314 Mass. 634 | Mass. | 1943
This is an appeal from a decree of a single justice of this court dismissing a petition brought by the petitioners under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 25, § 5, to review and annul an order or decision of the department of public utilities, made in a proceeding upon petition of the city of Boston relative to alterations, structural changes and repairs to be made in a portion of the bridge that carries Broadway, a public way, over the location and tracks of the Boston and Albany Railroad Company. This bridge was built in 1900 in accordance with St. 1896, c. 516, § 11. Since then it has been maintained by the city of Boston. The work comprehended in the petition filed by the city with the department consisted of the removal and replacement of the entire floor system, including the steel floor beams, sidewalk brackets, wooden stringers, underplanking and wearing surface. All or some of the steel hangers which support the floor beams were to be renewed. These floor beams not only support the floor but furnish important lateral bracing to the bridge. The floor beams, diagonal braces and other steel parts of the bridge immediately above the tracks have become deteriorated by the weather and exhaust gases from locomotives and have made the bridge unsafe and dangerous. The estimated cost of the proposed work was nearly $77,000. It would cost $250,000 to build a new structure. The department found that the work contemplated was substantial, involving “in degree” more than ordinary maintenance and repair, and that its performance was required “for the security and convenience of the public as well as for the proper maintenance or repair of the bridge.” The department found that the renewal of the steel floor beams and hangers will greatly strengthen the bridge and improve its present condition, but it does not appear that they will increase its strength beyond that for which the bridge was originally designed. In the judgment of the department the work was “of such a nature as to involve, at least in the case of the floor beams and hangers, a structural renewal of the bridge in order to strengthen
Upon an appeal from a decree by a single justice upon a petition under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 25, § 5, we have no power to review or revise findings of fact made by the department. We can deal only with rulings or orders shown by the petitioner to be unlawful and then only to the extent that they are unlawful. Paine v. Newton Street Railway, 192 Mass. 90. City Council of Salem v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway, 254 Mass. 42. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 137. There seems to be no dispute as to the size, type, structure or any other physical characteristic of the bridge, or the details of the work to be done, or the necessity for its performance. The subsidiary findings of the department fully set forth the nature, extent and cost of the work, and the changes to the bridge that will result upon its completion. Starting with these subsidiary findings our inquiry is limited to determining whether upon the subsidiary facts found the order was unlawful. Boston & Albany Railroad v. New York Central Railroad, 256 Mass. 600.
Section 59, as amended by St. 1933, c. 326, § 1, provides that “If a public way and a railroad cross each other, and the board of aldermen . . . deem it necessary for the security or convenience of the public that an alteration not involving the abolition of a crossing at grade should be made in the crossing, the approaches thereto, the location of the railroad or way, or in a bridge at the crossing, they shall apply ... if the crossing is situated ... in Boston, to the department of public utilities, which shall, after public notice, hear all parties interested, and,, if it decides that such alteration is necessary, shall prescribe the manner
Whether the work was a repair or an alteration depends upon the meaning of these words in the sections just quoted. The terms of a statute are to be interpreted in accordance with their plain, natural and ordinary meaning in the absence of anything contained in the statute indicating that they were employed in a particular or limited sense or as words of art having only a restricted or technical import. Doane v. Phillips, 12 Pick. 223. Bornbaum v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd. 311 Mass. 282. An alteration when used in reference to a structure usually denotes a change or substitution made in a particular part of a structure of such a substantial nature as to make the structure itself or an important part thereof materially different from what it formerly was. On the other hand, a repair is merely correcting the damage done sometimes by accident or fire or other cause, but more often due to the ravages of time and the deterioration resulting from wear and tear, by substituting for the damaged, decayed or worn out parts, new
Upon completion of the work prescribed by the department, the bridge will continue to be of the same size, width, elevation, construction, and strength as it was when first built. The work prescribed is nothing more than the restoration of a worn out structure, and the extent and cost of the repairs — approximately a little more than thirty per cent of a new structure — do not change the nature and character of the proposed work, which constitutes repair or maintenance and not an alteration as those words are commonly understood. If the term alteration is considered in the technical sense, which at times has been employed in statutes in reference to highways as meaning a change in the location of an intermediate section of a public way or the substitution of one way for another, Bliss v. Deerfield, 13 Pick. 102; Bigelow v. City Council of Worcester, 169 Mass. 390, the result would be the same. Obviously, there was no change of location of the bridge involved in the proceedings before the department.
The respondents contend that the term alteration should be given a broad construction consonant with the general aim and object of § 59, as amended, and that it should be interpreted as including repairs. They rely upon decisions sustaining orders made by the county commissioners under
The department decided that the work proposed, especially as it pertained to the floor beams and hangers, was a structural change or renewal for the purpose of strengthening the bridge, and ruled that it was an alteration within the definition of that word as it appears in what was added by the amendment of 1908.
The department misconstrued what was added to § 23 by the 1908 amendment and thought the word alteration as it now appears in the first part of § 59 was broadened in the last part of this section by the sentence that was added in 1908. The effect of this particular amendment was not to extend the operation of the section nor to amplify the meaning of the word alteration beyond that which it has always had since it first appeared in the original alteration statute. St. 1872, c. 262, §§ 1, 2. The purpose of this amendment in 1908 was to clarify what the statute had always covered and to make it plain that the scope of what is now § 59 “includes the alteration of bridges, or the renewal or rebuilding of bridges, as a part of an alteration in a crossing.” Aldermen of Fitchburg v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 203 Mass. 304, 309.
The respondents finally argue that the wording of the portion of § 59 that provides that a street railway company “shall bear such part of the expense of building, rebuilding, changing, renewing, repairing or improving á bridge forming a part of said way” as the special commission may decide, indicates that the term alteration is used in an unrestricted sense and includes repairs. The word repair was first used, in what is now §§ 59 and 61, by St. 1902, c. 533, which recognized the benefits that street railway companies were deriving from the use of the public ways and imposed upon them a liability to pay not only for a part of the cost of making an alteration in a highway bridge and the approaches but also for a part of the cost of maintaining the same in proper condition. The object of St. 1902, c. 533, was to make a new party liable to pay a part of the expenses and not to change in any way the nature of the work out of the performance of which the expenses arose.
It follows that the decree appealed from must be reversed and a decree entered annulling the order of the department.
Ordered accordingly.