307 Mass. 106 | Mass. | 1940
The purpose of this bill is to restrain the defendant from prosecuting an action under the Federal employers’ liability act brought by her in the Supreme Court in Rensselaer County in the State of New York to recover damages for the death of her intestate, who was killed while employed by the plaintiff as a brakeman.
The accident occurred at Deerfield in the county of Franklin in this Commonwealth. The deceased was a resident of Springfield in the county of Hampden in this Com
Other pertinent findings by a master are these: The railroad corporation will require as witnesses for the. defence of the action against it sixteen of its employees and possibly two more. These include a train crew, a yard crew, a track crew, two civil engineers, an air brake inspector, a track supervisor, and a yardmaster. All of these live in Greenfield or Springfield, except one who lives in Ayer, Massachusetts, one in Boston, Massachusetts, one in Concord, New Hampshire, and one in Troy, New York. The work performed by these men can readily be performed by substitutes in their absence, except in the instances of the night yardmaster at East Deerfield, a yard foreman, a track supervisor and an engineer. As to these four men the findings may be fairly summarized by saying that they perform important duties requiring special experience; that their absence will cause some inconvenience, and the work will not be done quite as well without them, but that there are others who can be called in to take charge; and that the work of the railroad will go on without these men in at least a reasonably satisfactory manner. The run from Greenfield to Springfield averages just short of an hour, while that from Greenfield to Troy averages about two and one half hours. If the trial takes place in Troy the witnesses will be absent from their work for at least two days, and it will be necessary to board and lodge them at a daily
There is no doubt that where a sufficient equity is shown courts of this Commonwealth have the same power to enjoin persons subject to their control from prosecuting suits in other States that they have to enjoin them from prosecuting suits in this Commonwealth. Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545, 550. Cunningham v. Butler, 142 Mass. 47. Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52. Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 298 Mass. 47, 52. Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 298 Mass. 53, 66. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107. On the other hand, a party commonly is free to.bring an action in any court having jurisdiction, and the question in this case is whether the plaintiff shows a sufficient equity to justify interference with the defendant’s right of choice. Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52, 53.
It may well be that the defendant went to New York instead of bringing her action in a jurisdiction which would seem to be more convenient both for herself and the plaintiff merely because of the hope of a larger verdict. But this is not a fraud upon the plaintiff, nor does it indicate an intent merely to harass or annoy for the purpose of forcing a settlement. The difference in procedure and the possibility of a larger verdict in New York do not raise an equity in the plaintiff’s favor. They fall far short of showing that a fair trial cannot be had in New York. These are not matters for our consideration. Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52, 56. Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 Ill. 383.
We do not say that a mere difference in convenience and expense may not in aggravated instances raise an equity to enjoin the prosecution of the action, but courts as a rule have shown much caution in só using their power as to deprive a litigant of his access to other courts having jurisdiction of his case. In this instance the differential in convenience and expense is no greater than must often exist between two counties in this Commonwealth in either one of which a plaintiff can bring an action under the venue provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 223, §§ 1, 6, 7, 8, 11. Hardships no greater than those permitted by our own statutes and commonly endured in actions brought here are slender ground for interference with a party who steps over the State line to bring her action. The attitude of the courts toward the enjoining of actions on the ground of inconvenience and expense of trial is shown by cases collected in the footnote.
The plaintiff further contends that the action in New
We need not deal with the question whether the provisions of the Federal employers’ liability act conferring jurisdiction upon State courts (U. S. C., 1934 ed., Title 45, § 56, as amended by act of August 11, 1939, 53 U. S. Sts. at Large, 1404) preclude the granting of an injunction against the prosecution of an action under the act in any State court.
Decree affirmed with costs.
McWhorter v. Williams, 228 Ala. 632. Kern v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway, 204 Ind. 595. McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16. Jones v. Hughes, 156 Iowa, 684. Wabash Railroad v. Peterson, 187 Iowa, 1331. Payne v. Knapp, 197 Iowa, 737. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad v. Ball, 126 Kans. 745. Reed’s Administratrix v. Illinois Central Railroad, 182 Ky. 455. Missouri Pacific Railway v. Harden, 158 La. 889. Miller v. Gittings, 85 Md. 601. Pere Marquette Railway v. Slutz, 268 Mich. 388. Freick v. Hinkly, 122 Minn. 24. State v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. 4 Buch. 457, 473. Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39 N. M. 22. Carpenter, Baggott & Co. v. Hanes, 162 N. C. 46. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. Matzinger, 136 Ohio St. 271. American Express Co. v. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326. Ex parte Crandall, 52 Fed. (2d) 650. Bryant v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 92 Fed. (2d) 569.