*1 1966] v. CITY OF
BOWMAN SOUTHFIELD. of the Court. Decision Municipal Corporations—Zoning at Use 1. Ordinance—Residence Heavily-Traveled Roads—Equally Divided Intersection Court. zoning un- Judgment ordinance for action to declare property at constitutional as it affeets her intersection uses, heavily-traveled by limiting is af- roads it to residential equally firmed divided eourt.
Separate Reversal. JJ. Adams, Dethmers, Souris, Smith, and Municipal Corporations—Zoning Ordinance. 2. may legislative properly de- A court exercise the function of termining suitability, shopping desirability, and need clearly area, preponderate where the center facts direction reasonableness ordinance which had been city, adopted by plaintiff’s property included defendant a residential zone. [2] [3] [4] [7, [5' [6] [9] [18] [19] [11] [12] [13] [14] [10] [1] [15] [16] [20, [17] 8] Error 58 Am Am58 58 Am Am 58 Am58 58 Am 58 Am 58 Am Am58 58 Am 5 Am Jur 5 Am Jur 58 Am 58 58 Am Am58 5 Am Jur 58 Am Am 58 Am § Jur, Zoning Jur, Zoning Jur, Zoning Jur, Jur, Zoning Jur, Zoning Jur, Zoning 902. Jur, Jur, Jur, Zoning Jur, Zoning Jur, Zoning Jur, Zoning Jur, Jur, References 2d, Appeal 2d, Appeal 2d, Appeal Jur, Zoning Zoning Zoning Zoning Zoning Zoning §§ §§ § § § §§ §§ §§ §§ §§ §§ § §§ §§ 21. 14. 16. §§ 229. 21-23, 229, 14, and Error and Error 21, 14, 16, 33, 20-22, 21, 229, 20, 16, 21, 20-22, §§ 16, 20, 18, 33. Error 21, 22, 21, 21. 22. Points 21. 33, 256. 224. 231. 21, §§ §§ § 258. 140. 238; 822. 229. in Headnotes 819, 702, 258, 5 Am 822. 703. 259. Jur 2d, Appeal 377 Mich 237. Same—Zoning 3. Ordinances—Police Power. Municipal police ordinances are a valid exercise they power, provisions. when reasonable in their Same—Zoning Ordinances—Reasonableness. *2 municipal zoning The reasonableness a ordinance is the test of of legality. its Same—Zoning 5. Ordinances. validity zoning municipal case Bach to test the a ordinance of must be determined on the basis its own and circum- of facts stances. Same—Zoning Ordinance—Presumptions—Burden 6. of Proof. duly municipal zoning adopted presumed A ordinance is to be valid, challenger proof validity and the burden is on the its of of his establish claim. Same—Zoning Legislative Body. 7. Ordinances—Local body legislative municipal The determination a local as to a of zoning ordinance is and conclusive unless it is shown the final body unreasonably. arbitrarily acted had or Same—Zoning 8. Ordinances—Courts. may modify municipal zoning No court or alter a ordinance legislative body unless it can be shown the local has arbitrarily unreasonably. acted Same—Zoning 9. Ordinances—Residential Use—Value. Zoning parcel plaintiff’s ordinance which restricted 2.4-aere at heavily intersection uses traveled roads residential lield, of for unreasonable, premises not had where been used non- for conforming prior adoption ordinance, uses the ordi- of although property nance does a is sub- effect confiscation stantially uses, less valuable residential than commercial for it purposes, is usable residential harmful effect surrounding being a matter consideration. Same—Major Zoning—Arbitrari- 10. Intersections—Commercial ness. majority major properties Bad that a substantial at of city intersections not malee were zoned commercial would zoning plaintiff’s property, the residential also at a located major intersection, necessarily arbitrary, where located it was dominantly residential area and arbitrariness was not showing major demonstrated that other intersections neighborhoods where existed similar commercial were in to the one at which is located. City ok
Separate for Reversal.
Adams, J. Corporations—Zoning Municipal Ordinance—Reasonableness. 1L existing zoning may city declare ordinance un- A court applied particular property, to a constitutional replace city’s zoning could not the void so made in the court thought only desirable, proper with what it since the concern properly court is whether the owner establishes the un- the zoned reasonableness use. Same—-Zoning 12. Ordinance—Reasonableness-—Burden of Proof. city zoning presumed reasonable, hence, A ordinance is to be meeting any test, have the does not burden one attach- having ing proving the ordinance the burden to be unreasonable. Same—Zoning—Residence—Reasonableness—Evidence. Zoning as residential not to have been shown held, unreasonable, one, experts, where to be all the save testified suitable and all the experts, one, save that commercial would result testified *3 in uses the area. detrimental to
Separate for Affirmance.
Kelly O’Hara, and JJ. Appeal Error—Chancery 14. and Cases—De Novo Review. chancery Supreme and The Court hears considers cases de novo appeal. on the record on Same—Chancery Cases—Bindings Trial 15. of Court. gimes weight findings Supreme The Court considerable of judge equity primarily the trial cases because he is in a credibility by position better to test the the witnesses ob- of serving hearing testify them in court them than appellate opportunity. court which has no such Cases—Bindings Same-—-Chancery of Trial Court. 16. Supreme ordinarily findings will not Court disturb of judge equity unless, trial in an case an examination of after record, it that it would have entire reaches conclusion position it arrived at a result had been of different the trial court. 240 Mici-i 237. Corporations—Zoning Municipal 17. Ordinance—Residential Use Property—View or Premises. —Commercial zoning Finding judge trial in suit to declare un- ordinance of plaintiff’s constitutional as to 2.4-acre at tract intersection of highways major arbitrary, because unreasonable and where provided properly residential use hitherto used of correct, purposes held, judge commercial where the trial had advantage inspecting plaintiff’s adjoining prop- of erty. 18. Constitutional or Powers-—Declaration Law—Separation or Zoning Unconstitutionality or Ordinance. by Finding zoning trial that court ordinance was unconstitutional applied plaintiff’s property, located at intersection 2of major highways lield, discharge not to have constituted a aof legislative function. Same—Zoning 19. Prop- Ordinance—Residence Use—Commercial erty. Finding trial court ordinance residence use of plaintiff’s major highways tract 2.4-acre at intersection 2of thereby permitting nonconforming extension use property that had been devoted to commercial uses before arbitrary
the ordinance became was unreasonable and effective amply sustained, being held, general there practice was to zone intersection commercial. Same—Zoning 20. Property Ordinance—Diminution Values. properly provi- by The extent to which values are diminished municipal zoning given sions ordinance must be con- determining sideration in whether the invasion of rights power purported police under a is unreasonable and confiscatory. Same—Zoning Ordinance—Reasonableness—Police Power. restricting commercially ordinance use of major highways used 2.4-acre tract at intersection thereby reducing residence its value than more held, not lo have met the test reasonableness bear- 50% ing objectives police power, a substantial relation to the preservation health, safety, morals, general public community as a whole. *4 of welfare Oakland; (Arthur from Moore
Appeal E.), J. February 5, (Calendar 1965. No. 48. Submitted 50,695.) Docket No. March Decided City Southfield. by against complaint Anna B. Bowman Bill of Michigan corpora- municipal a Southfield, zoning and others to declare the ordinance tion, defendant it municipal corporation as unconstitutional plaintiff’s property enjoin and to enforce- affects plaintiff. Judgment ment of Defend- ordinance. equally appeal. court. ants Affirmed divided Hayward, plaintiff. Davis, Slavens, Rann £ Ginn, James M. for defendants. (for reversal). sought Plaintiff Smith, judgment against city
obtained officials enforceable, its defendant declaring a ordinance void and un- applied plaintiff’s prop-
insofar as erty. appeal. Defendants city adopted
In 1959,the an ordinance which zoned plaintiff’s property prop Although residential. erty plaintiff is located in a residential has area, used the for commercial since prior 194:1.* Because of commercial use enact acquired ment of the nonconforming ordinance, plain permits use which, course, using tiff to continue before, places may certain limits what be done way altering rebuilding on non structures conforming premises. plaintiff was refused When building permit alterations, to make certain this suit was filed. question is located at the south-
east corner of Inkster Nine road and Mile road in parcel Plaintiff owns a consisting approximately land 10.4 In her acres. include a a Cupboard, guest [*] This includes a house or pienie and a delicatessen and apartment. ground, a catering site for service known as the Bowman Farm specialty wedding food store. Other uses ceremonial service, *5 Smith, J., Reversal. Opinion sought plaintiff July complaint 30, 1962, filed of
bill parcel. at the be- However, to the entire relief as plaintiff’s in his stated, counsel ginning trial, plaintiff not offer opening would statement, parcel, rather proofs 10.4-acre entire as to the portion proofs denomin- a 2.4-acre limit would proofs, plain- parcel At the conclusion A. ated complaint to in- amend the motion to made a tiff objections, only parcel A. defendants’ Over clude granted. motion was was conceded located what is The Northeast of area. a residential to be found Mile road is and Nine of Inkster road intersection a single-family area. Southeast residential is intersection, is, south single-family Both north- area. residential another lie intersection residential of the west and southwest only commercial use The other subdivisions. vicinity northeast corner on the a real estate office has a model home and therefore built as which was the appearance aof residence. testimony fully presented tried; was was
The case residential and commercial of the area and effect of commercial both as to values character
uses, zoning upon suitability property,
surrounding availability for residential testimony financing therefor; was adduced also, bearing in and about intersection as to traffic zoning. upon of residential the reasonableness parcel parcel A, the 2.4-acre As to the value proofs, experts confined her who which ranged $31,200 from to $67,000 on both sides testified $15,000 and from zero to use, for commercial residential use. parcel average valuation of and for $53,540 for commercial use was residential A to the character of the area and $7,770. As use surrounding- of commercial effect property, it conceded that the area is residential was Smith, for Reversal. testimony and there was substantial in character effect that commercial would have adverse properties. upon surrounding residential As suitability purposes, property for weight overwhelming on both parcel A suitable and usable for was that sides *6 question purposes. was no but There residential that the development financing was available for the parcel to traffic at the for residential use. As trial court that Nine Mile intersection, the found heavily traveled, road are both and Inkster road although are unable to find from the rec- we any testimony upon the court could base ord such a sonal observation which per-
finding the unless was based judge the who visited the trial site.
Additionally, testimony de- introduced property signed the for her to show that best use neigh- particularly “a more commercial, would be shopping outlet.” There borhood commercial living in the of families number approximate neighborhood and the immediate spent by it was Further, each for food. amounts adequate population the within said that there is super- justify a food area to establishment very shown that at the least. It was market, away, shopping a five-minute a mile area was nearest serving shopping car. centers drivé Other neighborhood miles dis- from to 5 were said to be prop- most of the that tant. Plaintiff also showed city at main intersections erties Southfield road claiming commercial, are zoned property her is there- denial of commercial fore arbitrary capricious. plaintiff’s property is trial court found that general and that area” “within residential
located a parcel question, parcel specific “could be1 A, only greatly at used for 377 Mich for ReversaIi. by Smith, stating value.” The trial after court, diminished issue the sole was one of constitutional reason- ableness, concluded as follows: property particularly “1. Plaintiff’s well suited is shopping a for question. center for area in desirable shopping- “2. There is definite need for center in this area. present plaintiff’s property “3. The use of shopping its use future center are not detri- any respect any surrounding
mental property. highest “4. The and best use for this shopping such center. Though conceivably might “5. purposes, only used for residential a it would be at unjustifiable greatly deflated and reduced value. standpoint municipal planning, “6. Prom only justification placing this solely a residential zone would be for esthetic rea- *7 sons.” upon
Here, novo, review de defendants, the and its officials, contend that the trial court erred findings They say in such and conclusions. surrounding neighborhood being- on the of basis the residential, the itself for suitable residen- development financing tial with available, this, coupled with other factors, relevant makes the zon- ' ing They argue ordinance reasonable. also determining “The trial court in this case its suitability, desirability conclusions as to and need shopping a center actually in the area, was sit- ting super-zoning per- as a commission. It was * * * forming legislative It function. substituting- judgment its legislative for that of the body making in this (Emphasis sup- decision.” plied.) 245 City v. Southkield. Smith, Reversal. position zoning ordinance is is that the
Plaintiff’s
confiscatory
arbitrary,
because:
unreasonable, caprice; (2)
legislative
(1)
it fails
it is the result of
general
purpose
welfare
to serve
useful
substantially
(3)
community;
ordinance
of the
destroys
(4)
property;
“a zon-
the value of
highest
provide
ing
and best
for the
ordinance must
provide
property,
reason-
for the
and should
use of
community.”
needs of the
able business
posi-
agreement with the
in
are
substantial
We
In
must reverse.
and therefore
tion of defendants
quoted
place,
conclusions,
trial
the first
court’s
substantially
clearly
dis-
it
indicate that was
above,
determining
charging
legislative
function in
“desirability”
shopping
center.
and “need” for
clearly preponderate
place,
In
in
the facts
the second
of the ordinance.
direction of reasonableness
up
principles
An
Certain basic
summed
it
Holland, 344 Mich
where
v.
derson
was said that:
firmly
legal principle
zon
established that
“The
provisions,
ing
when reasonable
their
ordinances,
Village
power.
police
are a valid exercise of
Euclid v. Ambler
(47
Company,
Realty
365
272 US
1016);
Older,
Austin v.
303, ALR
114, 71 Led
54
S Ct
an ordi
of such
Mich
The reasonableness
legality.
recognized
Hitch
as the test of its
nance is
Township
In the
Oakland, Mich 331.
man v.
necessarily fol
application
the test indicated
must be deter
of this character
case
lows that each
mined on the basis
and circum
facts
of its own
Huntington
Senefsky City
Woods, 307
stances.
1433).
(149
It must also be borne
ALR
validity
presumption
attends
mind that
proof
regulations,
that the burden
*8
challenging
to establish
an ordinance
such
on one
is
Portage Township
Full Salvation
v.
claim.
his
Properties
693;
Com
Northwood
Mich
Union, 318
Inspector,
Royal
City
Mich 419.”
pany
Oak
v.
377 Mich Smith,
J., for Beversal.
continually
The-line must
drawn
between what
proper province
legislative body
is the
of the local
reviewing
and a
court.
It was said
Burn,
in Brae
City
Inc., v.
Hills, 350
at
of Bloomfield
page 431:
wisely
people
“Our laws have
to
committed
community
of a
themselves the determination of
municipal
degree
destiny,
their
dustrial
to which the in-
precedence
may
residential,
have
over the
and the areas carved out of
to
each
be devoted to
pursuits.
commercial
With the wisdom or lack of
wisdom the
determination we
not concerned.
people
community, through
appro-
The
their
priate legislative body,
g’overn
courts,
and not the
growth
proposition
its
as
and its life. Let
state the
us
clearly may
ap-
be: It
our
is not
to
function
prove the ordinance before
as to
or
ns
wisdom de-
sirability.” (Emphasis supplied.)
legislative body
Unless
is
local
shown
unreasonably,
arbitrarily
acted
its determination
final and
Civic
is
conclusive.
Association
Tel-Craft
As reasoning plaintiff of- nor of the trial court in the especially support it where dwells fered upon thereof, desirability shopping center the need and question. Burn we held that Brae area in In desirability ordinance and particularly wisdom province within the are matters body. legislative can be shown local Unless arbitrarily legislative body un- or the local acted any reasonably, court nor other this neither Court may modify or alter the ordinance. question upon it was or not remains then whether legislative that the the record before us
shown arbitrarily. unreasonably body In this acted question that the is no case, there There was substantial in a area. located testimony residential permit tending commercial that to to show question harmful have would at the site in properties. surrounding residential effects Assuming Inkster road Mile Nine road that both only heavily of several too, is one this, traveled, are factors to be p Burn, in Brae said considered. As no rule,’ avenue have no “We Woodward 432, rule. value’ no ‘diminution such, as ‘traffic’rule pieces merely considered, factors All these of'the mosaic.” may say as that the also
We and com- in value between difference Again, prove confiscation. use does mercial Case, Burn su- point Brae is well delineated pra: “Disparity com- residential and between in values always leading case In the exist. will
mercial uses Realty Village Co., 272 US Ambler Euclid v. 377 by Smith, J., for Reversal. (47 1016), 71 L 303, 365 Justice S Ct ed 54 ALR Mr. upholding ordinance, Sutherland, noted that the worth involved was about compared per $10,000 acre for industrial use, with per $2,500 acre If for residential use. such show
ing an ordinance, serves to invalidate efforts people living our be to determine their will conditions hopeless. To avoid ‘confiscation’ in this sense *10 (the obtaining highest particu dollar for one lot) greater lar will in result confiscation of far scope property municipality in values in the aas inability growth we whole due to its to control its development. It not, must that stressed (as pointed on this record City situation which the we in out Anderson v. 710) ‘dealing Holland, 706, 344 Mich with a of in involved is unsuit able residential and has little no ” value if so restricted.’ We do have situation here of substantial coupled disparity unsuitability in value with purposes. for residential True, there is disparity substantial in value between the two con- tending nearly opinion uses, unanimous question on both witnesses sides in may purposes. be used for residential is This unlike City Muskegon, in situation Fenner v. City Muskegon 732; Mich North Miller, v. Corporation City 52; or in Paka Jackson, v. 364 Mich and other similar in cases which it only been that has held devaluation was one factor in the consideration of whether an ordinance is un- reasonable, but that where an ordinance restricts property to a use adapted for which it is not thereby destroys question greater part of its value presented. of reasonableness is
Finally, plaintiff claims that because of substan- majority properties major tial in the at intersections of Southfield are zoned commercial that legislative body shows this that the local was arbi- J., for Reveesal. by Smith, trary capricious zoning plaintiff’s property use. This in and of proves itself We nothing. might observe, however, if it were shown that each intersection where commercial exists is one in substantially similar question, is, similar with similar neighborhood uses and similar then there zoning, could be issue or arbitrariness.
For the reasons above are con- discussed, we strained to reverse the trial judgment court and direct entry of de- judgment favor fendants. Costs to defendants. and Adams, JJ., Dethmers, Souris, with concurred J.
Smith, (concurring J. reversal). I agree with Adams, Justice The trial court erroneously dis- Smith. charged legislative function. The trial judge con- cluded finding ordinance was “unreasonable and unconstitutional”; but, if opinion his read *11 aas it whole, is clear his concern with the suit- ability land for a he thought use was needed. “Plaintiff’s property is particularly well suited for a desirable center the area in shopping question.”
The
with this is that
fallacy
trial court did
not have the
plaintiff’s
to zone
power
shopping center. The court
declare
could
exist
ing zoning unconstitutional
but it could not replace
the void this made in the
with what
city’s zoning
it
Properties
Northwood
thought desirable.
Company
Royal
Inspector,
Oak City
v.
423,
upon that
to the
issue
defendant:
agree
city
“We do not
with the
that it has met
plain-
showing
the test
reasonableness
of
(Em-
adapted
tiff’s
use.”
is
phasis supplied.)
any
The burden is not on
to meet
test.
zoning
presumed
A
to be
ordinance is
reasonable.
Highland
Corporation
City
Lathrup
Oil
Vil
v.
lage,
City
650, 660;
v.
Bloom
Scholnick
Anyone attacking
Hills,
I believe is obvious following- unusually considering helpful, after prop- description adjoining terse erty Nine road and at the of Inkster located corner city’s given vis., witness, main Mile road George city planner Jr.: Vilican, quadrant, north of “Beginning in the north-east we and in the of Southfield Mile road Nine developed piece rugg-ed of terrain a rather have acreage, development. single-family It is common- proper ly name I think this Ravines, as the known question the area in However, of the subdivision. rapid- sloping flat It is sites, some sites. on is built ly developing lots. It for the size rapidly developing This north area. lies goes beyond question well *13 by for Affirmance. Kelly, to but the north side of Nine Mile. the east on the the quadrant, to southeastern Moving including have question in we deal un- good land, at the corner and developed beginning approxi- 500, 600 of the mately feet the east intersection property we have a in ravine the crossing through parcel in question, necessarily question, court case, owned east plaintiff, exactly this of the now this parcel in court and is undeveloped I primarily would imagine rugged because of terrain.
“The land to the south of the ownership plaintiff not in developed single-family residential, is but I totally predominately would say because more than area developed in land 50% immediately to the south. To west of Inkster and from across in parcel question we have in 1959 single-family residential subdivision, built basically. in plat approved and it is totally built. “And in the northeast, northwest quadrant, north of Nine and west of Inkster we have an area that still has a good open amount of land but immediate intersection built on again there ais subdivision topography extreme grade differences, is, built up with acreage development.”
I with disagree my Brother’s claim that trial judge, in his written opinion, “a discharged legisla- tive function in the ‘desirability’ and determining ‘need’ for a shopping center” which re- constituted versible error because “the line continually must drawn between what is the proper province local legislative and a body court.” reviewing
In the written the trial opinion, judge did make known what he believed in testimony proved re supermarkets, but he did not, his findings fact, any refer way supermarkets the final of his paragraph as revealed opinion, follow- ing quotation: Opinion by J., for Affirmance. Kelly, finding facts, “It is therefore the the conclu- opinion sion of law and the of this court that the ordinance of the un- defendant Southfield is applied plain-
reasonable and unconstitutional as tiff’s property. appropriate judgment restraining “An enforce- may accordingly, ment to the be entered with costs taxed plaintiff.” *14 way judgment in Likewise, the no referred to supermarkets, finding that but was confined to the the ordinance was “unreasonable and unconstitu- tional insofar the use as the said ordinances restrict plaintiff purposes” of the land of the to residential provided enjoined and further that defendant was enforcing from the ordinance “insofar as the said plain- ordinances restrict of the land the use purposes.” tiff to residential discharge legislative
The court did not a func- finding in tion ordinance unreasonable and why record discloses no reason this Court should way trial criticize the court for the the trial was conducted. agree my
I cannot with Brother’s statement particularly helpful Burn “the Brae Case in re solving presented instant several case because strikingly presented to one issues similar here.”1 considering Burn, In Brae we were 40 acres zoned a main residential, and used as a former estate with building of a 20 rooms and 8 and number baths accessory buildings set back a substantial distance from avenue. Woodward plaintiff granting a board, in variance, they grant did
set forth
the variance
so
that a
because of the fact
denial would create a
hardship
great
plaintiff,
him
had
and that
who
operate
purchased
intention to
with the
[1]
Brae
Burn,
Inc.,
Bloomfield
Hills,
254 Affirmance. Kelly, right granted that home, was a it as upon convalescent express promise not than “that more his and that home” persons cared for said will be neigh- change plaintiff the character “will not spirit will involved and conform borhood of the ordinance.” promise, operating some time under his
After the ordinance to invalidate started his suit enlarge permit building a he was denied because agreed quarters than the to accommodate more 3-story patients, a construct and also to premises. plaintiff, building on the office present had, Bowman, Mrs. In our case years prior for 18 enactment progress- ordinance, conducted successful business poultry, eggs, ing goods and baked butter, from retail catering to a retail wholesale business picnic grounds for busi- facilities on the business, to organizations, weddings from noon until ness accommodating evenings from 6 to 5 o’clock day. many her After zoned as 400 operate property mercially, nonconforming continued to com- she residential, city grant by legal grant aas *15 developing $120,- a business use, per 000 annum. commenced action after she was
Mrs. Bowman this building permit to to the rear of her add denied space taking baking building and additional care food. city on the
The Southfield is bounded south by by Eight on road, Mile the east Greenfield road on road. The mile roads the west Inkster through west run east and and Southfield such mile are intersected at one mile inter- roads highways, north and south as a vals result each mile which road intersects north and south city. Eight highways On Mile all within road are zoned or 7 of such intersections commercial ^ by Keli/s, J., for Affirmance. inter- 6 of the 7 road, Nine Mile On industrial. industrial, zoned commercial are sections plaintiff being exception sole Mile road. On Ten and Inkster Nine Mile road at road, zoned commercial 6 of the intersections zoned contra Plaintiff’s or industrial. prop- general practice zoning intersection erty commercial. why plain- in detail witnesses testified
Plaintiff’s to of her land should not restricted tiff’s use why plaintiff’s gave land residential use and reasons adapted especially commercial use, was to ample neighborhood market. There regard. judge’s conclusion this to the trial sustain zoning important question that the authorities An and that answered, asked and this Court should have plaintiff’s property is: answer, Can must ask commercially to without effect detrimental be used property? adjoining
My Brother states: to the character of the area and effect “As surrounding prop- of commercial erty, is residential was conceded that the area testimony there was in character and substantial effect would have adverse commercial properties.” upon surrounding concluded: The Court plaintiff’s property present its use of
“The shopping center are not detrimental use as future any surrounding property.” any respect George city planner city’s witness, main Vili- her had conducted can, Jr., admitted years many use commercial a adjoining prop- way that was detrimental erty. *16 377 Mich Kelly, Opinion by for Affirmance. by any resident,
No was offered changing plaintiff’s of residents, association that adjoining prop- restriction would erty. detrimental to be prop- That the did not conclude that all the erty kept adjoining the intersection must be resi- by allowing a dential is evidenced office real-estate plaintiff’s prop- operate to across street from erty at the northeast corner Inkster and Nine Mile road. proposed
Five witnesses testified in re effect of the surrounding property, use for defendant. city planner George witness,
Defendant’s Yilican, opinion expressed develop- Jr., that commercial ment would detrimental, that admitted the the subject property effectively from screened residential area to the east and north. Defendant’s appraiser, expressed opin- Bliss, witness ion the same city planner Yilican. city planner witness, Plaintiff’s Carl Goldschmidt, zoning, neighbor- testified commercial such as any way hood convenience facilities, would not in surrounding be detrimental residential area city planner (plaintiff’s son) and, Norman Bowman using testified for commer- cial would not be detrimental sur- rounding Ralph Conselyea residential area. W. tes- tified as follows: “Q. You have also stated another use
property could be commercial? you referring
“A. That is correct, Now, sir. to the corner?
“Q. Yes, sir.
“A. Yes, sir. your opinion
“Q. In as a broker, a com- would use of mercial this corner have an adverse effect *17 257 v. Sotíthkield. Opinion by Kelly, J., for Affirmance. properties prop- on the to the west? The residential erty city facing property? the I “A. could concede it could have beneficial ef- fect. “Q. Could Depending also have an adverse effect? type usage type “A. the on and
building. Type type layout? “Q. of use and “A. That is sir.” correct, nothing present in
"Wefind the record that would disagree cause tous with the trial who, court after seeing listening testify inspect- and to witnesses and ing neighborhood property, concluded: present plaintiff’s property “The use of and its shopping future use as a center detrimental any any respect surrounding property.” to (Smith Village In a recent decision Wood [syllabus 4]), again Creek Farms, Mich 371 127 we position regard made known our to diminution property by zoning of stating: values caused ordinances, “The extent to which values are dimin- by provisions municipal zoning of a ished must be ordinance given determining consideration whether property rights purported the invasion of under power police confiscatory.” is unreasonable and present The case establishes that city, by restricting defendant to prop- value use, has reduced the of her erty considerably per more than cent. agree city
We do not with that it has met by showing plain- test of reasonableness adapted tiff’s to residential use, and agree with trial court’s conclusion that: “Though property might conceivably be used great- purposes, only for residential it would at a be ly unjustifiable reduced value.” deflated l>y for Affirmance. Kelly, applied plain- city’s ordinance, as Defendant have property, meet the test that we fails to
tiff’s applied, viz: often municipal zoning valid, must ordinance, “A the ob relation to substantial
bear a direct preservation police power, jectives safety, general public welfare morals, health, community a whole.”2 judgment court, trial ordi- is unreasonable of Southfield nance of defendant *18 applied prop- and unconstitutional erty, appellee. Costs is affirmed. J. J., concurred
O’Hara, Kelly, with J., concurred M. T. C. Black, Kavanagh, in the result. Alderton Saginaw, (Syllabus 1).