Bouchard v. Price

Marie et al. BOUCHARD

Craig PRICE 95-205-Appeal. No. Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

5,May

Royalties of 1983. The At- Act Distribution torney the Rhode Island General for State of 24(d) intervened, pursuant to Rule Procedure, to Superior Rules of Civil Royalties argue Distribu- that Criminal tion Act constitutional. History

Facts and Procedural 1989, defendant, September then On fifteen, Family aged appeared before the facts to be Court and admitted sufficient adjudicated delinquent for murders of daughters, and her Jennifer Joan Heaton Price, and Melissa Heaton. See State (R.I.1996). April A.2d 894-95 On complaint plaintiffs against de- filed Superior in the Court in which fendant (counts wrongful sought for death 6), theory upon a through relief based (count unjust 7), a enrichment declaration subject defendant was Criminal (count 8), Royalties Act of 1983 Distribution Partington, Rebecca Tedford Nicholas preventing a declaration defendant from Gorham, Providence, for Plaintiff. receiving any property benefits or as a result Mann, Providence, Robert B. for Defen- Joan, Jennifer, and Melissa the deaths of dant. (count 9). Heaton WEISBERGER, C.J., and Present: Following hearing August on LEDERBERG, BOURCIER granted was defendant’s motion dismiss FLANDERS, JJ. except respect to all counts count 8. On 24,1995, February plaintiffs’ motion for sum-

OPINION granted mary judgment was on the sole re- Thereafter, maining judgment count. was LEDERBERG, Justice. entered, parties and the filed these cross- case This came before the appeals. plaintiffs, cross-appeals Marie Bou- chard, capacity beneficiary in her as Wrongful Death Claims Heaton; Garofalo, estate of Joan Steven capacity appeal, plaintiffs as the administrator of the es- On contended Heaton; Bouchard, justice wrong- Mary dismissing tate of Joan Lou trial erred their Bouchard, Zakalis, Raymond grounds that and Gail in ful-death claims on the capacities their barred of limita- the brother and sisters of claims were Heaton; plaintiffs Nancy Mayer, undisputed Joan General tions. It Island, wrongful for ex their action death Treasurer of State of Rhode plaintiffs; more than four and one- rel. the above-named defendant, years underlying Craig plaintiffs The half after the deaths their Price. have clearly Although for G.L.1956 10-7-2 appealed the dismissal of their claims claims. enrichment, death, provides of limitations in a unjust that the statute wrongful and relief years, plain- Slayer’s wrongful-death action is three Act. defen- under the so-called The argued of limitations granting plain- appealed dant has tiffs have summary judgment on their was tolled this case. tiffs’ motion of their seeking support remaining a declaration advanced two theories sole count position. subject to the that the defendant is Criminal

First, plaintiffs delinquent contended that cated defen remains within the minority jurisdiction dant’s tolled the statute of limita Court’s until he or she reaches wrongful years death age twenty-one. tions until three Section 14-1-6. age majority. after defendant reached the intent of the exclu- granting that, sive, plaintiffs pursuant jurisdiction The original Family noted to G.L. to the Court 9-1-19, § preclude the statute of attaching limitations on “to re- during plaintiffs juvenile civil actions does not run a to do- sponsibility the offenders for minority, that, argued ing protect and a thereby as matter of of the criminal act and to fairness,” “equity, adjudg- symmetry age by and prescribed basic the a child under the delinquent statute of ing wayward limitations should also not run him [or her] a “against entering judgment those who have of a of causes action child rather than against provides minors.” complaint.” Section 9-1-19 conviction on State Cook, exception to the statute of limitations for R.I. A.2d disabled, minor, (1965). legisla- including plaintiffs Clearly, purpose civil the of the tolling actions. The grant jurisdiction rationale for the tive of exclusive juve- of plaintiff Family limitations for a minor is to protect delinquent safe Court is to a guard right system, the bring justice minor’s to civil nile actions from the adult criminal during minority juvenile that accrue his or her until and a from civil not to shield such age majority, he or she the liability. reaches of at which time the individual decide wheth Family plaintiffs argued The that the also pursue er to such claims. are of the We jurisdiction Court’s exclusive over defendant opinion analogous purpose that no such jurisdiction to Superior of divested the Court by tolling

would served the statute of during against hear a defendant civil claim limitations in respect to minor defendants. minority. his re plaintiffs’ The assertion Moreover, previously we have held that jurisdic lack garding Superior of Court’s § 9-1-19 does not toll the statute limita- by tion delinquent over minor is undercut in a wrongful-death tions action. Short v. legislation of a recognizes right that Flynn, 446-48, 118 R.I. A.2d Family petition crime victim to Court (1977). Short, stated because juve “divulge the name address of the and wrongful a claim for death was unknown at committing nile the crime accused law, chapter common 7 of 10 of title purpose allowing the victim Laws, Rhode Island General entitled “Death juvenile against commence civil action Act,” Wrongful entirely created an new damages parents to recover for his and/or right of action that “cannot be main- now the crime.” Section sustained as result of except tained to the extent the man- “[t]he held that 14—1-66. This Court has provided ner in that at Act.” Id. § 14-1-66 is legislative clear intent behind Therefore, A.2d at 788. holding under our recover, action, allow victims to via civil Short, tolling provisions 9-1-19 are juvenile hands of a suffered at the applicable plaintiffs’ not claims under the Brewing Corp., offender.” Matter Falstaff wrongful-death act. Fire, Narragansett Brewery Re: 637 A.2d (R.I.1994). 1047, 1050

Second, plaintiffs asserted that therefore, opinion, We wrongful-death are their claims were tolled dim plaintiffs filing a precluded ing minority, were defendant’s he while was Superior civil suit “wayward” “delinquent” Court minor within exclusive, during minority. Consequently, the trial jurisdiction original justice plaintiffs’ wrong- properly Family dismissed Court. has exclu sive, grounds ful-death claims on original jurisdiction proceedings were of limitations. “[cjoneerning any residing barred being child (i) (ii) Delinquent; within the is: state who Unjust Claim for Enrichment (in) (iv) Wayward; Neglected; Dependent; (v) Mentally defective or that the disordered.” next contended A adjudi- justice by dismissing 14-1-5. minor trial claim who erred their Brewing statutory construction.” unjust This has held enrichment. Falstaff construing a unjust Corp., 637 A2d at 1049. brought upon that “actions theories statute, responsibility of “has the essentially this Court quasi-contract enrichment and are effectuating the intent of the same.” R & B Electric Co. v. Amco (R.I. giving Co., entirety examining a statute Construction meaning.” 1984). ordinary Furthermore, plain their the words it is well settled Consequently, we are constrained Id. quasi-contract “in order to recover under the context read 33-1.1-15 within enrichment, unjust plaintiff is re act as a whole. (1) quired prove three a ben elements: efit must be conferred the defendant Slayer’s Act Section 33-1.1-2 plaintiff, apprecia there must be slay specifically provides that “[n]either benefit, tion the defendant of such any claiming through him or person er nor acceptance must of such there be any way acquire any property her shall in benefit in such circumstances that it would any as the result of the death receive benefit inequitable for a be defendant to retain remaining sections the decedent.” paying benefit without the value thereof.” receiving specifically slayer from exclude Corrado, Anthony Inc. v. Menard & Co. any property through the of the decedent’s Contractors, Building (§ (§ 33-1.1-3), intestacy 33- laws of will (R.I.1991) (citing 1201-02 BR & Electric (§ 1.1-4), 33-1.1-5), entirety tenancy by the Co., 1355-56). at A.2d (§ 33-1.1-6), joint tenancy reversionary in- us, In plaintiffs (§ the case before have faded 33-1.1-7), subject a life terest interest to allege unjust support (§ facts to a claim 33-1.1-8), contingent remainder estate only purported (§ enrichment. The benefits to (§ 33-1.1-9), appointment power of 33- profits plaintiffs (§ defendant are antici- 1.1-10), proceeds and insurance 33-1.1- pate might by selling 11). defendant obtain Slayer’s It is that the Act was clear rights story unspecified to his at some time slayer acquiring intended to exclude a in the future. Even if this Court were formerly by a property that was held accept speculative profits these as a benefit slain decedent. The act does not address defendant, say we cannot that such benefit slayer property or benefits received by plaintiffs. was conferred sources, defendant from other nor do we construe Therefore, justice we hold that the trial did right no act to to individuals who have dismissing plaintiffs’ not err in claim for un- acquire property through the decedent. just enrichment. Slayer’s inapplicable Act is Because the case, justice did not err the instant the trial Slayer’s

Claim under the Act dismissing plaintiffs’ claim under this stat- plaintiffs next contended that the ute. justice dismissing trial erred their claim Act, Royalties Slayer’s

under the so-called Distribution Act G.L.1956 Criminal chapter plaintiffs 1.1 of title 33. The have argued that the cross-appeal, defendant On urged this Court to “construe the broad justice determining that defen- trial erred scope Slayer’s of Rhode Island’s Act [as] “criminally responsible person” dant was a legislative indicative of a intent that no crimi Royalties meaning within the of the Criminal profit by nal under cir shall (criminal royalties Act of 1983 Distribution support position, cumstances.” of their act), chapter of title 25.1 provides noted that 33-1.1-15 constitutionality of the upholding and in chapter shall be construed “[t]his royalties act establishes a act. The criminal broadly policy in order to effect the of this criminally whereby profits that a mechanism person profit state that no shall be allowed to collect responsible person would otherwise wrong.” his or her own felony exploitation of a from the commercial royalties fund from statutory diverted to a criminal

“Well-established canons of con- are reim- of the crime claim delegate the function which victims struction to this court a result damages suffered as duty questions final of bursement for arbiter paid pursuant of the crime. The act defines its critical The funds to this section are collectively terms as follows: known as the 12-25.1-3(b). fund. Section Criminally responsible person: person “a requires payment The act into fund of felony who has been convicted of a commit- moneys go that would otherwise criminally ted within the state of Rhode Island which responsible persons. Claims may be personal caused another to suffer against the fund and would paid in the injury property, or loss of or who has been following priority: first state and adjudicated guilty by insanity reason of municipality providing costs incurred offense, charge after trial on a of such an criminally responsible defense counsel voluntarily or who has admitted the com- person, investigative, prosecution and for mission of such an offense.” Section 12- victims, victim expenses, next to the then 25.1-2(6). criminally responsible per- to creditors of the “any exploitation: publica- Commercial son, finally, criminally responsible tion, reenactment, dramatization, inter- higher priority person after the above claims view, depiction, explanation, expression 12-25.1-3(e)(l). have been satisfied. Section through any medium of communication challenging which is undertaken for financial consid- argued that the act does not first includes, eration. The is not term but him because does not fall under the act’s he to, book, movie, magazine limited or “criminally responsible per definition of a article, newspaper tape recording, still disagree. criminally responsi son.” A We photograph, program, radio or television person person ble includes a “who has volun presentation, reproduction pre- live tarily felony.]” admitted the commission of [a sentation of kind.” Section 12-25.1- 12-25.1-2(6). undisputed It is that in 2(3). Section Family Court defendant admitted facts suffi § concepts These are melded in 12-25.1- adjudicated delinquent for cient to be the. 3(a), provides any person legal which murders of the Heatons. These three acts entity criminally responsi- contracting with a felonies had defen would have constituted person exploitation ble of the commercial dant been tried and convicted as an adult. supply the crime must to the Trea- General opinion, of this our the felonious nature copy surer of the State of Rhode Island a . negated, purposes behavior was contracting enti- contract and that such act, royalties the criminal defendant’s sta ty payments payable to must make otherwise juvenile tus as a at the time he committed person instead to the General Treasur- Contrary the murders. to the assertion Specifically, er. it states: interpretation concurring colleague, our firm, Family “Every person, corporation, partner- supported by provisions of the is association, Act, ship, legal entity chapter 1 of title 14. It or other 14-1-66, § criminally responsible indisputable that under a victim contracting with a * * * regarding petition of crime Court to the commercial juve “divulge of the exploitation of and circum- the name and address the events committing constituting surrounding accused of the crime stances nile and/or purpose allowing motivating alleged crime or the victim and/or contract, juvenile action copy crime shall commence civil submit (10) days making parents to recover for within ten there- and/or (Em of, pay as a result of the crime.” general to the treasurer and shall sustained added.) 14r-l-42(e) (re phases § general treasurer within ten See also over to the ferring days becoming payable, to “the victim or victims of the crime of it due juvenile adju compensation for which the was certified and any and all monies or other added)). (emphasis Clearly, the terms of dicated” which would otherwise payable contemplated intended and such contract be due and per- juvenile adjudged of such an act for which a delin distributed at the direction l-3(a). quent should be considered a crime in the 12-25. son.” Section contract, York brought by under the to the New context of a civil action a victim son (board).1 In re Board Section the crime. See Matter State Crime Victims Falstaff (purpose 632-a(l). Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d at 1050 § permit 14-1-66 to victim to recover dam At & Schuster was book issue Simon juvenile committing ages from accused of detailing and crimi- Wiseguy, the life entitled crime). We hold that such acts likewise re (Hill). In history Henry Hill nal of mobster tain their criminal character under the crimi 1987, the board that Simon & determined remedy nal which is also a civil Schuster, book, publisher of the had vio- for victims of crime. by failing its contract lated 632-a to submit next contended that by making pay- Hill to the board and with act is an unconstitu to Hill. board & ments ordered Simon expression. tional restraint on free In Si produce pay the contract and to Schuster Schuster, mon & Inc. v. Members the New money Hill to the board all due under Board, York State Crime Victims 502 U.S. contract, Hill to the and ordered to return (1991), 116 L.Ed.2d 476 S.Ct. payments already board the he had received the United States Court was faced to be held escrow for victims of Hill’s challenge with a First Amendment to New crimes. Simon & suit un- Schuster similarly statute, York’s structured 1983, challenging der U.S.C. (McKinney N.Y.Exec.Law 632-a 1982 and as unconstitutional under the First Amend- 1992), Supp.1991) (repealed enacted in 1977 seeking injunction against ment and response publicity generated by enforcement. Both the Federal District killings. “Son of Sam” serial The attention Ap- Court and the Second Circuit Court of crimes, perpetrator received peals held the law to be constitutional. The Berkowitz, David possibility created the Supreme granted certio- United States Court notoriety he could in” on “cash his while his Schuster, Supreme rari. In Simon & victims and their families remained uncom held that the Son of Sam law was pensated. sought The Son Sam law speech and thus content-based restriction potential inequity ensuring foreclose this applied scrutiny analysis. strict 502 money that through received a criminal 118, 116, 508, 509, 112 116 U.S. at S.Ct. at exploitation media his her crime would 487, Although recognized at it L.Ed.2d 488. “ recompense ‘first be made available to compelling that the state has interests victims of that crime for their loss and suffer ensuring compen- that victims of crime are ” Schuster, ing.’ 108, Simon & 502 at U.S. sated harm and that those who them 504, 116 112 (quoting S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d at 482 crimes, profit criminals do not from their id. Assembly 9019, Bill Memorandum ARe: 118-19, 509-10, 112 116 at S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d 22, 1977, July reprinted Legislative Bill 488-89, Supreme at Court nonetheless 823). Jacket, N.Y.Laws, 1977 eh. it struck down the Son of Sam law because law, implementation of the Son of Sam narrowly tailored to meet these com- was as it existed at the time the United States 123,112 512, pelling interests. Id. at S.Ct. at it, Supreme substantially Court reviewed was 116 L.Ed.2d at 492. similar to that of Rhode Island’s criminal Court, According statute, the statute was royalties act. Under the New York significantly “applies it overinclusive because any entity contracting with a accused any subject, provided to works on or convicted of a crime New York for the express thoughts depiction required was the author’s or recollections crime submit contract, crime, tangentially inci- copy any payments however about 511, 121, per- dentally.” Id. at 112 at 116 otherwise due the accused or convicted S.Ct. law, (1991), decided, Although the New York Court of the New York unlike its Rhode was apply counterpart, Appeals as not Island was not its terms had construed the statute limited 110, resulting injury persons prop- ing S.Ct. at to victimless crimes. Id. at 112 to crimes Schuster, 505, (citing erty, by 116 L.Ed.2d at 484 Children Bed the time Simon & Inc. v. Mem- 713, Board, Petromelis, ford, 77 N.Y.2d 570 the New York State Crime Victims Inc. v. bers of 541, 105, 501, 453, 460, (1991)). 573 N.E.2d 548 502 U.S. 112 S.Ct. 116 L.Ed.2d 476 N.Y.S.2d Schuster, 508, 115, 112 at at L.Ed.2d at 490. The Court noted that had & 502 U.S. S.Ct. 116 L.Ed.2d at 486-87. On the basis of our applicable the statute been in effect at the law, per case we are review relevant place, payments for such works as time and act is a X, suaded Autobiography Malcolm Thoreau’s true, Although statute. it is content-based Disobedience, Augustine’s Civil Saint Attorney General have and the would have been escrowed. Id. Confessions out, pointed that the States United opinion, In the fact Court’s “princi repeatedly has stated that the applied statute would have to works such as content-neutrality determining pal inquiry in “clearly these demonstrated that the act government has is whether range reaches a wide literature does because of regulation speech adopted a profit not enable a criminal from his crime disagreement with the mes [agreement or] uncompensated.” while a victim Id. remains Broadcasting Sys conveys,” sage it Turner at at at 491. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 622, 642, tem, F.C.C., 512 U.S. Inc. v. Thus, the statute was held to be unconstitu- 2445, 2459, 517-18 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. tional. Against Rac (quoting Rock Ward v. problem The Court also identified a second ism, 2746, 2754, 109 S.Ct. U.S. justification with the Son of Sam law: no was (1989)), the Court 105 L.Ed.2d drawing offered for “a distinction between rec pronouncements with the tempered such * * * expressive activity other activ- aof con ognition that “the mere assertion ity in connection with its interest in transfer- enough to purpose [will not] tent-neutral ring the fruits of crime from criminals to face, which, on its discriminates save law 119-20, 112 their victims.” Id. at S.Ct. at Broadcasting on content.” Turner based 510,116 words, L.Ed.2d at 489. other Inc., 642-43, 114 at S.Ct. System, 512 U.S. at profits statute’s focus on derived from ex- Thus, if the even 129 L.Ed.2d at 518. pressive activity nothing “has to do with the purpbse act—name of the criminal transferring proceeds State’s interest by utilizing victims ly, compensating that of of crime from criminals to their victims.” Id. from has derived proceeds that a criminal at at at 490. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d content-neutral, activity —is purpose If the of the act were scrutiny if the must strict nevertheless compensate profits victims from the derived basis on its on the face discriminates no there would be reason of content. target only profits expressive those from ac- reason- point Supreme Court’s On it, tivity. expressed theAs Court the state “The is instructive: ing in Simon & Schuster limiting if has “little interest * * * a content-based Son of Sam law is compensation proceeds wrong- from singles It out income derived statute. speech doer’s about the crime.” Id. at 120- expressive activity a burden the State 21, 511, 112 at S.Ct. at 116 L.Ed.2d 490. income, and it is directed places no other ultimately Although it rested its decision on only specified content.” 502 at works with a grounds, overinclusiveness the Court’s com- at at 112 at 116 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. mentary suggests that the statute also suf- added.) roy- The criminal (Emphases 487. problem fered from a of “underinclusive- act, law, only applies York’s alties like New post. ness.” See activity might be con- expressive to and thus bar, argued In the case at that a crime Fruits of sidered underinclusive. act, royalties like York’s the criminal New activity fall out- nonexpressive derived law, Moreover, mandate of the Son of Sam violates the sweep side the of the statute. activity First Amendment to the United States Con- applies only expressive fact, “Congress that shall make no law could stitution specified content. * * * abridging speech, determining the freedom of not be enforced without first press.” presumptively “A in- particular statute is of a work fell whether the content singular First if it regulated category. consistent with the Amendment This within activity imposes speakers expressive a financial burden on be- focus on the content of an places the speech.” rings their First cause the content of Simon Amendment bells squarely category though -within the of a this distinction is not insubstantial underlying regulation insofar as it ensures that meriting content-based strict scru- triggering crimes the law Rhode Island tiny. Consequently, “the State must show prosecuted, are it fails neverthe- serious necessary regulation that to serve a key problem that less to alleviate the compelling narrowly state interest and is Supreme identified in the New York Court drawn to achieve end.” Id. at law, namely, tangential inciden- that even (quoting at S.Ct. L.Ed.2d at 488 tal references to a crime are within Project, Ragland, Arkansas Writers’ Inc. v. the ambit of the statute. 221, 231, U.S. S.Ct. (1987)). L.Ed.2d Attorney argued General has royalties Rhode Island’s criminal unlike regard prong inqui With to the first law, only “significant” applies New York’s ry, Supreme the United States Court has exploitations commercial of a crime and that authoritatively question answered the tangential peripheral “a reference to a whether such statutes as the Son Sam law prior trigger provi- [its] crime would not compelling serve a Although state interest. Although duty sions.” it is the of this Court Supreme open question Court left duly to construe a enacted statute as consti- royalties whether properly book can reasonably tutional if such a construction is profits termed the of a it concluded its possible, Landrigan McElroy, analysis by determining interest that “the (R.I.1983), compelled we are compelling depriving State has a interest in recognize royalties that the criminal act fails crimes, profits criminals of the of their and in applicability “significant” to delimit its using compensate these funds to victims.” Rather, exploitations. plain commercial Schuster, 119, 112 Simon & 502 U.S. at S.Ct. language of the statute mandates that the act at 116 L.Ed.2d at It is clear that “any expression,” should G.L. royalties Rhode Island’s criminal act serves 12-25.1-2(3), of “the cir- events and compelling purposes the same identified constituting surrounding cumstances and/or Supreme the United States under- motivating alleged the crime or and/or girding New York’s Son of Sam law. 12-25.1-3(a). crime.” Section United Supreme States Court’s determination addressing the issue of whether nearly language identical was unconstitution- narrowly act is tailored compels al in Simon & Schuster our conclu- interests, compelling achieve these state sion that the criminal act cuts too at arrive the inevitable conclusion that through protected broad swath the field of shoal, upon this constitutional the act must expression.2 founder. The United States found New York’s statute to be overinclusive Moreover, only is the act overbroad “applies subject, it because to works on expressive activity all because it affects provided express the author’s Amendment, thus First it also violates the crime, thoughts or recollections about his suffers from underinclusiveness. Neither tangentially incidentally.” however Id. at Attorney justified nor the General 121, 511, 112 S.Ct. at 116 L.Ed.2d at 490. applicability expressive the act’s to major difference in inelusiveness be activity. compelling The state’s interest tween Rhode the Island and the New York compensating proceeds victims from the of expression regulated by statutes is that served, the example, crime would be better for pertain Rhode Island statute must to the by making available to a victim all the crimi- assets, felonious behavior for which the criminal was nal’s derived. however wherever (see ante), guilty expres found potential- whereas the expansion Such an of the resources regulated by sion ly the New York law could to victim stat- available a would avoid the pertain prosecuted singling only to or not. Al- ute’s Achilles’ heel of out ex- it, Schuster, expressed 2. As one commentator has Simon & and the First Amendment: Simon & Board, Schuster “foretells the demise of all these crimi- Inc. v. York Crime Victims 112 S.Ct. New 1060, provisions” Pub.Pol’y (1991), anti-profit nal similar to the Son of 15 Harv.J.L. & 1060 501 Note, (1992). Sam law. Criminal Statutes Anti-Profit 678 Palmer,

pressive activity special (quoting Riggs for a We v. N.Y. burden. normally (1889)). may note of a crime that victims 22 N.E. But however com- bring against the a civil action offender to achieving our pelling interest laudable a damages.3 judgment recover After objective, uphold must constitutional we re- obtained, may proceed against been victim a power regu- strictions on of the state to the assets, the defendant’s whether or not these expression. late free represent royalties assets the obtained from therefore, summary, foregoing In exploitation of the commercial crime. The reasons, appeal deny plaintiffs’ we judgment against of such a enforcement civil dismissing judgment affirm counts following personal a assets a in- defendant’s through complaint. of their and count 9 jury property pre- has not loss heretofore sustained, cross-appeal The defendant’s problem. sented a First Amendment judgment declaratory en- and we vacate We conclude that criminal plaintiffs. case is tered favor of the narrowly is not tailored to serve the state’s in- Superior Court with remanded to the compelling compensating interest victims plaintiffs’ dismiss structions count 8 to profits crime from the of crime. More- complaint. over, profits the act’s focus on from derived only activity expressive renders the act in- J., FLANDERS, concurs. First consistent with the Amendment to the United Constitution and thus States renders FLANDERS, Justice, concurring. Although it unconstitutional. con- the act clause, 12-25.1-12, severability tains a by I reached concur in the result portion of the unconstitutional act is indis- majority’s affirmance court and with the pensable rest of the act and cannot be plain- Superior dismissal Court’s destroying legislative severed without intent. death, unjust for wrongful tiffs’ claims Landrigan, See 457 A.2d at 1061. The act is enrichment, alleged violations of the entirety. in its therefore declared invalid However, separately Slayer’s I write Act. disagree with the ma- because I respectfully however, agree holding, so with the Royal- jority’s that the Criminal conclusion objective permitted one “[n]o [should] be (the criminal ties Act Distribution profit fraud, or to his own take advan- act), chapter 25.1 of title act or the tage wrong, or to his own found claim 12, applies There- juvenile defendants. iniquity, acquire property his own fore, Schuster, I the court should hy his do own crime.” Simon & not believe unconstitutional be- U.S. at 112 S.Ct. at 116 L.Ed.2d at declare the act to be Laws, generated longer recovery profits no Under G.L.1956 9-1-2 General limits expression crime victim recover from all but rather includes of the crime regardless offender in a civil action of whether profits generated by Section 632- crime. complaint Lyons has been filed. See v. a(l)(b). addition, profits are not auto- Scituate, (R.I.1989) Town 554 A.2d Price, matically 334 Md. See Curran escrowed. (observing prior to 1904 crime could victims (1994) (discussing "heavy bring injuries an action for until after crimi- speech initial review imposed on burden” proceedings nal had been instituted or a criminal statute). Sam process Rather, Maryland’s Son of Moreover, filed). complaint the event that contracting providing or any party felony jury defendant is convicted of a trial, after provide profit a crime judgment automatically a civil entered notify charged must of the crime convicted pursuant the trial court to G.L.1956 12-28-5 632- payment or contract. Section board of the Rights, chapter the Victim’s Bill of title 12. 28 of a(2)(a). required notify is then The board felony proof A victim of the must still establish 632-a(2)(b), record, may bring who § victims damages judicial proceeding in a recover- before compensation. Section a civil action to recover ing injury or loss. 632-a(3). board, acting on behalf victims, 4. We may note that the wake of plaintiff Simon & Schuster for all and other all Legislature repealed remedies, the New York the Son of including provisional attachment law, § Sam see New York Laws ch. plaintiff. injunction, Section available statute, replaced it with a new see N.Y.Exec. 632-a(6). applies only now to behav- The statute 1996), §Law (McKinney designed 632-a to rem- 632-a(l)(a). constituting felony. ior Section a edy by the constitutional defects identified United States Court. The new statute adjudication any my judgment upon cause in such a declaration is “No the status of indispensably necessary jurisdiction not to the determi child in of the court shall appeal. Barring nation of this See Town impose any of operate to the civil disabili- (R.I.1987) Blake, ton v. 532 A.2d conviction, ordinarily resulting from a ties (‘“this consistently court has followed the any nor shall child be deemed a accepted general pass rule that it will not by adjudication, reason of that nor shall constitutionality of an act of the conviction, adjudication a be deemed legislature unless its determination is indis any charged nor shall child be with or pensably necessary to the determination of court, any except of a crime in convicted cause’”)- For I this reason would not chapter. disposition provided in this challenge reach the defendant’s to the con any given a child evidence stitutionality simply of the act but affirm the court shall not be admissible as evidence plaintiffs’ dismissal of claims under the against any proceeding the child case or by holding that it inapplicable is to this court, disposi- other nor shall that juvenile defendant because of his status aas operate disqualify tion or evidence a when he committed the acts which he application, child in future civil service adjudicated delinquent. was a examination, appointment.” attempts The act regulate the commer Therefore, although defendant here “ad- exploitation cial “ of crimes attributable to a adjudicated mitted sufficient facts to be de- ” ‘criminally responsible person,’ § 12-25.1- murder,” linquent charges on four State v. 2(6). person Such a is defined as one “who Price, (R.I.1996), 672 A.2d he did * * * felony has been convicted of a which indeed, fifteen-year-old juvenile, as a he not — person caused personal another to suffer in could not —admit to the commission of a felo- * * * jury or property, loss of or who has ny.5 Rather he admitted to the commission voluntarily admitted the commission of such “which, adult, by of offenses if committed an However, an offense.” Id. “this court has felony.” would constitute a Section 14r-l- consistently adjudication held that an of de 3(5). by Such admissions are not covered linquency is not deemed a criminal convic purposes which for our is limited to tion, except as it by be considered persons “voluntarily those who have admit- sentencing justice within the Court.” felony].” ted the commission of [a Section H., (R.I. In re Bernard 557 A.2d 12-25.1-2(6). disagree I Thus with the 1989); D., see also In re John 479 A.2d ju- applies court’s conclusion that the act (R.I.1984) (“[a] finding delinquency veniles who admit to acts that would amount waywardness juvenile proceeding is if felonies had been committed an equivalent not the finding juve of a that the adult. crime[; rjather, nile has committed a a de agree I do also that the delinquency termination of is warranted contemplated intended that an act for when an act is committed that would amount juvenile adjudged delinquent which a felony to a if it had been committed adult”); Michael, should be considered a crime the context In re (R.I.1981) (“[a] of a civil action a victim of the juvenile delinquent way ward, crime. It is true that 14-1-66 of the Fami- juvenile not because the has committed ly petition Court Act allows victims to juvenile but because the has commit juvenile court ted an act that for information about a ac- would be a crime if committed juvenile committing cused of not a crime and because the juvenile care, purpose allowing requires the victim to commence a guidance ‘such juvenile control as will civil action serve the child’s welfare and/or ”). parents and the best interests of the to recover for sustained as state’ This principle is codified at G.L.1956 14-1- a result of the crime. See In re Falstaff 40(a): Brewing Corp. Narragansett Brewery Re: P.L.1990, adjudicated delinquent, (adding 5. When defendant was certified. See ch. new 14-1-7, 14-1-7.1, 14-1-7.2, juvenile age the law did not allow a under the of sections and 14-1- certification). provide sixteen be to waived the Court or to be 7.3 to for such waiver or Fire, (R.I.1994) (“[t]he clear a 687 A.2d “In the face of statute so ap- § legislative 14-1-66 is to there is no room unambiguous clear intent behind recover, action, statutory a of plication allow victims to via civil usual canons juvenile of at the hands a In a the statute suffered construction. such case offender”). However, may not where no this statute falls within declares itself. We the exception general beyond rule set in statute ambiguity the to the forth search exists 14-l-40(a) meaning. hardship § Even that no child shall be a a “deemed different reading adju- into a [delinquency] justify criminal of that a court in reason does not dication, unequivo- adjudication something contrary nor shall conviction, legislature any Only a the deemed nor shall child be cal when language. may charged trumpet a the with convicted of crime sounds an uncertain court, But when except chapter clarify call. provided as this court the move in added.) we [chapter (Emphasis 1 of it is here title certain as 14].” call is clear and as whether not consider law, royalties Unlike this act justice, of our ideas comports with written chapter part was not enacted 1 of title as In such public policy. expediency sound chapter 14 but as 25.1 of title 12 of the busi- not court’s that is circumstances Legislature truly General Laws. Had the House, Inc., 95 Hickory ness.” v. Kastal contemplated intended and the act (1963) 366, 369, A.2d 264-65 R.I. juveniles, would it would enact- have (citations omitted); Parkway Tow- see also part chapter ed it as of title 14 and A.2d Godfrey, 688 ers v. Associates thereby squarely purview it placed within the (R.I.1997). exception general to the rule set out 14-1-40(a). when the Thus inapplica sum, is I that the act believe juvenile wanted to enable the victims of- any con juvenile ble to defendants and they fenses obtain the information needed unnecessary is analysis of stitutional respon- to commence civil actions therefore, advisory. and, merely to the result (§ juveniles, a law 14-1- passed sible it such Society Ophthalmological See Rhode Island 66) part thereby as 1 of title chapter 16, 28, Cannon, v. 113 R.I. fitting provision exception within (1974) express lan “there no (although 130-31 14-l-40(a) general to the that chil- rule guage [Constitution Rhode Island dren are not deemed criminals or to to be judicial our which exercise of confines the “except been crime as controversies[,]’ have convicted of power to actual ‘cases and However, provided chapter.” it has advisory opinions will not render respect not done so with abstract”). “‘[n]o function in Because Accordingly agree act. I do judicial question before can be juvenile has that acts for which a been ad- delicacy those which greater than tribunal of judged delinquent retain their criminal char- legislative constitutionality aof involve the ” acter under the criminal much Franklin, act,’ 30 R.I. Blais considered less should be crimes (1910), teaching in A. this court’s context of the victims’ civilactions. Such Franklin, 258, 265-66, A. 30 R.I. Newell v. 14-l-40(a)’s interpretation eviscerates Coo (quoting Thomas M. “except provided chapter” in this clause ley, LL.D., on the A Treatise Constitutional opens action” in the gaping “civil hole Legisla Upon Rest Limitations Which Legislature’s policy against treating children American tive the States Power of as criminals. (7th 1903)), repeating: bears ed. Union 231 - rule, court, general

By as a drawing will a such careful deliberate “Neither question, juvenile adjudications pass constitutional distinctions between invalid, delinquency to be unless waywardness a statute and criminal decide felony very point nec- convictions, Assembly upon that becomes decision General cause. essary trumpet. sounded certain to the determination clear and discussion duty equally these courts cannot shun the circumstances our clear “While fairly pre- questions and certain: constitutional when sented, they go way will not out of their topics. They

find such will not seek to weighty collaterally, draw in such matters nor on trivial occasions. It is both more proper respectful and more to a coordinate

department ques- to discuss constitutional only tions very when is the mota. lis determined, presented Thus and the deci- weight sion carries with it to which no extra-judicial disquisition is entitled.’ any case[,] therefore, where a constitution- raised, question may

al though it be record, legitimately presented by yet if presents the record also some other and ground clear upon which the court rest judgment, thereby and render question

constitutional immaterial case, that will adopted, course be and the question power of constitutional bewill left

for consideration until a case arises which

cannot disposed considering of without it, consequently when a decision question bewill unavoidable.” Prior, Weisman, D. Aaron L. David Provi- dence, for Plaintiff.

For these I concur in reasons the result of the court’s plaintiffs’ Providence, decision dismiss the Cicilline, David N. Dianne L. claims under but I disagree Izzo, with Kingstown, North for Defendant. applies conclusion that to this defen- C.J., WEISBERGER, Present: dant. I aspect Thus would resolve this LEDERBERG, BOURCIER legislative case as a interpretation matter of FLANDERS, JJ. rather than reach and decide the constitu- tionality of the act.

OPINION

PER CURIAM. court

This case came before the for oral 7,1997, argument April pursuant to an order parties appear directed both had why issues order to show cause raised summarily appeal should not be decided. hearing arguments of counsel After STATE examining par- filed memoranda ties, opinion are that cause has not Richard C. HART. been and that raised in this shown the issues appeal should be decided at this time. No. 96-527-C.A.. appeals The defendant from order of a Supreme Court of Rhode Island. justice denying Superior driving complaint motion to dismiss a 5,May liquor in violation of under the influence of double-jeopardy 31-27-2 grounds. that the Ad- The defendant notes Adjudication already ministrative charges that he failed submit to sustained

Case Details

Case Name: Bouchard v. Price

Court Name: Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date Published: May 5, 1997

Citation: 694 A.2d 670

Docket Number: 95-205-Appeal

Court Abbreviation: R.I.