develop might expe- as a result adverse actuarial any it; rience is not stated whether deficits would be by legislative appropriation met the of monies by general taxation raised increase in the prescribed fees or some other manner. addressing problem requiring
In itself to a social appropriation public solution toward its the Legislature necessity funds, the must of draw lines. implorations public treasury The on the are bound- Legislatures, appropriat- less. the courts, have ing power and draw the fiscal lines. Courts are, legislative therefore, reluctant to declare that a designed public classification to conserve funds de- equal protection Dandridge nies of the laws. See supra, pp Williams, v. But 478-480, 487. see Sha- piro Thompson, supra, Employment p 633; Fox v. Security Commission 579.
The through accident claims fund is not financed appropriation money through general raised Legislature taxation. Nor has the decreed that surplus defray the fund should be used to other expenses government designated by Legis- surplus permanently lature or that a shall be trans- general ferred fund. The monies the acci- Legis- dent claims fund have been treated lature a kind trust fund the benefit of persons injured by uninsured motorists.37 rationality barring
The of the classification claims employees compen- entitled to workmen’s I am sation, satisfied, that was made classification, Legislature appropriated $9,000,000 year, has in plus annually by Legislature, terest at rate to be determined repay $45,000,000 year transferred earlier this from the accident claims general fund, fund being to the state the first annual installment payable in year beginning July the fiscal PA Nos 19, 63, MCLA 257.1103, (Stat 9.2803, Ann 257.1103a Curr Mat §§ §§ 9.2803[1]). v. Jacobs by Levin, integrity preserve fund, actuarial must objective sought light judged in the to be making classification. A classification served objective impelled which does not foster which Employment Security Fox See is not rational. *29 supra, p the Commission, 591. If discrimination injured employees against entitled to workmen’s compensation no reasonable relation- bears benefits purpose ship protecting of the actuarial to the of then discrimination fund, soundness is irrational.
The record is silent as to the number and the precluded by of the claims amounts exclusion injured employees of claims entitled to work- men’s benefits. It not been shown has injured excluding employees the claims of important substantial or contribution is made to preserving the actuarial soundness of the fund. showing, justified such a we Without in Legislature would validating preclusion ground on the that the reasonably excluding in
acted the claims injured employees of so as to conserve monies re- quired program to fund the uninsured motorist so although that, monies available were insufficient fully problem unpaid to deal with the entire social of judgments against partial motorists, uninsured problem. attack could be made on the actuarially We know that the fund is so sound, Legislature recently much so that the ordered a trans- general fer $45,000,000 as a loan to the state fund. Bather than decide these on the consolidated cases unproven assumptions indulge presump- basis support, tions which are without evidential the sound disposition and correct of these is to cases remand them to the trial court take to evidence additional finding question and for additional fact on the whether there a reasonable need to claims bar the App Mich by Levin, J. entitled injured employees compen- preserve
sation benefits so as actuarial sound- ness of the determined on a current fund, basis without reserves regard estab- extraordinary lished.38 dollars
Until and cents are figures presented, there no way deciding rationally presented question of the reasonableness rationality discrimination em- legislative ployees. facts should be determined the light of the as indicated in Gauthier because,
experience
there,
cited,
shown
the cases
change
facts,
38Recently
Lansing
Park
Board
Education
752, plaintiffs,
employees
administrative
a school
geographical
who lived
district
outside
boundaries of the
challenged
validity
district,
policy
requiring
such
of a
rule
personnel
live
among others,
within
ground,
the district
exception
persons
continuously
had
resided
who
outside
July
plaintiffs
of
tection of
equal pro-
since
*30
the district
denied
taking
laws. We remanded for the
of additional
saying
an
finding,
evidence
fact
pre-
additional
the record
permit
was insufficient
to
sented
a determination whether
July 1, 1962,
cutoff date
reasonable
“bears some
relation to
purpose
policy
Similarly,
intended
of the residence
rule”.
see
Hargrave (1971),
476,
Askew
(91
856, 858;
v.
401
479
US
S Ct
196, 199),
L28 Ed 2d
where the Court said:
program operates
“Since
manner in which the
bemay
critical
equal protection claim,
in the
decision of
that claim should
fully
not be
hearing.”
developing
decided without
the factual record at a
holding
appellate
Other eases
may
an
remand
court
taking
comparable
evidence
additional
in circumstances
City
to
present
Schappi
those
ease
Hammond
include
v.
(1927),
Bus
United
164, 171,
(48
Line
66,
218);
275
L
US
172
S Ct
72 Ed
States,
Alldredge
Bradshaw,
ex rel.
(CA3, 1970),
v.
432
1248, 1250;
F2d
165;
Smith
(1962),
v. Auditor General
366 Mich
Liquor
Robb
(1945),
604;
v.
Control Commission
311
Billiet
Mich
Aulgur
v.
(1969),
App 391;
18 Mich
(1968),
Roberts v. Rubin
13
652;
27);
Sharer
Tuck (1916),
Ky
(189
v.
172
200
SW
City Bridge
County
Sioux
(1923),
Co. Dakota
(194
v.
110 Neb 597
Transp.,
729);
Inc., Mayor
NW
A.
City
H.
Balti
v.
Council
&
249
&
(1968),
more
Township
(240
601);
Md 518
Mara
A2d
v.
Parsippany-Troy
(1955),
(119
449);
Hills
20
Garratt
Preckel
NJ 274
A2d
Dailey (1955)
v.
(279
1091);
Wash 2d
P2d
Bernier v.
(1925),
(236
242).
Although parties have not adverted these provisions statutory they may in their briefs, be rel- disposition evant correct of these cases. provision pro- If the in the accident claims act hibiting payment, directly indirectly, persons whose claims arise the manner described in 22 (5) of the act bars em- claims the fund ployers paid or their insurers who have injured by employee then benefits, Atlantic Walters 139 ALR US 39 Vigeant Similarly, 41MCLA MCLA 413.15 (157 382 Mich C. L. R. *31 973). NE § § (51 see Detroit Edison v. Postal 257.1122(5) 651, S 294 US Ct 497, 506; Co. 53 ALR (Stat Telegraph 75 Ed Ivey Aim 1968 (Stat Ann L Abie 867); Nashville, Company 690). Cable State Rev § (55 148 Fla 680 Company Bank S 17.189). Ct Department Rev § C. 486, Bryan & (1927), 260 Mass 9.2822[5]). S. (5 L. R. L So Ed Treasury 2d Co. 949); [282] by Levin,
an uninsured motorist who is entitled to workmen’s compensation might, proceed if also benefits he against fund, the accident claims receive more from 22(5) § than he if fund would receive were not part of the act. might, appropriate require
It therefore, be that recovery by injured employee an from the acci- dent claims fund reduced such amount he § 22(5) would have been to retain entitled if were part required, of the if act; then the in- exposure resulting creased the fund from allow- ing employee an from recover the fund substantially would be less than would it he if he is entitled to recover from the fund an amount that by 22(5), § is not reduced the amount which, hut payable employer employer’s would he to his or his insurer in reimbursement of workmen’s com- pensation paid employee. Reducing to the benefits injured employee’s recovery from the fund 22(5), payable the amount that, but for would he employer employer’s to the or the insurer, would tend to make less reasonable the discrimination against injured employees.42 question
Because has not been briefed or opinion argued, interplay I intimate no on the employer’s employer’s right and the insurer’s subrogation compensation under the workmen’s 22(5) act and I act. accident claims refer possible right subrogation to the relevance employer of and insurer under the work- his vidious or the fund indemnitees cident claims indemnitees Under arbitrary the circumstances being fund, generally treated alike. discrimination doubtful whether are not entitled to recover subrogees reason of disallowing recovery them, most would work §22(5) subrogees from the ac subrogees an in *32 Bbillhabt v. Danneffel men’s act because these consolidated a question public importance cases present the interests of the parties. transcends
BRILLHART v. DANNEFFEL Compete 1. Not Contracts —Covenant —Sale of Business— Validity. A compete, covenant not contained a contract of sale business, if (MCLA is valid §§445.731, reasonable 445- .761, 445.766). Compete 2. Contracts —Covenant Not —Sale of Business— Validity —Beasonableness. A covenant made sellers of compete a restaurant not to purchaser within ten-mile area with the of the restaurant five-year period for a and, thus, was reasonable valid where they the sellers contracting for, knew what were the sellers’ agent instrument, own drew voluntarily signed the sellers instrument, small, and the business sold was located rural area and similar business the immediate area in competition would be with the business sold. Damages -Speculative Damages- 3. — Not —Contracts—Covenant Compete —Evidence. (cid:127)
An damages improper award of speculative was as based on plaintiff buyer evidence sought damages where the had due to a breach compete, of a covenant not to contained in°the contract of business, sale of defendants’ restaurant the evi- Beferences for Points in Headnotes [1] ’2] '3] '4-6] 54 Am 22 Am 54 Am Ju-r 17 Am Jur Jur Am Jur Jur 2d, 2d, Monopolies 2d, 2d, Damages Monopolies 2d, Contracts Costs § 109. et Bestraints seq. Bestraints of Trade § Trade § 522. 535.