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Bower v. Morden
880 P.2d 245
Idaho
1994
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*1 215 P.2d Greg BOWER, County H. Ada Pros

ecuting Attorney, Plaintiff-Ap

pellant-Cross Respondent, MORDEN, Thomas R.

Honorable

Magistrate Judge, Defendant-

Respondent-Cross Appellant.

No. 21082. Idaho,

Supreme Court of

Boise, May 1994 Term.

Aug. 1994. *2 25(a) may under limited

cause due party to the number of cases which right against exercises not, judge. We hold that it and that in prohibition this case writs of man- date are available to enforce the as remedies right. - - - Appellant Respon-

Plaintiff Cross dent, Bower, Greg County H. Ada Prosecut- Attorney (Bower), appeals from a district ruling denying request for a of court his writ prevent mandate and writ of Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, Morden, Magistrate Honorable Thomas R. Morden), Judge (Judge denying from Bow- disqualify Judge motions to er’s Morden. appeals declaratory Bower also from the judgment ruling of court the district prospective rights parties. declared Judge from the cross-appeals Morden declar- atory judgment ruling.

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 1993, deputy prose- During the summer of cuting attorneys employed by Bower ex- pressed Judge their dissatisfaction with Mor- Bower, perception based den on Judge Morden was biased office prosecutor. August In policy having deputies instituted his file motions for automatic pursuant Morden in all initially criminal cases. Morden Bower, Greg Atty., Ada County H. Pros. motions, ultimately granted began but Colaianni, and Cary County B. Deputy Ada issuing identical blanket denials Bower’s Boise, Atty., Cary Pros. B. appellant. case, Judge in all In each cases. argued. Colaianni stated that motion was denied Morden because, 25(a), pursuant to it had been EchoHawk, Gen., Larry Atty. David G. “hindering, delay- purpose for the High, Gen., Deputy Atty. F. and Steven obstructing jus- ing, or the administration Seanlin, Gen., Boise, Deputy Atty. for re- tice.” spondent. argued. F. Steven Seanlin sought writ of mandate writ MeDEVITT, Chief Justice. prohibition against Judge Morden. After we if preliminary proceedings,1 this case are asked to decide a trial was held on judicial disqualification request the right to without Bower’s for the writs. Initially, Judge restraining*him denying 1. an alterna- future motions and Schroeder hearing. requiring Judge tive writ of mandate Morden set the matter for show cause disqualify Judge then moved Schroe- vacate his earlier orders and a writ of perceived trial, deputies cases for

At testi- den future “selected several they fied that believed bias.” County

biased. The Ada Public Defender a private attorney both testified that II *3 they thought Judge profes- Morden had a rul- sional demeanor and delivered consistent ANALYSIS ings. Other evidence at trial established Prohibi- Mandate And A. The Writs Of Judge had well one hun- Morden denied over Appropriate Remedies Be- tion Are ini- disqualification dred since Bower Ruling For Au- On A Motion cause policy tiated his and that Bower had not Disqualification Does Not sought rulings. tomatic appeal any of from these Discretionary Decision Additionally, sought Involve A Bower had not a writ Adequate And Had Reme- or writ of mandate with reference No grant dy disqualification to a to motion At refusal Available Law. any particular pending in Al- criminal case. 25(a) provides, Rule in rel- Idaho Criminal though there was evidence some adminis- part, evant as follows: delay by trative mo- caused the number of (a) Disqualification judge without cause. reassignments during tions and the attendant actions, parties In all criminal the shall those periods when the motions had been disqualification to each have the one (before deny- Judge began magistrate, the or without cause of motions), ing the there was no evidence fol- except provided, as herein under the any disqual-

which established that procedures: lowing conditions caused, cause, delay ification motion or would normally (1) to disproportionate disqualify. associated crimi- Motion to reassignment with of an after mag- individual case or the nal action in the district court disqualification thereof, motion. any party division istrate’s (1) by judge magistrate disqualify or one The request the for district court denied filing a for without writs, concluding the that Bower’s blanket cause, stating require which shall hinder, designed delay motions were to or therefor, granting any grounds justice obstruct the administration because of such motion for without they designed influence Judge were to Mor- cause, timely, granted. if Each shall be rulings. den’s The held district court also felony prosecution shall have party that Bower was to in the not entitled relief (1) disqualification without cause under one prohibi- form of a writ of or writ mandate magistrate appointed to this Rule as to the tion, failed both because he had to exhaust preliminary hearing and another hear his remedies at law and writs because the to disqualification without cause as the dis- appropriate were not to constrain a discre- the trial of appointed trict to hear tionary deciding function such or whether action. A motion for brought not a motion was not made under this without cause shall hinder, delay or obstruct the administration hinder, delay or the ad- Rule obstruct justice. justice. ministration of further district court concluded (2) filing. Judge by Time for A motion dis- Morden had abused his discretion must be filed responding qualification without cause blanket motions with (7) days after service considering blanket denial instead of each not later than seven setting the action for independently. case en- of a written notice district court conference, conference, pre-trial tri- declaratory allowing tered judgment status hearing on first file motions Mor- al or contested and, recusals, allowing nary jury hearings, denial in trials. der after several the case was but However, cross-appeal assigned appeal ultimately Fuller this Court. because alternative writ so that this case are both the final Fuller modified the court, rulings obligated grant are not at the mo- district these earlier appeal. prelimi- in this tions when in court trials and issue (14) person motion, application of days affidavit on the or not later than fourteen beneficially specifying interested. of a written notice after service magistrate presiding judge or who the I.C. 7-402. first; be, the action will whichever occurs counterpart is the The writ of be filed before the and such motion must It arrests writ of mandate. conference, a of a status commencement tribunal, corporation, proceedings of conference, proceed- pre-trial a contested proceedings person, board or when or trial the action. jurisdiction are without or excess tribunal, per- or corporation, board of such the rule Prior to its amendment son. language prohibits did not contain the *4 § 7-401. I.C. “hinder, filing delay or obstruct a motion to justice.” That lan- the administration consistently that held This has Court corollary guage adopted civil was (and counterpart, mandate “writs of 40(d)(1). rule, This has never I.R.C.P. Court per- compel the prohibition) will not issue to decide, upon under before been called discretionary purely function.” formance of a rule, 488, criminal whether a either the civil or Sandpoint, 110 Idaho Bopp City v. may (citations prohibition (1986) of mandate writ of or writ 1260, 490, P.2d 1262 716 against denies a motion for omitted). issue a who “hin- being brought one previously approved the has This Court der, delay or obstruct the administration refusing to dis- against judges use of writs justice.” disqualify was not the refusal to qualify when discretionary decision. predicated on a statutory authority for a writ of man- The Featherstone, Idaho v. 48 Hultner-Wallner date, 7-302, provides: § I.C. 507, (1929), that a 42 this Court said 283 P. any except a may by It be court issued appropriate mech- prohibition was an writ of court, justice’s probate any inferior or judge refused to anism when a tribunal, person, corporation, board or allegation despite party’s a himself for cause compel performance of an act which in the outcome an interest that the had enjoins duty result- especially as a law by personal stock- litigation virtue of station; office, or or to ing from an trust corporation interests holdings in a whose party to the use compel the admission of a by litigation. affected might have been enjoyment of a or office and the would not that the writ concluded Court entitled, he and from which which he is because judge’s discretion interfere with the tri- unlawfully precluded by such inferior in the matter” and was had no discretion “he bunal, person. corporation, board or re- of law without disqualified as a matter subjective about judge’s beliefs gard to the in limited circum- The writ is available Id., 512, impartial. at ability to remain his stances: Likewise, in Price v. Feath- 43-43. 283 P. at in all cases where The writ must be issued (1942), erstone, P.2d 853 130 64 Idaho speedy adequate plain, not a and there is a original proceeding in issued this Court It remedy ordinary in course of law. de- judge who had writ of review affidavit, appli- upon on the issued must be because he for nied a motion beneficially interested. party cation of the disqualify was not avail- thought motion to proceeding. divorce modification able is sub- writ of I.C. 7-303. The orders, not judge’s vacated the This Court scope limitation: stantially similar both discretion, but he had abused his because except may by court It be issued law. a matter of he had erred as because courts, an inferior justice’s probate or Price, 317-18, 130 P.2d at 855. Idaho at 64 tribunal, per- corporation, board or or to a case con court this The district plain, there is not a in all eases where son as to decision that Morden’s remedy in cluded adequate the ordi- speedy and disqualification under motion for upon whether a It issued nary course of law.

219 Bearshield, (1987). Cf., 104 “hinder, delay or brought was (1983) (holding on P.2d 548 justice” was a Idaho the administration obstruct disagree. appeal There no denial of discretionary We act. direct 40(d)(1) upon brought under I.R.C.P. discretionary act involved motion 25(a)(1) holding reversing mo- court’s because lower improper, motion under filed). timely rule must How- conformity tion motion was not that the right. appeal last ever, as a matter direct fact the mere 25(a)(1) condemns necessarily sentence of I.C.R. establish does available filing disqualify in order to of a motion to remedy in this case. adequate it is an “hinder, delay or obstruct administration is no discretion justice” supply basis for an Because there does judge against grant deny a motion

exercise discretion or 25(a), adequate is made. no whom and because under remedy was available to appellate at law The next issue we must decide is whether Bower, writs of mandate we hold speedy “plain, or not Bower had ade- against Judge issue quate remedy” other than the writs. available for dis denying hold he did We not. *5 question now to the qualification. We turn finding a The district court made factual whether, disqualifi number of light of the process adequate was as a appellate that the Bower, writs by filed motions cation remedy rulings Judge for the adverse issue. should initially given Morden that had rise Bow- perception Morden biased er’s that was Disqualification Under Motions For However, B. against prosecution. this find- 25(a) Be Irre- Must Granted I.C.R. by the district court frames the issue Party spective A Of How Often incorrectly. analysis appropriate- Our A Disqualify Particular Moves To availability ness of the writs is focused on the Judge. remedy allegedly improper of a for the denial availability disqualification, of the not the of a case, dispute no this there remedy in previous cases that have con- timely motions were each individual Bower’s asserting tributed to Bower’s motivation for 25(a)(1). conformity I.C.R. filed with disqualification subsequent motions in motion, Thus, disqualification if viewed each cases. alone, granted. Judge would have specifically it to be an finding While not disqualifi urges the number of seeking adequate remedy alternative by against Judge motions filed cation writs, the court did that Bower district note Morden, aggregate, converted viewed interlocutory had never availed of an himself conforming non-con motions to appeal disqualification of the denial of subject hold forming to denial. We motions by permission. motion We believe dis- it did not. finding point trict on this is incorrect. court’s 12(a) permission application I.A.R. limits ground upon single interlocutory appeal an in criminal to take had abused court found that Bower district Moreover, the denial cases the defendant. 25(a) Bower’s its conclusion that was a of a final attempt improper were an blanket motions appeal purposes under I.A.R. order rulings on Judge Morden’s future influence 11(c). Therefore, interlocutory appeal con do this of law. We not embrace issues remedy to Bower. available as clusion. fu Morden’s course, ap- not have affected a direct could Of could take because, if Bow rulings of law ture on issues peal of the motion. denial granted, disqualification motions were appeal er’s has addressed direct This Court rulings by law no would be more disqualification motion there of an automatic denial 25(a) Bower was a in cases where appeal Judge Morden pursuant to I.C.R. on direct filed party. 739 P.2d Schaffer, 112 Idaho SILAK, suggests Justice, BISTLINE, joined that Bower’s by Justice, dissenting. usurpation blanket judi motions are a of the ciary’s power. Pointing to Article 2 of today compellingly Court’s decision Constitution, the Idaho 25(a) Morden con why demonstrates Idaho Criminal Rule that, substantially tends needs to be Supreme because the revised. As it is Court ad presently today by interpreted written and is supervises ministers and judiciary pursu 25(a) Court, readily susceptible mandate, ant to constitutional Bower’s blan any party litigates abuse who with ket motions exclusively judicial invade that great frequency judicial single in a district. argues function. He the number of separately my I write explain both to dis- Bower’s motions removing resulted in him agreements reasoning, Court’s entirely from the criminal docket. This suggest that the rule be rewritten. clearly Court contemplated disqualification portion pro- The relevant of I.C.R. as a promulgating matter of vides as “A disqualifica- follows: motion for 25(a)(1) without language limiting the tion without cause shall not be made under party may number of times a invoke the rule hinder, delay this Rule to or obstruct Therefore, as single judge. Bow justice.” administration of The Court holds er’s motions cause no divestiture of this nothing this more than Court’s power. constitutional cautionary language. I do not believe that to Rather, be the case. language believe the disagree We also with the district very important safety was included as a valve court’s conclusion that prevent exploitation Morden’s blan process. ket denials were an abuse of discretion be cause, above, explained no discretion explanation why The Court’s as to no dis *6 ought to have been involved on cretionary ruling upon act is involved in 25(a) However,

Bower’s motions. supported by we affirm motion under the I.C.R. is reasoning. circular The Court states that no district court’s conclusion that Mor judicial implicated “any discretion is because den’s denial of imper Bower’s motions was brought conformity with the rule missible on.the alternative basis that inher right.” must be as a matter of Of right disqualification ent in the to as a matter course, argument upon that revolves itself right prohibition is the of a blanket denial how, when examined to discern in the first of such motions. instance, any determination that a motion is “hinder, brought delay not to or obstruct justice” administration of could ever take CONCLUSION 25(a) place. plain language The of I.C.R. judgment The denying of the district court necessarily requires judge that the involved Bower’s motion to issue the writs of mandate disqualification decide or not whether mo and is being reversed. The writ of purpose. tion is filed for a forbidden definition, By decision-making process directing Judge mandate grant Morden to Therefore, implicates judicial discretion. disqualify hereby the motions to is issued. here the Court should have concluded declaratory judgment to affirmed the writs of mandate and were prohibits Judge extent that it Morden from “discretionary unavailable on the of the basis denying disqualification Bower’s motions and City exception. Bopp act” See v. Sand portions limiting right those file 488, 490, point, 110 Idaho 716 P.2d disqualification motions are reversed. No (1986) (“writs (and of mandate appeal. costs on counterpart, prohibition) will not issue compel performance purely of a discre function”).2 TROUT, JJ., tionary JOHNSON and concur. 25(a). disqualification

2. Because I the writs should not believe issue decision under function, Nevertheless, against discretionary unnecessary agree it is I do that none Court my analysis to determine whether Bower has exists for Bower and I would advocate revis- 25(a) adequate appellate remedy peremptory an for review of a to create one. The acceptable to rulings become less Because the Court has decided that should 25(a) Morden, disqualification under I.C.R. Bower than those absolute, proceed provide prop- it does not power redirect his blanket motions has the guide deciding er criteria to judge from the and remove an disqualify whether a motion to exposes possibility That criminal bench. “hinder, delay or obstruct the administration underlying separation powers violation justice.” dissenting In conclu- dispute. this entire sion, I offer a framework that I is the believe disagree I conclusion that with Court’s 25(a) proper interpretation of I.C.R. invasion are not an Bower’s blanket motions ought explicitly through to be made so 5, § 2 of Article judiciary’s power. revision of the rule. invest this Court Idaho Constitution does agree I with the Court that Bower’s mo- and su- power with to administer exclusive tions attempt were not an to influence Therefore, judiciary. Bower is pervise rulings Morden’s future on issues of law be- disqual- constitutionally to use authorized cause, granted, Judge if Morden would be number so motions ification removed from all of Bower’s cases. Howev- equivalent reassign- of a effect the functional er, beyond point we must look believe (an objective magistrate ment of a systemic damage to measure the that “blan- conceded).3 openly ket” motions such as these considerations, On of the above can cause. the basis have concluded that blanket Court should City In City Court Tuc- type are of this motions son, (1986), 150 Ariz. 722 P.2d 267 justice obstruction of the administration of Supreme Arizona Court was confronted with pro- meaning of within the analyzed a similar situation the broader some of “blanket” supply ceeded to definition impacts of blanket motions. provide guidance for the future. order to Tucson, City the court held that a attempt did to do that district court prosecutor’s policy having deputy prosecu- directing permitted file that Bower was judges tors certain under rule in “selected similar to Idaho’s an abuse of the rule perceived phrase If cases for bias.” it attempt because was an to intimidate all of *7 mean cases in understood to selected judges, just targeted those for dis- by Judge perceives bias Mor- qualification. This has application rationale case, specific on facts of the den based here. Even if Bower filed blanket motions “quasi-cause” then a against Judge the standard becomes Morden and refrained from away peremptory filing any standard that takes against motions 25(a) magistrate judges challenge characteristic that I.C.R. was other so Mor- Moreover, provide. given reassigned judge any designed den never the was Bower’s, case a for dis- magistrate judges of the motions need state basis other put qualification, any on disere- attempt would still be notice that if invoke reassignment judge goal of a without cause under his to effect a was 25(a) peremptory disquali- judge. similar undesirable potential juror. process fication of similarly subject That separation powers principles are These discretionary decision-mak- important equally under the Idaho Constitution. ing imper- limited instances abuse as attorney Although prosecuting office challenges gender, missible based on race or 5, "quasi-judicial" position pursuant to Article corresponding decisions which there is no Constitution, § is also one 18 of the Idaho it interlocutory appellate review. performance charged "executive powers importance separation 3. The of these 14, Wharfield, State v. 41 Idaho functions.” See recognized People v. concerns has been ton, Whar Therefore, 17, 862, (1925). sepa- 236 P. 863 423, 786, 144 136 Ill.2d IlI.Dec. 556 N.E.2d powers principles established in Article ration of (1990). Wharton, Supreme Court 253 2, § be under- 1 of the Idaho Constitution must prosecutor that a who was Illinois concluded prohibit prosecuting attorney stood multiple disqualification against using powers judicial appropriating the administrative single judge unconstitutionally invad would exclusively granted Court in Article 2. this judiciary the administrative duties of the if 222 by Judge employing this stan-

tion P.2d 252 speculation dard would be mere as to wheth- CAMPBELL, A. Claimant- Wade type particular er a case was more of the Respondent, him from than Bower wanted removed any other. I believe a more balanced construction OF BOARD BONNEVILLE COUNTY disquali-

would be one that allowed Bower to COMMISSIONERS, Employer, fy Judge many Morden from as cases as he Defendant-Appellant, chooses, long grossly dispro- so as it is not portionate to the number of motions filed magistrate judges. other Such a Idaho, Department of disqualify standard would allow Bower to Employment, Defendant. potential improp- without erly influencing magistrate judges. other No. 20494. Additionally, it would also constrain unlimit- Idaho, Supreme Court of ed to the extent that a liti- Idaho, May Term. Eastern gant filing disqualification motions should re- judge reassignment judge ap- ceive a as Aug. 1994. proximately many judge times as the disqualified by litigant from other cases. prac- Morden’s also conclude issuing

tice of blanket denials without

type hearing4 an abuse of discretion

because he failed to utilize discretion

denying all of motions without consider-

ing whether under Bower was

entitled to him from some cases.

By suggest this I do not mean to

Morden must rule in a vacuum such that he beyond

cannot look an individual motion and disqualification pattern.

examine Bower’s disquali-

When a is faced with blanket motions,

fication the exercise of discretion larger

occurs in a context than the individual

motion, for the should evaluate the

pattern upon motions and act blanket *8 collectively hearing.

them after a At that deny

point, judge ought tó be able

enough of the motions to maintain or restore

approximate equilibrium to the administra- assignment of cases.

tive reasons, I foregoing

For would affirm part, revers-

the order of the district court

ing only portions indicated herein. those hearing the court or type that the issue of abuse is raised of abbreviated 4. The to some recognition necessarily corresponds party, opportunity heard opposing to be some under I.C.R. on a appropriate. discretionary point function. At the is a

Case Details

Case Name: Bower v. Morden
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 29, 1994
Citation: 880 P.2d 245
Docket Number: 21082
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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