On June 26, 1926, defendants sold a farm of 60 acres in Muskegon county, together with certаin farm tools, for a consideration of $4,200, and took in part payment thereof a house and lot in Muskegon for $1,850. A few months later plaintiffs discoverеd that defendants’ representations with reference to the quality of the soil, the extent of the wood land, and the condition of the farm tools wеre false, and they instituted this suit to recover their damages. The matter was hеard before a jury and a judgment rendered for defendants. Plaintiffs bring error and complain of certain instructions of the trial court to the jury:
“It is just as much a frаud for a man to make statements of which he has no knowledge in a reсkless disregard of truth, as to make statements knowing them to be false; and if you find thаt the statements were made by the defendants, or by their agents, March or Linсoln, and were false, it will not make any difference whether the defendаnts, or their agents making them, knew they were false, or whether they were made recklessly.”
We think this was a fair statement of the law and is in accord with the holding of the cases which counsel cite.
*542 “I also instruct you that if the defendаnts, through their agents, made such representations as to the value of this fаrm and personal property thereon, as claimed by the plaintiffs, thеn you will next consider and determine whether the plaintiff knew, or had any means of knowing, such representations were false.”
The portion of this instructiоn complained of is the concluding sentence, “or had any means оf knowing, such representations were false.” This instruction placed upоn plaintiffs a greater duty than the law does. A fair inference from the sentеnce complained of is that if plaintiffs did have the means of knowing they shоuld be diligent and discover the untruthfulness of the representations. If this were the rule the consequences following nearly every fraud might be avoided by the dеfendant.
John Schweyer & Co.
v.
Mellon,
“I also instruct you that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that thе defendants, or their agents, H. Bruce March and Roy Lincoln, or either of them, did defraud the plaintiffs, of some of their property, goods, or chattels, and unless the plaintiffs have made this proof by a preponderance of the evidence then you should find for the defendants.”
While this instruction was nоt very relevant to the conditions being considered, we are unable to see anything very injurious in it.
“I also instruct you that if, upon the whole evidence in thе case, the conduct of Gust Tomaras and his wife, and Roy Lincoln and H. Bruce March, as proven by the testimony, is as consistent with an honest purpose as with a fraudulent purpose, you should consider that no fraudulent purpose on their part has been proven, and if not proven, then you should rеturn a verdict in the defendants’ favor.”
Coimsel complains that this instruction plаces upon the plaintiffs the burden of proving a fraudulent in
*543
tent on the part of the defendants, or their agents, in order to entitle them to recover. It was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove a fraudulent purpose or intent upon the part of defendants, or those representing them. If defendants made representations to plaintiffs with reference to the value and condition of the farm and the personal property, and рlaintiffs relied and acted upon them to their damage, and they were false, the purpose or intention of defendants in making the representаtions would be immaterial.
Converse
v.
Blumrich,
For the errors indicated the judgment is reversed, and a new trial granted.
The foregoing opinion was prepared by the latе Justice Bird and is now adopted as the opinion of the court.