30 Cal. 621 | Cal. | 1866
This is an action to restrain the collection of a balance due on a judgment foreclosing a mortgage.
The judgment of foreclosure was rendered on the 19th of January, 1861. The mortgaged premises were subsequently sold by the Sheriff, who returned a deficiency which was docketed on the 3d day of October, 1861. For the unsatisfied balance thus due, the defendant Crary caused an execution to be issued on the 10th day of May, 1866—more than five years after the judgment of foreclosure was rendered, but less than five years after the balance left due by a sale of the mortgaged premises was docketed.
The only question presented is whether the period of five years, within which an execution for an unsatisfied balance on a foreclosure sale may be taken out, commences to run from the date of the judgment of foreclosure or from the date when the balance was docketed.
The provisions of the Practice Act applicable to the question are found in sections two hundred and nine and two
It will be observed that nothing is said in this latter section as to the time within which process may be issued, either for the sale of the encumbered property or for the collection of any deficit that may be found to exist after a sale has been had, but the language is confined to the form of the particular kinds of judgments therein provided for, and the mode and manner of enforcing them.
The mere fact that two kinds of final process may be required to enforce a judgment of foreclosure is of no consequence and does not of itself affect the reason of the rule. These different kinds are provided for in the two hundred and thirteenth section, which is in the same chapter with the two hundred and ninth, and therefore expressly referred to by the closing phrase of the latter section.
Our conclusion is that the two hundred and forty-sixth section only prescribes the mode and manner of enforcing judgments of foreclosure, and that the time within which they
The only mode by which the theory of the respondent can be sustained is to hold that the balance, when docketed, becomes a new and independent judgment; but this is forbidden by the language employed. The language is not that the Clerk shall enter a judgment for such balance in his judgment book, but it is that he shall enter in his docket the judgment—that is to say, the judgment which has been already entered—for such balance. The distinction is obvious. It only remains to be added that this view renders the Practice Act consistent with the Statute of Limitations in all respects so far as the present question is concerned.
Judgment reversed and the Court below advised to enter a judgment for plaintiff.