ORDER GRANTING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Petitioner has appealed to this Court from an order of the District Court of Comanche County denying his Application for Post-Conviction Relief in Case No. CRF-76-202.
On May 17, 1976, Petitioner was tried by jury and convicted of Second Degree Murder and sentenced to an indeterminate term of forty (40) years to life, pursuant to 21 O.S.Supp.1973, § 701.4. On September 17, 1976, the trial court ruled this sentence invalid as an ex post facto sentence under 21 O.S.Supp.1976, § 701.9(B) and re-sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years to life. Petitioner perfected a direct appeal of his conviction and this Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
Bowman v. State,
We find that Petitioner is entitled to relief in this case as he was properly sentenced in September 1976 to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years to life. It is a well established rule of law that the appropriate criminal penalty is the penalty in effect at the time the defendant commits the crime.
Penn v. State,
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to have his sentence modified to the minimum of ten (10) years because of this Court’s recent rulings regarding the application of indeterminate sentence provisions of 57 O.S.1981, § 353. Petitioner is correct in the conclusion that Section 353 does not apply, but misses the mark in his reasons why. Section 353 provides for the imposition by judge or jury of an indeterminate sentence upon conviction of an offense. This Court has held that a
trial court
may not set an indeterminate sentence where a life sentence is the maximum imposed for the reason that it is not possible to calculate one-third of a life sentence.
See White v. State, 774
P.2d 1072 (Okl.Cr.1989) That is not the issue, however, in the present case. At the time Petitioner committed the offense and was sentenced, both 21 O.S. Supp.1973, § 701.4 and 57 O.S.1971, § 353 provided punishment upon a criminal conviction. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that when there are two statutes on the same subject, the more specific of the two provisions controls.
Short v. State,
IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that this matter is REVERSED and REMANDED to the District Court with instructions to correct Petitioner’s record and show his sentence to be an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years to life.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/James F. Lane
/s/Tom Brett
/s/Gary L. Lumpkin
/s/Charles A. Johnson
