MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff David M. Bowie moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 for relief from this Court’s order of March 31, 2008,
I. Background
In August 2002, plaintiff was terminated from his position in the District of Columbia Office of the Inspector General (“DCOIG”). (Mem. Op. [146] at 1.) Plaintiff filed suit, alleging wrongful termination and violation of other federal and District of Columbia employment and civil rights laws. (Complaint [1] at 50-51.) On May 25, 2007, the jury returned a verdict for defendants on each claim. (Verdict Form [120] at 1-5.) Plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. (Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law [124] at 1.) This Court denied the motion on March 31, 2008. (Order [147] at 1.) On March 31, 2009 at 10:57 PM, plaintiff filed a motion for relief *278 from that order. (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150-2] Ex. R.)
Plaintiff alleges that the verdict and judgment in his case were procurеd through fraud when a fraud perpetrated in a separate case entered the proceedings. (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 2.) In that separate case,
Johnson v. Maddox,
II. Legal Standard
Plaintiff proceeds
pro se
in this matter, therefore the Court will construe his filings liberally.
See Richardson v. United States,
Plaintiffs fraud claims arise under the Court’s statutory and equitablе powers. First, Rule 60(b)(3) permits a court to relieve a party from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” for “fraud ... misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” (PL’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 1. ) Second, the Court’s equitable power permits it to set aside judgments based on “fraud on the court.” 1 (Id. at 2.) Accordingly, plaintiff seeks relief from judgment, an order to schedule discovery, and leave to file independent actions for fraud upon other courts. (Id. at 28; PL’s Mot. for Disc. [159] at 1.)
A motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) must be filed “within a rеasonable time” and “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order....” Fed.R.CivP. 60(c)(1). “What constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ depends upon the facts of each ease, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for the delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.”
Osborne v. Homeside Lending, Inc.,
“Fraud on the court” is a claim that exists to protect the integrity of the judicial process, and thereforе a claim for fraud on the court cannot be time-barred.
See
12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.21 [4][g] & n. 52 (3d ed.2009) (citing
Lockwood v. Bowles,
III. Discussion
A. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(3) Motion
The order from which plaintiff seeks relief was entered on March 31, 2008. Plaintiff asserts that he filed his motion for relief from that judgment exactly one yeаr later on March 31, 2009. Defendants argue that the motion was not actually filed until April 6, 2009, and not docketed until April 28.
3
(Defs.’ Mem. of P.
& A.
[155] at 1-2.) If the motion was filed later than March 31, 2009, it would have to be denied as untimely because Rule 60(b)’s one-year time limit is inflexible.
See Carr v. District of Columbia,
A movant must offer sufficient justification for delaying a Rule 60(b) motion almost until the one-year deadline.
See White v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
1. Information Needed for the Motion Was Unavailable
Plaintiff asserts that much of the information required to establish fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) was unknown to him until a case to which he was not a party, Johnson v. Maddox, came before the Court of Appeals. (Id. at 2.) The Johnson litigation is relevant here, plaintiff argues, because fraud perpetrated in that case entered into plaintiffs own case. (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 2-3.) The Court is not convinced that information from the Johnson case was actually unavailable to plaintiff.
Plaintiffs basic argument is that defendants submitted a fraudulent affidavit in his name in the Johnson case and then lied about the authenticity of that affidavit throughout those proceedings. (PL’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 6-10.) It is unclear how plaintiff remained unaware of this purported fraud and why the information he needed to establish the fraud remained unavailable until Johnson v. Maddox came before the Court of Appeals. (See PL’s Reply [158] at 2.) Plaintiff has submitted one exhibit related to the Johnson case as it was presented to the Court of Appeals — a brief written on behalf of the defendants in that case, some of whom are also defendants in plaintiffs case — but that exhibit is dated April 23, 2004, about four years before final judgment was entered in plaintiffs case. (PL’s Mot. for Relief [150-2] Ex. O.) Unless plaintiff was prevented from accessing the court filings in Johnson v. Maddox for the past five years (which he does not allege), the Court does not see how the appeal of the Johnson case is relevant to his claim of not having the information needed to support his argument.
The Court must reject plaintiffs claim that he did not have the information he needed to support his fraud argument. Plaintiff states that he was aware as early as 2003 that defendants may have perpetrated a fraud. (PL’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 10-11.) Plaintiff testified before Magistrate Judge Facciola that the affidavit submitted on his behalf in the
Johnson
case was not actually his.
(Id.
at 10.) He later stated that thоugh he was not prepared at that time to accuse anyone of fraud, he knew there was “something wrong.”
(Id.
Ex. M at 67.) Thus, at the time of judgment in plaintiffs case in 2008, he had known for at least four years that a fraud may have occurred. Plaintiffs one-year delay in filing a Rule 60 motion therefore could not have been reasonable.
See Osborne,
2. Pro Se Movant Experienced “Significant Confusion”
Plaintiff argues that thе one-year delay in filing his Rule 60 motion resulted from the “unique nature of this case,” which caused him to experience “significant confusion” in how to pursue his fraud claim. (Pl.’s Reply [158] at 2.) Because the alleged fraud was perpetrated upon the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, three district court judges, and the Court of Appeals, he argues, he did not know where to file his motion, even after researching the issue. (Id. at 2-3.) He ultimately filed with the Court of Appeals, which denied his motion without prejudice on March 18, 2009. (Id. at 3.)
To the extent plaintiff argues — coming as a
pro se
plaintiff with no formal legal training — that his level of legal ability serves as grounds for a more relaxed standard of reasonableness, the Court cannot validate such a proposition. Although the Supreme Court has relaxed certain standards and rules when confronted with
pro se
filings by prisoners in criminal cases, it “ha[s] never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”
4
McNeil v. United States,
Although the Supreme Court’s language in McNeil does not appear to act as a complete bar to an untrained pro se litigant being held to a lower standard than a licensed attorney, this case does not present circumstances compelling such a standard. Plaintiff had been representing himself for almost five years when the final judgment was rendered in his case. (See Compl. [1] at 1; Order & J. [148] at 1.) During that time, he must have become aware of the Court’s desire for speedy resolution of cases and the unforgiving standard for filing deadlines. He also must have developed a sense that the Court does not lightly forgive a lawyer’s failure to research and follow the correct procedures regardless of how complex the issue is. If plaintiff truly was having difficulty determining the correct procedure, the Court finds it implausible that he could not have consulted with an attorney for a modest fee or asked one of the numerous lawyers he must have come into contact with as a former federal law enforcement agent.
3. Time Period for Measuring Reasonableness of Delay
Plaintiff argues that, because he originally filed a Rule 60(b) motion with the Court of Appeals, and because it did not rule on his motion until March 18, 2009, the reasonableness of his delay in filing should be measured from that date rather than from when final judgment was rendered in his case on March 31, 2008. (PL’s Reply [158] at 3-4.) Plaintiff does not cite and the Court has been unable to
*282
find any authority supporting that proposition. The timeliness of a Rule 60 motion is universally measured from the date of the judgment being attacked.
See McMillian v. District of Columbia,
L Conclusion
Plaintiff filed a Rule 60 motion with little over an hour before the one-year time limit ran out. (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150-2] Ex. R.) Plaintiff did not adequately justify his delay and was already aware of the grounds upon which his motion relied. Balancing these factors against the interest in finality and prejudice to the defendants,
Osborne,
B. Fraud on the Court
Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ submission of a fraudulent affidavit in the Johnson litigation constituted fraud on the court when the Court “relied upon the fraudulent assertions of defendants” arising out of that separate case. (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 2-3.)
Here, plaintiffs claim of fraud on the court must be denied. First, plaintiff does not provide clear and convincing evidence of conduct that rises to the level of fraud on the court or of knowing or reckless misstatements on the part of defendants and their counsel. Second, he was aware of a possible fraud throughout the proceedings and thus was not prevented from presenting his case fully and fairly.
1. Plaintiff Does Not Prove Fraud On The Court By Clear And Convincing Evidence
To constitute fraud on the court, the fraud must be part оf an “unconscionable plan or scheme,”
England,
a. Plaintiff states that defendants lied when they told the Court of Appeals, Judge Urbina, and Magistrate Judge Facciola that they had submitted plaintiffs affidavit to the EEOC and had in fact not done so. (PL’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 6, 14-15.) However, plaintiffs claims are nothing more than bare allegations and hypotheses. For example, he asserts that the status of one of defendants’ attorneys as a deputy in the Office of Corporаtion Counsel by itself constitutes proof that an officer of the court asserted that plaintiffs affidavit was submitted to the EEOC while *283 knowing that assertion to be false. {Id. at 6.) Although her status may indicate that she is an officer of the court, it does nothing to prove the other elements of plaintiff’s assertion. Such non sequiturs permeate plaintiff’s motion, but nowhere does he provide clear and convincing evidence that defendants’ representations were more than mere oversight or mistake.
b. Plaintiff asserts that defendants falsely represented the authenticity of plaintiffs affidavit before Magistrate Judge Facciola. {Id. at 7.) First, he states that an affidavit submitted by one of the defendants’ attorneys, Gail Davis, proves that an attorney at DCOIG perjured herself when she testified about the authenticity of plaintiffs affidavit. {Id. at 9.) He also claims that the information in the affidavit was “deliberately withheld from the Facciola court.” {Id. at 8.) Second, he provides e-mails between himself and the DCOIG attorney that are supposed to prove the falsity of her testimony. {Id. Exs. B, C.) Even if the attorney’s statements were false, plaintiff neglects that the events about which she testified occurred in 2000, three years before her testimony. {See id. at 9.) Plaintiff has failed to clearly and convincingly prove that the discrepancies resulted from anything more than mistake or the attorney’s faulty memory. Furthermore, if defendants failed to give information to Magistrate Judge Facciola, plaintiff submits no proof that this omission was knowing or reckless.
c.
Plaintiff asserts that the affidavit submitted in his name was a forgery.
{Id.
at 10.) His evidence consists of typographic differences between the purported forgery and documents that he submitted, his own testimony before Magistrate Judge Facciola, and circumstantial evidence regarding the dates of the various affidavits and signatures to which plaintiff refers. At best, plaintiffs evidence raises the mere possibility that defendants engaged in forgery, but he does not present the sort of unassailable evidence required to overcome the finality of а judgment.
Cf. Lockwood,
d. Plaintiff further asserts that defendants perpetrated fraud on the EEOC when they made reference to plaintiffs affidavit but had not submitted it to the EEOC. (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 17.) Again, plaintiff makes only bare allegations and does not clearly and convincingly prove that defendants’ statement was more than mere mistake.
e. Plaintiff takes issue with the Court’s reliance on Gail Davis’s statement in a 2004 affidavit that “[plaintiff] was free to submit his аffidavit on Johnson’s or his own behalf and independent from the OIG’s position statement.” {Id. at 18, Ex. P.) He argues that none of the defendants alerted plaintiff that his affidavit had not been sent to the EEOC. {Id. at 18.) Although plaintiff might have been less likely to submit his affidavit without knowledge that it had not already been submitted, he fails to show an affirmatively false statement on Davis’s part or that any defendant had an affirmative duty to tell him the affidavit had not been sent.
f. Plaintiff claims that Gail Davis lied in a 2004 affidavit when she stated that plaintiff was out of his offiсe when she met with defendants Maddox and Andersen. {Id. at 19, Ex. P.) Plaintiff provides no proof that this statement was untrue. He merely states that Davis made no attempt to contact him before or during these meetings. Even if her statement was not true, plaintiff provides no clear and convincing evidence that her misstatement was more than a mistake or lapse of memory.
*284 g. Plaintiff argues that Davis fraudulently stated in a 2004 affidavit that plaintiff edited the affidavit she prepared on his behalf. (Id. at 19-20, Ex. P.) He argues this statement is frаudulent because he clearly refused to sign the affidavit she prepared and instead drafted his own. (Id. at 20.) Here, Davis may have been under the impression that plaintiff was cutting out her words in the affidavit and replacing them with his own, which is a valid definition of “edit.” She may also have mistakenly used the word “edit” when she meant something else. Plaintiff does not clearly and convincingly prove any knowing or reckless deception on her part.
h. Plaintiff argues that Branson and Andersen were working on the allegedly forged affidavit two weeks after the EEOC filing deadline had passed for the sole purpose of providing Maddox a stronger legal defense in the Johnson case. (Id. at 20.) He also argues that they circumvented EEOC instructions only with respect to plaintiffs affidavit, which evinces fraudulent intent. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff provides no evidence to support these conclusory assertions.
i.
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that officers of the court were involved in some of the alleged misrepresentations. (Pl.’s Reply [158] at 10-13.) Even if they did make misrepresentations, their status as officers of the court is not enough to prove fraud on the court. Some form of intentional misconduct must be demonstrated.
See Demjanjuk,
j. Plaintiffs “newly discovered evidence” is similarly deficient. The affidavit by Robert Isom and accompanying evidence are supposed to prove that the re-inspection of plaintiffs division at DCOIG, which formed the basis of his termination, was pretextual. (See Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 21-27, Exs. A-l to -6.) Even assuming these exhibits prove fraudulent acts by the defendants, they do not show fraud on the court. Plaintiff does not provide clear and convincing evidence that defendants created any of the documentary evidence for the purpose of deceiving this or any other court, nor that defendants submitted these documents to the Court while knowing they were false.
To the extent that plaintiffs new evidence supports a Rule 60(b)(2) motion for “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b),” such a motion would be barred as untimely. As explained above, plaintiffs motion was not filed “within a reasonable time.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1).
2. Plaintiff Was Able to Present His Case Fully and Fairly
In
Reintjes,
the First Circuit denied an independent action for relief from judgment when the movant only submitted proof of an adverse witness’s perjury at trial.
C. Plaintiffs Motion for an Order to Schedule Discovery
Plaintiff requests that the Court order discovery to permit him to further develop his claims of fraud on the court.
6
Plaintiff cites to
Pearson v. First NH Mortgage Corp.,
“Colorable” is defined as “appearing to be true, valid, or right.” Black’s Law Dictionary 282 (8th ed.2004). Plaintiff has so far presented only bare allegations and evidence that points to the mere possibility of fraud on the court, but presents no evidence that makes his claim “appear to be true.”
Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
Plaintiffs request for discovery is also undermined by the fact that many of his claims revolve around issues that he should have addressed at or before trial. Plaintiff was aware of a possible fraud as early as 2003. (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150] at 10-11.) He had every oppоrtunity before trial to engage in discovery to determine the existence of fraud and to raise that issue with the Court. The defendants should not be subjected to discovery when plaintiff failed to take advantage of that opportunity.
D. Leave to File Separate Independent Actions For Fraud Upon Other Courts
This Court does not have jurisdiction to grant or deny leave to request relief from judgments rendered by other courts.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment [150] and *286 Motion for Discovery [159] will be DENIED.
A separate order shall issue this date.
Notes
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(3) provides that "[t]his rule does not limit a court's power to set aside judgment for fraud on the court.”
See also Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
. Fraud on the court does not encompass “ordinary fraud,” and thus must be distin
*279
guished from Rule 60(b)(3), which permits relief from judgment even for unintentional misrepresentations. Moore et al.,
supra,
§ 60.43[l][a]. “[I]f fraud that may form basis of independent action ‘is not kept within proper limits but is ballooned to include all or substantially all species of fraud within 60(b)(3) then the time limitаtion upon 60(b)(3) motions will be meaningless.’ ”
Geo. P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp.,
. Plaintiff first filed by e-mailing his documents to the Court instead of using the Court’s Electronic Document Filing System. (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief [150-2] Ex. R.) The clerk's office informed him the next day that he did not have permission to file electronically. {Id.) He submitted paper filings, which the Court received after March 31. It is disputed whether plaintiff had permission to file electronically (Pl.’s Reply [158] at 1-2) and, if he did, whether sending filings to the Court by e-mail constitutes a valid filing.
.
McNeil
deals with a filing deadline that has an absolute time limit rather than with the more flexible "reasonableness” standard at issue here. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s ruling was predicated on "evenhanded administration of the law,” which remains a valid principle here.
. The
Reintjes
court does imply that involvement of an officer of the court in perjury could constitute fraud on the court even if the adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
. Because plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(3) claim of fraud or misrepresentation is untimely, discovery at this point could only support a claim of fraud on the court.
. Although plaintiff correctly states that "the law favors discovery and correction of corruption of the judicial process even more than it requires an end to lawsuits" (Pl.'s Reply [161] at 3 (citing
Lockwood v.
Bowles,