Boswell's Lessee v. Otis

50 U.S. 336 | SCOTUS | 1850

50 U.S. 336 (1850) 9 How. 336

THOMAS E. BOSWELL'S LESSEE, PLAINTIFF,
v.
LUCIUS B. OTIS, ADMINISTRATOR, MARGARET DICKINSON, WIDOW, AND EDWARD F., JULIA S., MARGARET O., JOHN B.B., RODOLPHUS, MARTHA JANE, AND JAMES A. DICKINSON, MINOR CHILDREN, OF RODOLPHUS DICKINSON, DECEASED, BY L.O. RAWSON, THEIR GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND, ET AL.

Supreme Court of United States.

The cause was submitted on printed arguments by Mr. Ewing, for the plaintiff, and Mr. Stanberry, for the defendants.

Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This case is before us on points certified, on which the opinions of the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for Ohio were opposed.

In 1825, a bill was filed by Thomas L. Hawkins, in the Court of Common Pleas for Sandusky County, Ohio, against Thomas E. Boswell and others, which represented that, in the year 1816, Boswell, of the State of Kentucky, the complainant, Reed, and Owings agreed to build a saw-mill on the public land, with the view of purchasing the land when sold by the government. Boswell and Owings advanced a part of the money; the complainant was to be the active partner, and his share of the capital was to be paid by labor. That he expended labor and money until the land was sold, in 1818, at Wooster, in Ohio, when Reed and Owings abandoned the contract; and it was then agreed by Boswell, William T. Barry, of Kentucky, and William Whitimore, of Boston, and the complainant, to go on and purchase lot number nine, or a large part of it, on which the building for the mill had been commenced. The purchase was made, and it was agreed that the complainant's share of the purchase-money should be paid in labor on the mill, and in improvements on the land. That he should be the active partner, &c.

The complainant proceeded in the construction of the mill, and expended for the company the sum of five thousand dollars, of which he advanced two thousand six hundred dollars, besides his own time; that the complainant expected his partners would have conveyed to him one fourth of the land purchased, they having obtained a legal title to two thirds of the lot, but that they have refused to do the same, or to account and refund him the money expended, &c. And the complainant prayed a decree for one fourth part of the land to which the defendants have obtained a title, and also that they may account, &c.

The defendants being non-residents of Ohio, the court ordered nine weeks' notice to be given in a newspaper, as the statute requires. There being no appearance of the defendants, the bill was taken as confessed, and the matter was referred to a master, who reported a balance against them, and in favor of the complainant, of the sum of eighteen hundred and forty-four dollars and seventeen cents, for which a final decree was entered, and it was adjudged that it should have, from the time of its being pronounced, the operation and effect of a judgment at law, and be a lien on all the town lots of the defendants, and all other real estate owned by them within the county. And execution was authorized, &c. Several executions were issued and a number of lots were sold, among others lot number seven, containing seventy-seven acres and seventy-five hundredths, for which the sheriff's deed was executed.

For this lot number seven, an ejectment was brought by Boswell in the Circuit Court of the United States, and issue being joined, on the trial the following questions were raised, on which the opinions of the judges were opposed.

"1. Whether or not the proceedings and decree of the said Court of Common Pleas of Sandusky County, set forth in the record above stated, are coram non judice.

"2. Admitting said proceedings and decree to be valid so far as relates to the land specifically described in the said bill in chancery, whether or not said proceedings and decree are coram non judice and void so far as relates to lot number seven, in controversy in this case, and which is not described in said bill in chancery; or, in other words, whether said proceedings and decree are not in rem, and so void and without effect as to the other lands sold under said decree."

As the title to lot number seven only is involved in the ejectment suit, it is unnecessary to consider the first point certified. Under the decree, which was only for money, many lots were sold by the sheriff that are still held, it is presumed, under his deed; but the holders are not parties to this suit, and it may be decided without affecting their interests.

When the record of a judgment is brought before the court collaterally or otherwise, it is always proper to inquire whether the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is acquired in one of two modes; — first, as against the person of the defendant, by the service of process; or secondly, by a procedure against the property of the defendant, within the jurisdiction of the court. In the latter case the defendant is not personally bound by the judgment, beyond the property in question. And it is immaterial whether the proceeding against the property be by an attachment or bill in chancery. It must be, substantially, a proceeding in rem. A bill for the specific execution of a contract to convey real estate is not strictly a proceeding in rem, in ordinary cases; but where such a procedure is authorized by statute, on publication, without personal service of process, it is, substantially, of that character.

The chancery act of Ohio of 1824 confers on the Court of Common Pleas general chancery powers. In the twelfth section, jurisdiction is given over the rights of absent defendants, on the publication of notice, "in all cases properly cognizable in courts of equity, where either the title to, or boundaries of, land may come in question, or where a suit in chancery becomes necessary in order to obtain the rescission of a contract for the conveyance of land, or to compel the specific execution of such contract."

Under this statute the bill by Hawkins purports to have been filed. But without reference to the other lots sold under the decree, there is no pretence to say that the bill had any relation to the title or boundaries of lot number seven, or to any contract for the conveyance of the same. And it is only in these cases that the act authorizes a chancery proceeding against the land of non-residents by giving public notice. It is a special and limited jurisdiction, and cannot be legally exercised, except within the provisions of the statute.

The principle is admitted, that, where jurisdiction is acquired against the person by the service of process or by a voluntary appearance, a court of general jurisdiction will settle the matter in controversy between the parties. But this principle does not apply to a special jurisdiction authorized by statute, though exercised by a court of general jurisdiction. The present case will illustrate this view. Admit that a special jurisdiction was acquired against all the other lots, yet number seven was in no way connected with them. It was not named in the bill, nor was there any step taken in relation to it, until it was levied on by the sheriff to satisfy the general decree. It was not within any one of the categories named in the statute. Until long after the decree, the title to it was not obtained by defendants. If it can be made subject to such a procedure, then the special jurisdiction given by the statute is converted, by construction, into a general proceeding against the property of non-residents by a mere publication of notice.

The property of an individual is subject, in a certain sense, to the law of the State in which it is situated. It is liable for taxes and to such special proceedings against it as the law shall authorize. An attachment may be laid upon it, and it may be sold in satisfaction of an established claim. And the legislature may, perhaps, subject other lands to the payment of the judgment on the attachment after the sale of the lands first attached. But no such proceeding is authorized by the act under which this procedure was had. It is limited to the cases enumerated in the statute.

It is said that the statute authorizes a decree for money. This may be admitted. Under the rescission of a contract the money paid may be decreed to be refunded, and the land covered by the contract, being within the special jurisdiction of the court, may be ordered to be sold. But the power of the court is limited to this. Under the assumption of a special power, it cannot be made general by any supposed necessity, beyond the provisions of the act. Such a construction would not only pervert the object of the legislature, but it would sacrifice the property of an individual without notice in fact, and who had no opportunity to make his defence.

The proceedings in this case are a practical commentary upon this construction.

It is said, if this construction of the act be erroneous, it does not make void the proceedings, and that the error can only be corrected by an appellate court. And we are referred to the case of Lessee of Boswell and others v. Sharp and Leppelman, 15 Ohio, 447, in which it is alleged that the Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the decision of the Common Pleas on the question now before us.

In that case the Supreme Court did hold that the Court of Common Pleas of Sandusky had jurisdiction in the chancery proceeding, and that the validity of the same could not be questioned collaterally. But that decision was made in reference to a part of lot number nine, on which the mill was constructed, and to obtain a title for a part of which the bill was filed. The title to lot number seven was not involved in the case before the Supreme Court, and, consequently, they did not consider it.

It may be difficult in some cases to draw the line of jurisdiction so as to determine whether the proceedings of a court are void or only erroneous. And in such cases every intendment should be favorable to a purchaser at a judicial sale. But the rights of all parties must be regarded. No principle is more vital to the administration of justice, than that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice, and an opportunity to make his defence. And every departure from this fundamental rule, by a proceeding in rem, in which a publication of notice is substituted for a service on the party, should be subjected to a strict legal scrutiny. Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and exercised in such cases upon the general ground, that the subject-matter of the suit is within the power of the court. This would dispense with the forms of the law, prescribed by the legislature, for the security of absent parties. The inquiry should be, have the requisites of the statute been complied with, so as to subject the property in controversy to the judgment of the court, and is such judgment limited to the property named in the bill. If this cannot be answered in the affirmative, the proceedings of the court beyond their jurisdiction are void.

If this test be applied to the proceedings before us, we think in no just and legal sense can they be held to subject lot number seven to the decree of the court, nor to-fix any personal liability on the defendants, and consequently, that the levy and sale of the sheriff were without authority and void, and the second question certified to this court must be so answered.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio, and on the points or questions on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that the proceedings and decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Sandusky County, as set forth in the record, are coram non judice and void, so far as relates to lot number seven, and consequently that the levy and sale of the sheriff were without authority and void. Whereupon it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.