KERRY BOULTON, ANE MARIE LACY, WILLIAM GAMBA, LUCA ANGELUCCI, and JEREMY ANDREWS, Plaintiffs, v. US TAX LIEN ASSOCIATION, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; SAEN HIGGINS, and STEVE CLEMENTS, Defendants. US TAX LIEN ASSOCIATION, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; and SAEN HIGGINS, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN TRANSFER SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, and REUBEN SANCHEZ, Third-Party Defendants.
No. 2:15-cv-02384-MCE-AC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
August 7, 2017
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
ORDER
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Under
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“In determining whether a plaintiff has exercised ‘reasonable diligence’ for purposes of
§ 415.50(a) , a court must examine the affidavit required by the statute to see whether the plaintiff ‘took those steps a reasonable person who truly desired to give notice would have taken under the circumstances.‘” Duarte v. Freeland, No. C-05-2780 EMC, 2008 WL 683427, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2008) (quoting Donel, Inc. v. Badalian, 87 Cal. App. 3d 327, 333 (1978)); see also Watts v. Crawford, 10 Cal. 4th 743, 749 n.5 (1995) (“The term ‘reasonable diligence’ . . . denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in good faith by the party or his agent or attorney.“). Due process concerns mandate that service by publication is appropriate “only as a last resort.” Donel, Inc., 87 Cal. App. 3d at 327; see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (discussing due process and notice to a party). “Before allowing a plaintiff to resort to service by publication, the courts necessarily require him to show exhaustive attempts to locate the defendant, for it is generally recognized that service by publication rarely results in actual notice.” Watts, 10 Cal. 4th at 749. “The fact that a plaintiff has taken one or a few reasonable steps does not necessarily mean that ‘all myriad . . . avenues’ have been properly exhausted to warrant service by publication.” Duarte, 2008 WL 683427, at *1 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Donel, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 333). In Mullane, the Court noted that “in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.” Id. at 317.
The Court is satisfied that USTLA has diligently attempted to serve ATSI and Sanchez, and that such service has been all but impossible. USTLA filed its Answer and Third-Party Complaint (“TPC“) on October 19, 2016, ECF No. 26, and summons was issued the following day, ECF No. 27. From October 20, 2016 to the date on which USTLA filed the present motion, it attempted to effect service on ATSI and/or Sanchez many times at no fewer than six different business and residential addresses. See Decl. of Teri T. Pham ISO Mot. for Service by Publication, ¶¶ 3-9; Decl of James J. Passmore
Further, it appears that a legitimate cause of action exists against ATSI and Sanchez for fraud, indemnity, and contribution. See TPC. Moreover, these general allegations provide further support to USTLA‘s theory that ATSI and Sanchez are evading service.
On these facts, service by publication is appropriate and USTLA‘s motion is GRANTED.2 USTLA shall publish the Summons in a newspaper in the State of California most likely to give actual notice to ATSI and Sanchez,
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 7, 2017
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
