163 Mass. 64 | Mass. | 1895
The claim of the plaintiff in this case is so meritorious that we regret that the rules of law do not allow a recovery of the amount claimed.
The facts stated in the report fail to show authority on the part of the committee on public property to contract the debt sued for. This committee is stated to be a joint standing committee of the city council, appointed yearly, but its general powers and duties are not shown, further than its name implies.
Giddings, the original contractor, “ did no work whatsoever, and did not offer to do any work, upon the portion of the work contracted for by the plaintiff, or for which the said sum of §250 was set apart in the Giddings contract.”
It would thus appear that, at a time which was probably about eighteen months after making the contract with Giddings, the committee on public property assumed to take into consideration certain additional requirements not contained in the specifications of the architects, Chamberlain and Whidden, and not included within the original authority given to the committee. Whether the committee in March, 1891, when it voted to incur this additional expense, and to employ the plaintiff to do this work in the place of Giddings, was composed of the same
There was no sufficient evidence of ratification by the city of the contract with the plaintiff. It is stated that, “ when the plaintiff had partly completed the work contracted for, the defendant paid to the plaintiff the sum of $134.50 on account of this contract of $384.50, and received a receipt therefor.” This however must be taken in connection with the statement that the records showed no vote or order of the city council or board of aldermen. An officer who was not authorized to contract had no authority to ratify, and no such authority on the part of the city solicitor or other officer was shown, though in court the city solicitor would no doubt have the usual powers of an attorney. Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208. Savage v. Blanchard, 148 Mass. 348. And the acceptance and use of the building by the city do not bind it to pay for extra or unauthorized work done upon it, though the same is beneficial. The city could reject and decline to use the building on this ground, and it was not bound to take out such extra or unauthorized work. Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102. Hayward v. North Bridgewater School District, 2 Cush. 419. See also, as to work done on roads, Blanchard v. Ayer, 148 Mass. 174; Bean v. Hyde Park, 143 Mass. 245; Clark v. Russell, 116 Mass. 455; Keyes v. Westford, 17 Pick. 273; Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343; and on the general subject, see Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th ed.) §§ 464-466, and cases cited.
The result is, that upon the facts reported the jury would not have been justified in finding for the plaintiff, and according to the terms of the report the entry must be,
Judgment for the defendant.