Bostick v. State

(Ind.2002); Jernigan, heart, v. resulting in his death. This evi- (Ind.Ct.App.1993). A know to dence was sufficient enable a reasonable ing killing may from be inferred the use beyond find to reasonable doubt deadly way likely in a weapon to killed knowingly Beas- death. Barker cause 695 ley. (Ind.1998). Conclusion The to judgment facts favorable re judgment We affirm the of the trial 17, 1999, on August

veal that James Beas court. Gullett, ley, Michael and the defendant socializing yard were in the back of a SHEPARD, C.J., SULLIVAN, and residence East Minnesota Street in In BOEHM, RUCKER, JJ., and concur. them, dianapolis. A fight among broke out bystanders, alerting Beasley who observed defendant, ground,

on the holding and knife, standing bystander him. over One out, “I you’re going

called can’t believe witnesses,”

kill him front of two and

Beasley escaped. Record at 228-29. He running,

started followed Gullett and defendant, Amy BOSTICK, Defendant-Appellant, who still had knife in hand. chase ended two away, blocks Beasley tripped. Gullett Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. STATE of him, first reach knocked him back he attempted down as rise. defen No. 33S00-9911-CR-651. up, said, dant caught then “You made Supreme Court Indiana. [N]ow, deleted], [expletive me bleed. you’re going to bleed.” Record at 341. 19, 2002. Aug. put Beasley’s He his left arm around neck arm, and underneath his and stabbed

Beasley chest the knife. As away,

Gullett and the defendant ran Beas

ley nearby to a help went house for wound,

died punc stab which had lung

tured his and the left ventricle of his

heart. argues

The defendant that the evidence prove insufficient to his awareness of

a high probability that killing he was

victim, proved only but rather that he in- battery.

tended a initially

The defendant stood over Beas-

ley a with knife in his hand. When Beas-

ley escaped run, started defen-

dant, knife, him, armed with pursued him,

caught up with and stabbed him in chest, piercing lung the victim’s K. Public Defender Carpenter,

Susan Freund, Indiana, Deputy David P. Public IN, Defender, Indianapolis, Attorneys for Appellant. Carter, Attorney General of

Steve Indiana, Parsanko, Deputy Attor- L. Janet General, IN, Attorneys ney Indianapolis, Appellee. for DICKSON, Justice. chil-

Following death of her three two, dren, one, four, who were ages fire, during in their room a house locked Bostick, defendant, Amy charged of three counts of mur- with and convicted parole to life without der and sentenced of murder. She three counts Arson, charge on a house also convicted inside. doors were also only people did not sentence her on this the trial court locked. other Jeopardy- count of the Double house were her teen- because Upon aged boyfriend. the Indiana Constitution. The defendant woke the Clause of boyfriend her conviction of sexual miscon- after the fire The de- additional started. minor,1 gave duct with a the defendant was fendant five statements to law en- given concurrent sentence of fifteen forcement authorities the fire: regarding (the fire) years. night this appeal, In direct the defendant March 16th of the at 2:54 (1) a.m., 24th, of July raises three issues: admission her a.m. and March 24th 9:48 (2) officers; July to law enforcement statements and 28th.

refusal of her tendered instruction on trial, At consisting when exhibits of the (3) homicide; imposing reckless and three videotape transcript July the and of final parole to life without mani- sentences 28 interview the defendant with were of- festly unreasonable. evidence, objected, fered the defendant 1. Admission of to Statements Police to referring solely “the reasons the writ- ten motion filed with the Court heard argument, As first the her by previously.” and determined the Court by that the trial court fail- contends erred at 3515. The Record trial court overruled 28, 1998, ing July to her exclude statement objection, it stating the defendant’s that to law on grounds enforcement officers “will rule as it did before.” Id. probative substantially that its value was by danger preju- outweighed its of unfair earlier, Approximately six weeks the de- dice, issues, misleading confusion of and of fendant had filed a motion to exclude evi- making the In jury. the course of by police July dence of her interview on argument, the defendant also that claims 28, 1998,2following her polygraph exami- the that vi- interrogation exhibit contained nation, and after she was that advised she 704(b), olated Ind.Evidence Rule which had failed the examination. defen- prohibits opin- testifying a witness from to dant’s motion acknowledged her concerning guilt ions or innocence in a during statements the interview were argues criminal case. The State that she knowingly and voluntarily given, urged has her challenges waived to the admission that the statement should be excluded be- object of this for failure at statement to (1) “objectionable cause: it was and taint- trial. repeated due to the ed” references upon poly- Four inferences based investigators fire testified that the and/or (2) results; fire of graph that took lives the defendant’s is irrelevant and vio- 401, deliberately children set Indiana Evidence pouring was lates Rule and that and igniting liquid probative flammable closet “the in the value of said evidence is of along the children’s bedroom substantially outweighed by danger of (3) adja- redacted, wall separating prejudice;” the bedroom from an unfair even cent As chil- resulting evidentiary room. the fire consumed the statement “lacks bedroom, dren’s locked children were value other than accusation the interro- defendant, age provided by prosecutor. 1. Ind.Code 35-42-4-9. The ment The State twenty-four, charged was with sexual inter- actual was clarified date fifleen-year-old boyfriend. course her which the court noted and thereaf- ter referred the correct date. Record at 2. The of text her motion referred to her state- 1308. 29, 1998,” "July ment of Record at based copy on an date state- incorrect on of the purpose procedural deni- to obviate the de repeated and the defendant’s gators” Further, grounds the incident and fault on such memory regarding this issue. al polygraph preserved appeal of the defen acceptance were “apparent ruling at 141. Before contemporaneous objection Record at results.” dant made motion, further trial court heard referring expressly arguments twice reviewed argument counsel pre-trial Record at in her motion. along with its videotaped statement appellate The defendant’s claim that Ind. in two different formats. transcription 704(b)3 however, violated, was Evid.R. was 270. The trial court understood Record at presented at trial or in the defendant’s claim that the pre-trial refer motion to exclude in the statement value of the evidence objection, pro enced her trial thus preju- of unfair danger the outweighed to con applies prevent cedural default our respons- the arising from defendant’s dice of claim. Brown v. sideration this See polygraph directly affected being es (Ind.2000). of results, potential of confusion and “the statement, in that with- issues could exist respect to viola With her asserted polygraph, could con- to out reference of Ind.Evid.R. the defendant now tion (emphasis jury.” Record at 271 fuse the probative value of argues any that her added). not re- Concluding that it was substantially out 1998 interview a redacted properly to exclude quired unfair weighed by danger prejudice statement, the trial court denied de- allowing hear her interro from the statement motion to exclude fendant’s gators assert their beliefs and “repeatedly prejudice, unfair on relevance and based absolutely opinions that there was no forty-five redactions and correc- ordering had set fire [the defendant] doubt that Record at 272-79. tions. her Br. of Defen that killed children.” that, acknowledge the redacted at dant-Appellant We 34. statement, objections expressed in the immediately This occurred af- interview clear, less than defendant’s motion were polygraph had taken ter appeal is argument slight her and that and had been told that she examination in the trial

ly from one made different had she set had Medwhen asked whether However, her motion did di proceedings. fire. that the The defendant contends to the re trial court’s attention rect the “inter- used an interrogating officers then that relevant evi Evid.R. 403 quirement telling over- rogation technique [her] if “may be excluded its dence they already knew again and-over that substantially outweighed by the value is it, they she and that because knew that did prejudice, unfair confusion of the danger of it, what did did she did remember she she issues, misleading jury....” And or it.” Br. of Defendant why she did express court consideration of the trial did examples Among at 29. Appellant it ordered the redaction these issues presented by the defendant’s brief parts of the statement. Un of numerous appendix following: are we be presented, der the circumstances why help explain this you I want me appellate that the defendant’s claim lieve you if why Not happened, you did this. presented to the trial sufficiently court 704(b) falsity allegations; a witness has may whether states: “Witnesses Ind.Evid.R. intent, concerning guilt, legal testify opinions truthfully; or conclusions.” testified case; the truth or or innocence in criminal it, Amy. Why you did it did cause that’s that killed point, her children. At one 3519], important. what’s at during interrogators’ inquires [Record regard- ing why crime, she committed the Amy, you me don’t tell didn’t it. do questioner it, to her that “you asserted did time, okay That’s not a factor at this you kids, get that rid of wanted to so [Record at 3519]. you could boyfriend].” [her have Jacob Listen, everyone’s gonna Amy, know replied, Record at 3568. “I She don’t even you and that’s ques- did this not a doing remember it. But there was a tion, question is not we’re here to it, reason for me to do Jacob would not be time. you discuss at can tell later, the one.” questions Id. A few re- absolutely any, any without reservation sponding to questioning further regarding if you whatsoever that did is not a why, the defendant said: “Fine. I can’t question. at 3519]. [Record not, remember if I it or good did but one You you you know set that fire and why. reason estranged [her Jason hus- you know exactly how set fire. band].” Record at 3570. A questions few at [Record 3521]. later, asserted, again the questioner Yeah, you you it Amy. do know set “Okay, you well know we all did it” and only question why you it is set ... [Rec- asked, you just “Now the reason told us is 3522], ord at what I want to make sure is the reason. give Don’t me I don’t know Amy. You Was that the Was that reason? the reason you your know as well as know name is that you did it?” Record at 3573. The Amy up you got that out of bed and set responded: defendant you the fire. I want to tell me you how that, reason, If there was that would did it [Record 3523]. at pushed be it. Jason me my over limit. No, Amy. that’s the truth You know I should have killed him is what I should you that set fire [Record that at 3524]. have done. I have should killed Jason Amy We know the truth and we know when I had the chance. 3526], you did it at [Record . Id. No, Amy, you set that fire. You know Despite further extensive intensive in- and I at 3527]. know it [Record terrogation, the defendant consistently I absolutely Oh believe no doubt that maintained that she did not remember set- you question. did it. not a That’s ting example, the fire. For she stated: only question explain have to peo- we I okay, “And know why, my problem is ple why at [Record 3528]. it, I can’t doing okay? remember We that Amy know for a fact set the fire And I don’t want to sit here and admit that I going on in Amy’s know what’s life it, say that I do did because I don’t [Record at 3540]. it, remember doing okay?” Record at Okay, well we all you know did it ... Later, 3580. asked to “admit the it, Okay, well I think we all know and I truth,” “Okay, you she said: so what want think you it too [Record know at 3573]. me to say do is sit here and I my killed The interview not contain any pushed does ex- children because Jason me over plicit guilt by admission of the edge.” defendant. at Record 3583. When her interview, Throughout despite the entire interrogator replied: “Is that the truth?” the interrogators’ insistence responded: that she she I my start- “If did kill children fire, ed the the defendant yes, maintained that then be would the truth.” Rec- she had no recollection of setting the fire ord at 3583. She then stated: admit, individually collectively, my so ror killing remember children I don’t recordings four video and audio and tran- everything else is to assume that I have scripts interrogations, including I just reason her some for right July Implicitly one taken acknowl- on where can’t my head to have block edging presented that this claim was not my did kill chil- that and so I past see court, she asserts that it consti- me over the pushed Jason dren and error, avoiding thereby tutes fundamental have killed that I wish I would edge and To funda- procedural default. constitute he did push a bitch first before son of “ error, mental the error constitute ‘must edge. me over principles, blatant of basic violation Id. harm potential harm or must be sub- that, ruling surprising It is not stantial, resulting deny must and the error motion to exclude the pre-trial defendant’s ” process.’ fundamental due statement, court stated: (Ind. State, v. Etienne reviewing the The Court notes from 1999) (quoting Wilson 514 N.E.2d repeatedly that the Defendant statement (Ind.1987)); Barany see also that she has no recollection indicates (Ind.l995)(defin- have anything which would start- doing preju- as “so ing fundamental error error deaths. The fire that caused the ed the of the as to rights dicial which might responses Defendant make a trial impossible”). fair ac- by the State as be characterized principal thrust of claims with her guilt judged by be knowledging can respect to similar the other statements is finders, rest of the with the along fact to the defendant’s claim to evidence, determining in whether she is statement, rejected discussed and above. acquiescing acknowledging guilt or truly interroga argues: “Each one of the She questioners. conclusions of the in the permeated individually is tions at 272. Record of type of inadmissible statements same pro The evaluation of whether the in inter Amy’s guilt the various belief a item particular value of of evi bative in rogators that have been discussed detail substantially outweighed by the is dence Br. interrogation.” concerning the a prejudice of unfair is discretion danger at Appellant Defendant 41. The defen of trial performed by the court. ary task best portions her dant eleven of highlights State, (Ind. Dunlap v. 761 N.E.2d are inadmis statements that she contends 2002). view, interrogators’ ac In our Considering consistent hearsay. sible responses and the defendant’s cusations interrogation use of the same obvious establishing in have little value challenging the defendant technique, by Likewise, conclude that the guilt. her we that guilt, her it is clear with assertions of accusations, the context repeated in “were not as interrogators’ utterances statement, a create entire did not substan fact, more in the nature sertions of prejudice. of unfair We are not tial risk response.” designed elicit a statements persuaded that the trial court abused its (Ind. State, N.E.2d v. Smith in redacted admitting the exhib discretion 1999). its. is each Regardless whether statement individually or all concluding Argument I in considered whether

Before Defendant, we collectively, Appellant Brief of the de statements are considered There- fundamental error. claims that was er- decline find additionally fendant default, case, fore applying procedural charged we de- cide and As in murder. cline to a conviction murder give any requires further consideration to that culpa- “knowing” these claims. defendant had a level of ie., bility, that the defendant was aware of 2. Failure Give Reckless the high probability that her conduct Homicide Instruction would result in the death of another when claims that defendant next the trial engaged activity. she in the Ind.Code court refused give erred when it 41—2—2(b); § § Ind.Code 35-42-1-1. 35— on tendered instructions reckless homicide. homicide, however, requires Reckless a argues She homicide an that reckless is i.e., culpability, “reckless” level of that the murder, inherently included offense “engage[d] the conduct dispute that there is a in the evi- serious conscious, plain, unjustifiable disre- dence the defendant regarding whether gard might of harm that result knowing or acted with a reckless mens a disregard involves substantial deviation rea. acceptable from standards of conduct.” 35-41-2-2(e); § Ind.Code Ind.Code 35- requests When a defendant an ruling upon 42-1-1. In the defendant’s covering instruction lesser-included of homicide, tendered instructions on reckless fense, applies a trial three-part court the trial expressly court found no serious analysis Wright set forth in evidentiary dispute. Record at 3851-52. (Ind.1995). 566-67 The first parts require two court to deter Although presented to the mine whether the offense either inher court, argues appeal ently factually or included in the charged “there is in what nothing [the defendant so, the trial offense. Id. If court must told the police investigators] negates determine is a whether there serious evi- possibility that she started the fire dentiary dispute any regarding element recklessly.” Br. of Defendant at Appellant distinguishes two offenses. Id. at argues: 52. The defense 567; see also Brown Nothing would preclude she said 1010, 1019(Ind.1998). If, in light of such finding that she started the fire with “ dispute, jury ‘a conclude that the could (who getting intent of had [her husband] lesser offense was committed but not the just threatened the week burn before to then it greater, is reversible error for a down) trouble; getting house instruction, an trial court not to give money being insurance from the house requested, inherently factually on the or up burned solve her prob- to financial ” Brown, included lesser offense.’ 703 lems; and that she and boyfriend] [her N.E.2d at (quoting Wright, 658 upon would be looked as heroes for sav- 567). a N.E.2d at trial court has When ing the from the [her kids fire that express finding made an that there is no started, but the got husband] fire out-of- dispute, evidentiary serious its ruling hand too quickly. Brown, reviewed for discretion. abuse of Id. 703 N.E.2d at 1020. We decline infer the of a to existence asserts, evidentiary dispute

The spec- and the serious based agrees, that State reckless homicide is an ulation from the absence of evidence. The inherently undisputed lesser-included offense of mur at trial evidence was that flam- Only culpability required poured der. the level of mable liquid ignited and distinguishes of around the crimes reckless homi- the bedroom which the children a proved beyond did not doubt trial court reasonable and had been locked. The was no serious discretion. There to abuse its the defendant three sen- sentenced dispute these actions were evidentiary parole. tences of life without high proba- of the an awareness done with Court, Supreme The States how- United in the bility the actions would result ever, since determined that the Sixth has See § 35- of the children. Ind.Code death Amendment to the U.S. Constitution re- 41-2-2(b). quires “any fact that increases the Parole 3. Life without Sentence beyond a penalty prescribed crime of her three chil For each murder be statutory maximum must submitted to 2, 4, dren, the defendant was ages jury, proved beyond a reasonable parole. Alleging to life without sentenced Apprendi Jersey, v. New doubt.” U.S. unreason manifestly that her sentence is 466, 490, 2348, 2362-63, S.Ct. able, our seeks review and Arizona, (2000). Ring L.Ed.2d pursuant the sentence Ind. revision of Apprendi applies made it clear that 17(B).4 reach Appellate Rule We do not — capital sentencing schemes. U.S. at required relief by of the issue because -, of the Unit S.Ct. at 153 L.Ed.2d at intervening the recent decision Ring Supreme Court. See Ring, to Apprendi Contrary ed States — Arizona, 2428, 153 U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. parole defendant’s sentences to life without (2002). L.Ed.2d 556 35-50-2-9, § pursuant Ind. Code were extending facts based on sentence be- sought a in this case sentence State yond maximum authorized parole life for each murder without 35-50-2-9, pursuant § jury’s finding guilty count Ind.Code of murder. verdict aggravating cir- qualifying based on a jury of the determi- Because absence under cumstance that each victim was qualifying aggravating nation that circum- twelve. See Ind.Code 35-50-2- age proven beyond a stances were reasonable 9(b)(12). jury during sentencing doubt, we must therefore vacate phase unable to reach a unanimous parole. of life without court’s sentence recommendation, and thus there was no Upon resentencing, remand for unless jury finding qualifying determination court, appellate an otherwise directed beyond a rea- aggravating circumstances may sentencing a new court order judge sonable doubt. The then found the may briefing and required aggravating hearing,5 circumstances order additional situation, 7(B). ("In ordinary App.R. 4. This is now at 969 dis rule charge possibility of the of retrial dissent, expresses In Sullivan his Justice jury procedure.”); with a new is the standard phase penalty jury a should concern that new also, State, e.g., McCarthy v. see 749 N.E.2d be convened on remand because Ind.Code State, 528, (Ind.2001); Buell v. 668 532 35-50-2-9(1) discharge § of a calls for State, (Ind.1996); Hughley v. 737 N.E.2d 251 jury agree a recommen unable on sentence 420, (Ind.Ct.App.2000). N.E.2d 422 Like position is consistent with his dation. This wise, penalty new we have remanded for State, separate opinion in Burris v. 642 phase capital penalty trials in cases where 961, J., (Ind.l994)(Sullivan, N.E.2d 969-70 phase jurors were unable to reach a unani result), concurring interpretation in but this State, Ben-Yisrayl v. mous recommendation. contrary practice. trials to established In for 253, (Ind.2000)(affirming 738 N.E.2d 267-68 offenses, it is not uncommon for criminal phase post-conviction penalty for new remand juries that are unanimous unable reach discharge following jury unable to discharged juries verdicts to be new con Burris, Burris, recommendation); place. 642 vened in their See 642 N.E.2d render a order, may a new or a outweighed prejudicial then issue issue new its effect. The ma- proceed- jority opinion order without further sets forth in its sentencing twelve ex- State, 943, plicit assertions of the fact v. of defendant’s ings. O’Connell (Ind.2001). case, guilt by police made during In the inter- present 952-53 State, 213, view. In Smith v. 721 N.E.2d request the State elects to dismiss its (Ind.1999), we held that two such as- parole, without sentencing to life police sertions of fact made a detective may proceed accordingly and resen- court during a interview er- similar constituted of years tence the defendant to term Here, ror. the error seems more severe statute, authorized the murder Ind. than in In I regard, Smith. this concur 35-50-2-3(a). § If pro- Code the State Justice Boehm’s dissent. parole with its life without sentenc- ceeds ing request, the trial court shall convene a II penalty phase jury new and conduct fur- I agree majority Ring with the v. proceedings pursuant ther to Ind.Code — Arizona, U.S.-, 2428, 122 S.Ct. § 35-50-2-9. (2002), L.Ed.2d 556 renders Bostick’s sen- Conclusion tence I agree, unconstitutional. do not convictions, affirm We the defendant’s however, parole life without is an vacate the we sentences of life without option on remand. parole, and we remand case to the declaring After Bostick’s sentence un- trial court for proceedings further consis- Ring, majority constitutional under opinion. tent with this opinion says, proceeds “If the State parole sentencing its life without request, SHEPARD, C.J., RUCKER, J., the trial court shall penalty convene new concur. phase jury and proceed- conduct further SULLIVAN, J., separate dissents with ings pursuant § to Ind.Code 35-50-2-9.” opinion. jury But Bostick’s case was unable agree sentencing on a recommendation. BOEHM, J., separate dissents with Indiana Code 35-50-2-9—the statute SULLIVAN, J., opinion in which concurs. procedure which sets forth the to be fol- SULLIVAN, Justice, dissenting. in cases in lowed which sentences of death parole and life sought explic- without are —

I provides itly jury that if the is unable to respectfully recommendation, majori- dissent from the reach a unanimous “the ty’s conclusion that the value of court discharge proceed shall by police defendant’s hearing 28 interview as if the had been to the court ("Common tion, judicial expressly recognized N.E.2d at 964 sense and we have that new economy judge juries may dictate the trial should upon have be assembled remand in ha jury....”). the latitude to assemble new bitual offender cases. Stewart v. (Ind. 1997); jury penalty phase similarly New trials have Funk (Ind.1981); penalty occurred in various other death cases 427 N.E.2d 1088-89 State McMillan, penalty 174-76, phase jury discharged where the 274 Ind. 612, (1980). rendering after a recommendation and the N.E.2d 617-18 In McMillan we appeal. public case was thereafter remanded declared: "It is in the interest that the See, State, 506, [Sjtate e.g., given opportunity Rondon v. 711 N.E.2d 523 be another to secure (1999); State, 924, penalty Averhart v. N.E.2d attempt 614 an enhanced should the first (Ind. 1993); jury.” 935 Castor result in a deadlocked Id. at 1281, 1283, (Ind. 1992). In addi N.E.2d at 618. 50—2—9(f). ac- But that was not done and admitted. Id., Thus there alone.” 35— interview should have been cordingly, a new the authority to convene statutory no jury excluded under Rule original the phase once penalty reach a recommenda- unable to has been majority’s rationale that the interro- tion. gators’ simply questions statements were State, 742 N.E.2d O’Connell Unlike persuade in form does not me. declarative (Ind.2001), where this is not a situation interrogation in Smith v. imposing in error (Ind.1999) was trial court there by cited the Rather, statutory the scheme sentence. example acceptable of an majority as an imposed sentencing was pursuant to which response designed statement to elicit in cir- the Amendment violated Sixth was: remand, the trial court cumstance. On Well, know, Q: you anybody if we ... (which does the statute

must both follow in brought say who would we here phase jury penalty a new provide for not you might who do think have your gut circumstance) the and follow Con- in this ... done this (which, by Ring, interpreted as stitution They probably would A: Um-Hum. with- imposition of life permit not does said me. circumstance). parole in this out be, Q: have How does feel Omond. reputation? Everybody kind BOEHM, Justice, dissenting. you. wants Sullivan agree I with Justice up. messing That’s me Everybody! A: was transcript July 28 interview repeated ex- cry That is a far from the In admitted into evidence. erroneously interro- changes between Bostick and her view, state- interrogating officers’ my majority. quoted by the Here gators Evidence inadmissible under ments were 704(b) placed opinions their as interrogators therefore the interview Rule jury, reinforced guilt Bostick’s before Evidence Rule 403. inadmissible under they “knew” Bostick by their claim that session, Bostick con- In hour this several wholly eviscer- guilty. technique This setting sistently any denied recollection 704(b), in a and does it mode ates Rule value of the inter- probative the fire. The permitting than pernicious more that is view, any, if is found Bostick’s state- testify guilt in court as to be- witness to crime, it commit the ment that she did subject interrogator is not cause the by animosity towards was motivated of this as to the source cross examination many The interview contains husband. “knowledge.” claimed interrogating officers statements objected to the admission Bostick of the When guilty know” Bostick was “we transcript of the videotape and under of the crime. These were inadmissible trial, 704(b) she did police during the as to 28 interview opinions Rule Evidence in her written the reasons stated view, minimal so for my In guilt. evidence, previously to exclude statements motion value of Bostick’s admissible These included the trial court. prejudicial effect of filed with outweigh does redaction of statements, argument that even after giving even substantial these references, resulting polygraph discretion on deference to the court’s “evidentiary value other lacked response If had been statements that issue. Bostick’s interrogators.” than accusation disentangled offending from the state- ments, sufficiently raised think this contention presumably they could have been 704(b) preserve appeal. it for Ac- issue agree

cordingly, Justice Sullivan

that this case should be remanded for re-

trial.

SULLIVAN, J., concurs. ABEL, Appellant-Defendant,

Marceilus Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

STATE of

No. 49S00-0011-CR-709.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: Bostick v. State

Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court

Date Published: Aug 19, 2002

Citation: 773 N.E.2d 266

Docket Number: 33S00-9911-CR-651

Court Abbreviation: Ind.