699 So. 2d 166 | Ala. Civ. App. | 1997
Dot Bowers (the "worker") was injured on August 24, 1993, when she fell on her way out of a storage building on the premises of her employer, Cotton Bayou Condominiums (the "company"). The worker was carrying patio furniture she had been instructed to bleach. She sprained her foot, her shoulder, and her wrist in the fall.
After notifying the president of the condominium association of her fall, the worker had her husband transport her to South Baldwin Hospital for treatment. She was seen by Dr. Barton Mitchell in the emergency room. She saw no other doctor until November 1993, when she sought treatment for the continued pain from her injuries.
In January 1995, the worker sued for workers' compensation benefits. The parties appeared at trial on November 21, 1995. The only testimony presented at trial was that of the worker.1 The company's counsel, before testimony began, entered the following stipulations on the record:
"MR. GREEN: We're willing to stipulate the date of injury was 8-24-93; that the employer-employee relationship existed at that time between Mrs. Bowers and the Cotton Bayou Condominium. . . .
"It occurred within the line and scope of her duties as resident manager. . . .
". . . [H]er salary was continued during the tenure of her employment with Cotton Bayou [and] . . . she was continued on her regular salary.
". . . .
"MR. GREEN: Mrs. Bowers and her husband were the resident managers and they jointly worked there as the resident managers. . . ."
The trial court entered a judgment for the company on January 29, 1996; however, its judgment failed to comply with Ala. Code 1975, §
The review of this case is governed by the new Workers' Compensation Act, which states in pertinent part: "In reviewing pure *168
findings of fact, the finding of the circuit court shall not be reversed if that finding is supported by substantial evidence." Ala. Code 1975, §
In its judgment, the trial court finds that the worker failed to meet her burden as a plaintiff and failed to prove both that she was an employee of the company and that the accident occurred in the line and scope of her employment. These findings directly contradict the stipulations at trial. In fact, Mrs. Bowers had no burden of proof, given the stipulations, because a plaintiff does not have the burden of proving facts stipulated to at trial. See Kurn v. Counts,
The company asserts that a trial court is not bound by the stipulations of the parties and may disregard a stipulation if it is not supported by the facts established at trial. SeeWilson v. Berry Industries Co.,
This case differs from Wilson in that here the parties did not attempt to limit the issue to be addressed by the trial court and then inadvertently fail to stipulate to a particular issue. The company in this case stipulated to the employer-employee relationship and stipulated that the accident occurred in the line and scope of employment. The trial court's findings on these matters are inconsistent with the stipulations and, in light of those stipulations, are not supported by substantial evidence.
The trial court apparently believed that certain payroll records and tax documents introduced by the company outweighed the stipulations. Those documents certainly indicate that the payroll records were not well-kept and that the salary paid to the worker and her husband was reported under his Social Security number. However, the mere fact that the salary paid to the worker and her husband, as joint resident managers, was reported to the IRS and the State Department of Industrial Relations only as income to Mr. Bowers is not substantial evidence that the worker was a volunteer and not an employee in light of the stipulations and the testimony of the worker.
On the company's payroll records, under the section marked "employee name," the names "Bowers, William and Dot" appear. The worker testified that she entered only one Social Security number, her husband's, in part because the payroll program allowed her to enter only one and also because they "file [taxes jointly] anyway." In fact, the company's own exhibit, the termination letter, which stated "the Board . . . voted to terminate our employment relationship with you and your wife," indicates strongly that the company considered the worker its employee.
The trial court also found that the worker did not prove her average weekly *169 wage. At trial, the worker testified that she and her husband were paid $1,000 every two weeks and that her average weekly wage was $317. No one else testified at the trial to refute that testimony. As we have stated, the mere fact that the payroll records and tax documents reflect that all income was earned by Mr. Bowers is insufficient to overcome the worker's testimony and the stipulation that an employer-employee relationship existed between the worker and the company.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment for the company is reversed and the cause is remanded for entry of a judgment based upon the stipulations that the employer-employee relationship existed and that the accident occurred in the line and scope of employment. In addition, that judgment is to adjudicate all other issues, and it should be based upon the evidence already presented at trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
YATES, MONROE, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs in the result.