{1} This аppeal involves an election contest between two competing boards of commissioners of the San Lorenzo Community Ditch Association (the Association). As relevant to the appeal, Plaintiff Horace L. Bounds, Jr., along with Wigwam Ranch, LLC (Wigwam Ranch), and Boots & Spurs, LLC (Boots & Spurs), sought a declaratory judgment that they were duly elected commissioners at a December 3, 2007 election of the Association and that Defendants Ray Hamlett, Nanci Kelleher, and Norm Wheeler, elected at a January 4, 2008 meeting, were not cоmmissioners entitled to act on behalf of the Association.
{2} The district court held that neither group of commissioners was duly elected. In doing so, it concluded that a “hybrid” form of voting in an acequia election in which voting may be based on either water rights or ditch rights was contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 73-2-14 (1921), and the New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding in Wilson v. Denver,
{3} We hold that the district court correctly held that the 1982 stipulated judgment was not lawful and that the bylaws controlling the December 2007 election were improperly based on the 1982 stipulated judgment that created a hybrid form of voting rights that wаs contrary to both Section 73-2-14 and Wilson. We do not address the district court’s actions concerning the January 4, 2008 election and the special election because they are not before us in this appeal. We affirm.
{4} The Association is a community acequia association organized under NMSA 1978, Sections 73-2-1 to -68 (1874, as amended through 2006). It adopted its first official set of bylaws in 1981, which provided that “[e]ach member will have the same number of votes as acres of land with water rights.” At that time, Plaintiff owned 203.8 acres of land with water rights and had “ditch rights” totaling 141 hours and 20 minutes, which he acquired from his predecessors in interest, his father, Horace L. Bounds, and Wigwam Ranch. Ditch rights are the amount of time during a water cycle that an individual water user may take water from the ditch.
{5} In 1982, Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against the Association to clarify voting practices. He did not name any of the individual members of the Association as defendants. The case resulted in a stipulated judgment, confirming Plaintiffs ditch rights of 141 hours and 20 minutes, and stating his voting rights to be “in proportion to his interest in [the] ditch or in prоportion to the number or amount of his water rights (203.8 acres), whichever is larger.”
{6} In 1989, the Association adopted a second set of bylaws that again provided that voting rights would be based on water rights. There is no evidence in the record of any objections to these bylaws. In 1999, Plaintiff transferred 46.17 of his 203.8 acres of water rights from the San Lorenzo Community Ditch to another location and, as a result, thereafter owned 157.63 acres of water rights on the ditch. After this transfer, the Association did not readjust any of its member’s ditch rights, including those of Plaintiff.
{7} In 2001, the Associаtion held an election in which voting was based on water rights as required by the 1989 bylaws. At that time, Plaintiff, through his attorney, informed the board of commissioners of the 1982 stipulated judgment. The board indicated that, based on the 1982 stipulated judgment, it understood Plaintiff to “prefer ditch rights to water rights[,]” and “that all future dealings of the ... Association will be done by ditch rights.” In February 2002, the board of commissioners adopted new bylaws that based voting rights on ditch rights, a departure from all previously recorded bylaws. The change was prompted by communications from Plaintiff and his attorneys leading commissioners to believe that compliance with the 1982 stipulated judgment was required by law and to prevent litigation.
{8} On December 3, 2007, the Association held a meeting, called by Plaintiff, and conducted an election based on the 2002 bylaws under which a member’s voting rights were in proportion to the member’s ditch rights. Plaintiff, Wigwam Ranch, LLC (represented by Jo Bounds), and Boots & Spurs, LLC (represented by Steve Bounds) were elected commissioners. Plaintiff was also elected mayordomo.
{9} On January 4, 2008, the Association held another meeting cаlled by members who did not believe that the December 3, 2007 meeting was proper. Plaintiff did not attend. The members present conducted an election based on a recalculation of each member’s ditch rights or water rights, whichever provided the member the greater number of votes. Defendants Hamlett, Wheeler, and Kelleher were elected commissioners, and Defendant William Lee was elected mayordomo.
{10} Plaintiff, Wigwam Ranch, and Boots & Spurs filed this action for declaratory judgment in response to the January 4, 2008 election. After trial, the distriсt court ruled that neither set of commissioners was duly elected and entitled to act on behalf of the Association. It held that both elections improperly employed hybrid voting systems contrary to Section 73-2-14 and Wilson and were therefore invalid. The district court further held that the 1982 stipulated judgment was not binding on the Association’s members. The district court ordered the Association to conduct a special election with voting based either by each member casting one vote reflecting the tenancy in common interest of the members of the ditch or by each member voting in proportion to the member’s water rights in the ditch.
{11} In Plaintiffs appeal of these rulings, he raises three issues: (1) whether the Association’s voting rights may be based disproportionally upon hours of ditch time because
VOTING RIGHTS IN ASSOCIATION ELECTIONS
{12} Plaintiffs first argument on appeal asks this Court to overturn the district court because the district court did not properly recognize Plaintiffs voting rights in the Association’s December 3, 2007 and January 4, 2008 elections. Plaintiff argues that “ditch rights” are an easement interest and are, therefore, a valid methоd of apportioning votes in acequia elections under Section 73-2-14 and Wilson. According to Plaintiff, under the second type of ditch interest recognized in Wilson, Association voting may be disproportionate because an easement in a ditch measured by hours of ditch time “generally results in disproportionate voting.” Further, Plaintiff contends that a February 2, 1962 document signed by the owners of water rights in the ditch and notarized created vested rights in the stated ditch times such that, based on Holmberg v. Bradford,
{13} Section 73-2-14 controls the conduct of election of acequia officers in Grant County, New Mexico. It reads in its entirety as follows:
The election for acequia or community ditch officers under this article shall be held by the outgoing commissioners under rules and regulations to be prescribed by them. Only those having water rights in the acequia or ditch and who are not delinquent in the payment of their assessments, and fail to [sic] proffer such delinquent assessment at the time they offer to vote, shall be allowed to vote; but votes may be cast by written proxy and shall be in proportion to the interest of the voter in the ditch or water, or in proportion to the number or amount of his water rights.
Id. (alteration in original).
{14} Plaintiffs concern about the district court’s decision overturning the elections requires us to interpret Section 73-2-14. When interpreting a statute, we seek to fulfill the legislative intent. Wilson,
{15} The central issue in this case is the manner in which voting rights may be apportioned. We thus specifically address the language that states that votes “shall be in proportion to the interest of the voter in the ditch or water.” When we look to the plain language of Section 73-2-14, it statеs that votes shall be cast “in proportion to the interest of the voter in the ditch or water, or in proportion to the number or amount of his water rights.” Section 73-2-14 (emphasis added). See Wilson,
{16} Our reading of the relevant eases supports this analysis. In Holmberg, a new landowner sought to compel a community ditch association to reallocate the shares of the community ditch company “in proportion to thе number of acres irrigated by each land owner from the waters of [the] ditch.” Holmberg,
{17} In Olson, the Court addressed the ditch rights of water users to a community ditch. Olson,
{18} In Wilson, the Court considered a protest to the way aсequia elections were conducted. Wilson,
{20} With the predicate that the plain meaning of Section 73-2-14 requires voting based on one of the alternatives set forth in Wilson, we turn to the two elections at issue to consider whether the voting methods satisfy these requirements. We address the December 3, 2007 election in its historical context.
{21} The Association’s initial bylaws adopted in 1981 called for members to vote in Association elections based on their water rights. In 1982, Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action against the Association, alleging that by virtue of historical practice and the 1962 document of the Association’s members setting forth the ditch time of the members, Association voting should be conducted on the basis of ditch rights rather than water rights. No members of the Association besides Plaintiff were parties to the declaratory judgment action. The action ended in a stipulated judgment providing as to voting that Plaintiffs “voting rights for the election of ... Association officers is in proportion to his interest in said ditch or in proportion to the number or amount of his water rights ..., whichever is larger.” The 1989 bylaws again stated that voting rights were to be based on water rights. However, as a direct result of communications from Plaintiff and his attorney, the Association сhanged its bylaws in 2002 in an attempt to comply with the 1982 stipulated judgment and to prevent additional litigation.
{22} However, the 1982 stipulated judgment creates a hybrid voting scheme that is facially invalid. The 1982 stipulated judgment allows Plaintiff to vote in Association elections either in proportion to his interest in the ditch or in proportion to the number or amount of his water rights, depending on which interest is larger. In addition, the 1982 stipulated judgment gave Plaintiff the power to decide the manner in which he could vote regardless of the manner in which other members were allowed to vote. For example, if the board of commissioners decided to base voting on the number of acres in the ditch with water rights attached, the 1982 stipulated judgment would nevertheless permit Plaintiff to vote based on other interests. While Wilson holds that Section 73-3-3, and thereby Section 73-2-14, contemplates alternative methods of voting, nothing permits combining alternative methods into another method in a single election. A hybrid voting method is one that does not follow a single method of apportioning votes in an acequia election and, therefore, does not comport with Section 73-2-14 and Wilson. The 1982 stipulated judgment was therefore contrary to Section 73-2-14 and Wilson and therefore is invalid.
{23} We acknowledge that the Association’s 2002 bylaws did not provide for a hybrid
{24} Plaintiff does not contest the district court’s factual findings. With such facts, the 2002 bylaws were improperly based on the 1982 stipulated judgment. The district court’s findings indicate that the changes to the bylaws occurred because Plaintiff and his attorneys led the commissioners to believe compliance with the stiрulated judgment was required by law and in order to prevent litigation, which presumably would be initiated by Plaintiff. The Association acquiesced and complied with the 1982 stipulated judgment by, presumably, adopting the voting method that reflected Plaintiffs greater interest as between water rights and ditch rights, that of voting on the basis of ditch rights. Substantial evidence supported the district court’s conclusion to overturn the December 3, 2007 election in this regard. See Malissa C. v. Matthew Wayne H.,
{25} Althоugh Plaintiff frames the issues before us in the context of disproportionate voting, because we conclude that the December 3, 2007 election was not validly conducted because of the hybrid method underlying the voting process, we need not specifically address this argument. We pause briefly, however, to mention Plaintiffs argument that the 1962 document provided him vested rights. The document lists water rights, work performed, and assessments as of specified recorded dates. For “the present owners of water rights” on the ditch as of February 2, 1962, it states “the time to which each is entitled to receive water.” Nothing in the document discusses voting. Rather, it concludes with the ditch time available to the owners of water rights on the ditch. To the extent that the document can be understood to include voting rights, from its allocation of ditch time based on water rights, voting would follow water rights as well. As a result, the 1981 and 1989 bylaws that base voting rights on water rights are consistent with the 1962 document. If anything alters vested rights based on the 1962 document, it would be the 1982 stipulated judgment that sought to create voting based on Plaintiffs choice of voting rights based on his greater rights regardless of the rights of the other members. Cf. Holmberg,
{26} At the January 4, 2008 meeting, the Association based voting on each member’s ditch time or water rights, whichever gave the member the greater number of votes. The district court also held that this manner of voting was an invalid hybrid method. It granted declaratory judgment in Plaintiffs favor declaring that the officers elected at the January 4, 2008 meeting were nоt duly elected and were not entitled to act on behalf of the Association. Defendants do not appeal from the district court’s judgment, and, as a result, we do not review the judgment in this regard. See State ex. rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. John D.,
1982 STIPULATED JUDGMENT — RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ATTACK
{27} In his second and third arguments on appeal, Plaintiff contends that the district court should have followed the 1982 stipulated judgment because it was entitled to res judicata effect and because it was not subject to collatеral attack.
{28} “Res judicata bars relitigation of the same claim between the same parties or their privies when the first litigation resulted in a final judgment on the merits.” Deflon v. Sawyers,
{29} In 1981, Plaintiff sued the Association only; he did not name or serve as a party any individual members of the Association. The 1982 stipulated judgment was approved by the attorneys on behalf of their clients, Plaintiff and the Association. In this case, Plaintiff named the individual Defendants in their complaint as members of the Association. Plaintiff also named the Association as a nominal Defendant. As we have discussed, the controversy involves the voting rights of members of the Association to elect the Association’s board of commissioners.
{30} The determination of whether parties are in privity “requires a case-by-case analysis.” Id. ¶ 4. A court must determine whether a party is “so identified in interest with another” that the party “represents the same legal right.” Lems v. City of Santa Fe,
{31} The interest, and concomitant legal right, of the Association is that the election be legally held and binding. See § 73-2-12 (requiring that officers of ditch corporations be elected biannually); § 73-2-21 (defining powers and duties of ditch corporation officers). The members, on the other hand, in addition to interests that may be common to the Association, have the legal right to vote in the election. See § 73-2-15 (stating that when commissioners neglect to call an election in reasonable time, those entitled to vote may call an election in the same manner as the commissioners). The Association does not vote, and although it has an interest in ensuring that the members’ votes are legally cast, that interest is not the same as a member’s interest аnd right to participate in the Association’s governance by voting to elect the Association’s governing board. As this case illustrates, voting rights bear upon a member’s rights in the acequia because the Association’s board of commissioners has the authority to determine the allocation of water from the acequia. See generally § 73-2-21. Although the Association did not remove the right to vote of any member by entering into the 1982 stipulated judgment, it altered the members’ voting rights, which necessarily diluted the rights of some members. Thus, because thе rights of the Association and its members did not coincide, the Association could not have protected the legal rights of all its members in the action. The Association and the members do not share the required privity, and res judicata does not apply to the 1982 stipulated judgment.
{32} We next address Plaintiffs collateral attack issue. Generally, district court judgments are presumptively correct. Porter v. Mesilla Valley Cotton Prods. Co.,
{33} However, “judgments entered by the consent of the parties and upon stipulations have only been regarded as immune from collateral attack by the parties themselves, or those in privity with them.” Lewis,
SPECIAL ELECTION
{34} After determining that the Association did not validly conduct the December 3, 2007 and the January 4, 2008 elections, the district court ordered the Association to conduct a special election in a manner not previously stated in any of the Association’s bylaws. The district court ordered the members to agree as to one of two alternative methods of voting: by casting one vote per member representing the tenancy in common in the ditch, or by voting in proportion to the members’ water rights in the ditch. Plaintiffs appeal does not challenge this action, and Defendants did not cross appeal. We therefore do not address this aspect of the district court’s decision in this appeal. See John D.,
CONCLUSION
{35} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling.
{36} In addition, the Court notes that, on its own initiative, it requested briefing from the Office of the State Engineer and the New Mexico Acequia Association as amicus curiae in this appeal. We thank amicus curiae for their presentations to the Court.
{37} IT IS SO ORDERED.