144 F.2d 819 | 8th Cir. | 1944
This case involves an application of the principles which have been set out in No. 12,793, In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co. (Bostian v. Shapiro), 8 Cir., 144 F.2d 812, decided concurrently herewith, and which need not be repeated here.
The question is whether Newman, president of the bankrupt corporation., had a substantial adverse claim to $75,900 withdrawn by him from the corporation’s bank account some time before the bankruptcy, so that he could not, except with his consent, be made subject to a turnover order in summary proceedings. Newman had objected to the summary jurisdiction of the referee and had set out in his response the matters which he contended made him an adverse claimant. A hearing was held, and evidence was adduced.
As indicated in our opinions in Nos. 12,791 and 12,793, the evidence showed that, some months before the bankruptcy, Newman had made a contract, in his own name as agent, with General Properties Co., Inc., for the purchase of the secured bonds, some unsecured notes and the capital stock of the insolvent Kansas City Journal-Post Company. Newman later formally assigned the contract to Morris Schapiro,
In form, the contract was a written offer by General Properties to sell, with a notation of acceptance by Newman as agent, which declared that the offer was accepted upon the condition
Newman was then elected president of the newspaper corporation, and General Properties turned over to the corporation the $100,000 cashier’s check for which the 500 new shares of stock had been issued. The board of directors of the corporation by resolution authorized Newman to open an account with the funds in a local bank in the corporation’s name and, as president, to draw checks on the account. The account was opened on the bank’s records as a general checking account of the corporation. Within three hours after the opening of the account, Newman drew a check on it for $24,000 in favor of Schapiro’s attorney, covering the amount which he and Schapiro claimed it had been agreed between them that Newman was to pay for the capital stock. Within a few days thereafter, Newman drew another check on the account for $75,000 in favor of the bank
Newman admitted in his testimony that he had no authority from the board of directors to withdraw or use any of the corporation’s funds for personal purposes. His contention, however, was that as to the $100,000 deposit he needed no such authority; “that it was never contemplated by said agreement that such sum of $100,000 should be paid into the said Kansas City Journal-Post Company except upon compliance with all the terms and conditions of said contract and agreement”; “that said deposit was not for the benefit of said Kansas City Journal-Post Company or any creditors of the said Kansas City Journal-Post Company until said agreement was fully complied with, being deposited in said account in the name of said Kansas City Journal-Post Company only in contemplation of the fulfillment of said agreements and to be used solely.for the purpose of additional cash working capital after the corporation had been placed in the position contemplated by said agreements”; “that until such time said funds were and remained in fact the property of said Harry Newman who alone was authorized to draw on said account”; that General Properties had not delivered the assignment of the International Paper account,
But the absolute effect of the things that the parties had done in connection with the transfer of the securities and the payment of the money left Newman without any semblance of legal right to withdraw the $100,000 or any part of it, without authority from the board of directors, for his personal use. His contention that the $100,-000 was “my money” is mere bald assertion. As between the seller and the purchaser, it was paid over as part of the consideration for the transfer of the bonds, notes and stock. As against the newspaper corporation, it was in law a payment for the 500 new shares of stock, which were issued to and accepted by the purchaser. If it was agreed between the seller and the purchaser, with the newspaper corporation’s consent, that the transaction was to remain subject to the performance of the condition that an assignment of the International Paper account should be furnished, then the condition may have been converted into a condition subsequent, and the situation may have been left sufficiently open so that the purchaser would have had a right to rescind.
But that does not help the situation here, for Schapiro neither attempted nor wanted to rescind. He did not see fit to let loose of his profit-making opportunity on the bonds, but brought foreclosure upon them instead, and, on the basis of his foreclosure-sale bid, apparently stood to make a profit of at least $50,000 above the $200,000 total purchase-price investment. And, of course, if the transaction had been thus rescinded, the 500 shares of stock issued for the $100,000, which Newman and Schapiro retained, would have-had to be surrendered to the newspaper-corporation.
But, beyond this, there is another element also in the situation which, apart from what has been said, makes Newman’s contention that the money was his to do-with as he pleased utterly devoid of any-legal foundation. If the General Properties transaction still remained open and the $100,000 was to be held until the International Paper assignment was delivered, it clearly was the newspaper corporation that was to hold the funds and not Newman. The $100,000 cashier’s check admittedly was turned over to the newspaper corporation, and so was placed legally under the control of the corporation’s board of directors, for the doing of whatever the corporation was supposed to do with the funds. The cashier’s check never came into Newman’s hands as an individual but only as president of the corporation. His only authority to deal with it was acquired from the board of directors. That authority, on the record, was to deposit the check to the account of the corporation, with the right to draw checks on it as president, for the uses of the corporation. He never received authority from the board of directors to withdraw any part of the money to buy property or pay off mortgages or for any other personal purposes.
The testimony in the record that New
It has been argued that the order of the District Court should be affirmed on the ground that the referee failed to make a preliminary inquiry on the question of jurisdiction. But the referee’s finding that Newman had not “the slightest color of title” to the funds expressly indicates that there had been a determination of the question of jurisdiction. As to the formalities of the proceeding, the record shows that the hearing consisted of an offer by the trustee of the evidence previously introduced in No. 12,791; its receipt without any objection by Newman; a statement that Newman did “not care to put on any further testimony”; a further statement by Newman’s representative that “there will be no further hearing of any kind on the issues”; and an offer by the referee to receive and consider any briefs filed by either party within a limited time. This clearly was a submission of the case, on both the question of preliminary inquiry and the merits, with the right in the referee to make a summary adjudication without further proceedings if he found that jurisdiction existed.
Newman has stipulated that for purposes of this proceeding, if he is properly subject to a turnover order, the $75,900 is to be regarded as having been placed by him in the Habosa Company; that that company is in legal effect his personal corporation; that the assets of the corporation are available to satisfy a turnover order for the funds; and that “Mr. Newman’s decisions would be the corporation’s decisions as to that matter.” The order of the District Court is reversed, with directions to affirm the turnover order made by the referee.
As in No. 12,793 the evidence here consisted of the testimony which had been introduced in No. 12,791, In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co. (Bostian v. Schapiro), 8 Cir., 144 F.2d 791, this date decided.
The contract actually was assigned to Schapiro’s attorney as agent, in order that Schapiro’s name would not appear in the transaction.
There were some other conditions also, not here material.
The bank in opening the acppunt had required the board of directors to adopt the customary protective resolution in favor of the bank on checks issued by an officer to his own order.
The evidence shows that at the time the contract was made General Properties had also orally agreed to obtain
Both the referee and the District Court held in No. 12,791, In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co. (Bostian v. Schapiro), that Schapiro and Newman, in aecepting the stock, bonds and notes and making payment of the $200,000, had waived the condition that the International Paper account should be assigned. But that determination cannot, of course, constitute an adjudication here, nor do we have any right to determine the question in this proceeding if it presents a substantial issue of right. For purposes of the jurisdictional question here involved, we are accepting the testimony of Newman and Schapiro’s attorney that General Properties had promised at the time of the transfer of the securities and the payment therefor that an assignment of the International Paper claim would be furnished within a few days and that Schapiro and Newman relied upon that promise.
Incidentally Sehapiro’s attorney testified that: “I left a check for $100,000 endorsed to the Kansas City Journal-Post Company, and couldn’t imagine it going any place other than to the credit of the Kansas City Journal-Post Company.”
Whether Newman actually could have any legal grievance in the situation, in view of the fact that he had assigned the contract to Schapiro, that he admitted Schapiro was the one who was to have the assignment of the International Paper account, and that the evidence showed that Schapiro never had agreed to cancel, and had no intention to cancel, the account as against the newspaper corporation, there is, of course, no occasion for us to discuss.