49 F. Supp. 600 | D. Idaho | 1943
This is an action in which Boundary County, Idaho, and its present commissioners sue the defendant for $49,232.63 with interest or, in the alternative, that certain tax deeds executed by plaintiffs’ officers on December 30, 1938, be set aside and that the defendant be required to account for proceeds received by him from the use of the real estate described in such tax deeds. The litigation of which this is an outgrowth has been the subject of controversy in the Idaho courts for many years. To attempt even briefly to describe the issues which have previously been litigated between this plaintiff, its various elective officials, and the Commissioners of Drainage District No. 1 of Boundary County on the one side and this defendant on the other would serve only to confuse the questions of the real issues in this case. It is to be hoped that this litigation, at least, may be viewed as the end of the beginning of the controversies between these parties.
This case originally came before me sitting under assignment in this court on a motion to set aside Judge Cavanah’s order of July 28, 1942. Plaintiffs’ counsel confessed the motion. He agreed that the opinion itself was not sufficient authority upon which to base the order. He admitted the necessity for Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree. Thereupon, discussion arose as to the procedure to be followed in order to proceed with the entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment or Decree. It was agreed that the entire matter be submitted to me and the necessity of making available to me the testimony introduced at the trial was recognized by both sides. Thereafter, the testimony was reduced to writing. I considered it and all of the pleadings and exhibits in the case and arguments and briefs were presented upon all of the merits of the controversy.
The embarrassment involved in this situation is obvious. My high regard for Judge Cavanah naturally persuades me that I should accept his opinion if such a course is possible. Plaintiffs’ counsel urges that I am bound by Judge Cavanah’s opinion. With that argument I cannot agree. The responsibility for the decision rests with me. Unfortunately, my conclusions concerning it are not in accord with those of Judge Cavanah. It may well be, in the event of an appeal, that the Appellate Court would accept Judge Cavanah’s opinion rather than mine. In order that it may have full advantage of Judge Cavanah’s opinion, I will direct that the record on appeal should include such opinion. However, I have been forced regretfully to reach a conclusion different from that at which Judge Cavanah arrived and I must follow that conclusion despite my dislike for that course of action.
In this case, plaintiffs seek collaterally to attack a judgment of the court of the State of Idaho. No appeal having been taken from that judgment, it was final and binding. The plaintiff’s duly elected County Commissioners were parties to that suit in the State Court. Consequently, it was binding upon plaintiff Boundary County. Sec. 30-719, Idaho Code Annotated, Board of Commissioners v. Bassett, 14 Idaho 324, 93 P. 774. The court had jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of that action. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 et seq., 59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104. The Idaho court judgment is res judicata and can not collaterally be attacked in this court. Sunshine Mining Company v. Treinies, D.C., 19 F.Supp. 587; Treinies et al. v. Sunshine Mining Company, 9 Cir., 99 F.2d 651, affirmed Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Company, 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85. What Judge Cavanah said in that case (19 F.Supp. 587, 594) is peculiarly pertinent here. “Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation, and especially where the parties have contested an issue in a court having first jurisdiction. This thought is forcibly expressed by Mr. Justice Roberts in the case of Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Association, 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 518, 75 L.Ed. 1244, where it is said: ‘Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest; and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause.’ ” When the Treinies case reached the Supreme Court (308 U.S. 66, 78, 60 S.Ct. 44, 51, 84 L.Ed. 85) Mr. Justice Reed succinctly stated the rule: “One trial of an issue is enough. ‘The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,’ as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties.” If the Idaho court committed error in including the words “or its equivalent” in the judgment,
Furthermore, these plaintiffs are estopped to seek the relief for which they pray in this action. The plaintiff county, through its Commissioners, failed to challenge the language of the judgment of December 24, 1938, either by motion for its correction by the court which entered it or by appeal. The evidence is undisputed that the transaction of December 30, 1938, was at the instigation of plaintiff’s officials. The defendant had a right to rely and did rely upon the conduct of plaintiff when he paid $22,811.33 taxes and delivered for cancellation the $49,232.63 worth of bonds. He had no reason to believe that a change in control of the county would result in the attempted change of position on the part of the county. The evidence is undisputed that, after Woldson received deeds to the property, the county collected from him a total of $55,580.09 taxes, the Drainage District collected from him, in 1939, $16,-250.90 in drainage district assessments. He was required to spend $1,000 in order to defeat certain homestead claims in the office of the Commissioner of Public Lands in Washington, D. C. Believing that he was the owner of this property, he sold a portion of it and faces the possibility of a damage action by his purchaser in the event his title was invalid. This case clearly comes within the rule laid down in James v. Nelson, 9 Cir., 90 F.2d 910, 917, certiorari denied, 302 U.S. 721, 58 S.Ct. 41, 82 L.Ed. 556. In that case, the grantor sued the grantee and the lessees of the grantee. The grantor was advised of the deed and knew and allowed the lessee to go upon the land and expend money for improvements. In invoking the doctrine of estoppel against the grantor, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used the following language:
“They are also defeated as the result of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by conduct.
“The elements of this latter type of estoppel are well stated in Nelson v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Corporation [8 Cir.], 76 F.2d 17, 21, 100 A.L.R. 87: ‘The essential elements of estoppel, as applicable in this case, are: (1) Ignorance of the party claiming estoppel of the matter asserted; (2) silence concerning matter where there is a duty to speak amounting to misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact; (3) action by the party relying on the misrepresentation or concealment; and (4) damages resulting if the estoppel is denied. (Many cases cited).’
“In more trenchant language, in Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580, 25 L.Ed. 618, the Supreme Court thus expounded the doctrine: ‘The estoppel here relied upon is known as an equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais. The law upon the subject is well settled. The vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Such a change of position is sternly forbidden. It involves fraud and falsehood, and the law abhors both. This remedy is always so applied as to promote the ends of justice.’
“Again, in Gregg v. Von Phul, 1 Wall. 274, 68 U.S. 274, 281, 17 L.Ed. 536, the court said: ‘The doctrine of estoppels in pais, or by the act of the party, is founded in natural justice, “and is a principle of good morals as well as law.” “The primary*604 ground of the doctrine is, that it would be fraud in a party to assert what his previous conduct had denied, when on the faith of that denial others have acted.” (Cases cited.) No one is permitted to keep silent when he should speak, and thereby mislead another to his injury. If one has a claim against an estate and does not disclose it, but stands by and suffers the estate sold and improved, with knowledge that the title has been mistaken, he will not be allowed after-wards to assert his claim against the purchaser. And justly so, because the effect of his silence has actually misled and worked harm to the purchaser. And in this case the silence of Gregg concludes him.’ See, also, Pacific Mill & Mining Co. v. Leete [9 Cir.], 94 F. 968, 975; 21 C.J. 1059-1062; Mascarel v. Mascarel’s Ex’rs, 3 Cal.App. 501, 86 P. 617, 618; Mills v. Rossiter Co., 156 Cal. 167, 103 P. 896, 897; Bigelow on Estoppel (6th Ed.) ch. xviii, pp. 602-716; California Packing Corporation v. Sun-Maid R. Growers [9 Cir.], 81 F.2d 674, 679, certiorari denied 298 U.S. 668, 56 S.Ct. 833, 80 L.Ed. 1391.”
Even stronger language was used by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Pacific Mill & Mining Co. v. Leete, 9 Cir., 94 F. 968, 974: “Having allowed the defendant in error to act upon the understanding had by both parties, the plaintiff in error cannot now deny that understanding, to the loss or injury of the defendant in error. Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. [N.Y.] 166 [10 Am. Dec. 316] ; Mississippi Coal & Ice Co. v. The Ottumwa Belle, [D. C.] 78 F. 643; Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. City of Arkansas City [8 Cir.], 76 F. 271, 22 C.C. A. 171, 40 U.S.App. 257 [34 L.R.A. 518]; Smiley v. Barker [9 Cir.], 83 F. 684, 28 C.C.A. 9, 55 U.S.App. 125; Markham v. O’Connor, 52 Ga. 183 [21 Am.Rep. 249]; Cunningham v. Patrick, 136 Mo. 621, 37 S.W. 817. ‘The vital principle (of estoppel in pais) is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Such a change of position is sternly forbidden. It involves fraud and falsehood, and the law abhors both.’ Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578 [25 L.Ed. 618] ; Fetter, Eq. §§ 21, 22. ‘Equitable estoppel, in the modern sense, arises from the conduct of a party, using that word in its broadest meaning as including his spoken or written words, his positive acts, and his silence or negative omission to do anything. Its foundation is justice and good conscience.’ 2 Pom.Eq.Jur. § 802. ‘The doctrine seems to be established by authority that the conduct and admissions of a party operate against him in the nature of an estoppel, wherever, in good conscience and honest dealing, he Ought not to be permitted to gainsay them. Thus negligence becomes constructive fraud, although, strictly speaking, the actual intention to mislead or deceive may be wanting, and the party may be innocent, if innocence and negligence may be deemed compatible. In such cases the maxim is justly applied to him that, when one of two innocent persons , must suffer, he shall suffer who by his own acts occasioned the confidence and loss.’ Stevens v. Dennett, 51 N.H. 324.”
Plaintiff’s contention is that the doctrine of estoppel should not apply here because the plaintiff was acting as trustee for the drainage district. That contention is fully answered by the case of James v. Nelson, supra, where the doctrine was invoked against cestuis que trust because of their knowledge of the acts of their trustee. It must be remembered that the commissioners of the drainage district were parties to the state court action and had the same right to appeal therefrom as did the commissioners of the county. Furthermore, in 1939, the drainage district collected $16,-250.90 assessments from the defendant. The commissioners of the drainage district acquiesced in and the drainage district accepted the benefits of the transaction of December 30, 1938. Since estoppel would apply to the drainage district were it a party to the action, it avails these plaintiffs nothing to contend that the relationship of the county in the transaction was purely that of a trustee.
For the foregoing two reasons, I am convinced that the action of plaintiff must be dismissed.
In so far as the arguments presented to me are concerned, defendant has not seriously pressed his cross-complaint. Most of the matters raised therein could have been raised in the previous actions in the state court. Furthermore, the nature of the proof presented on the cross-complaint is not such as to justify the entry of a judgment thereon. For these reasons, defendant’s cross-complaint also will be dismissed.
The judgment of dismissal must also contain an order setting aside the order of July 28, 1942, and a decree setting aside