Charles Lee Boseman was convicted of malice murder in the shooting death of Augusta Police Sergeant Charles Hammock. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial 1 challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, the denial of his motion to suppress his confession and the trial court’s finding that his trial counsel provided effective assistance. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence adduced at trial authorized the jury to find that appellant, after joining co-indictees McIntyre and Jones in consuming a case of beer, was riding around in McIntyre’s blue Escort, which was equipped with distinctive rims. The men were in the parking lot of the apartment complex where appellant lived when Jones spotted the victim driving into the lot. Jones commented, “there goes one right there,” and ordered McIntyre to turn the Escort around to follow the victim back into the parking lot. They were joined by the occupants of another car, who were friends and acquaintances of the men in the Escort. After McIntyre parked the car so it faced the exit of the complex, appellant and Jones walked over to the victim, who was sitting in his parked vehicle with the driver’s side window rolled down. The men exchanged words and then Jones, who had a handgun in his right hand, shot the victim in the chest and took his wallet. The *356 bullet destroyed part of the victim’s heart and vessels coming out of the heart. Appellant and Jones walked back to the Escort and left the scene. Police officers responding to a 911 call placed by an eyewitness to the shooting found the victim dead, with his police badge visible on the front of his jacket, his keys in his right hand and his weapon still secured in its holster. The victim’s wallet, empty of money but containing some credit cards, was found the following morning near the automotive body shop owned by Jones’s father. 2
After appellant told a friend that he knew it was Jones who shot the victim, the friend contacted the police. Police located appellant through his uncle, a local board of education police officer, and, at their request, appellant voluntarily went to the police station, accompanied by his uncle. Appellant was questioned for half an hour and then informed of his rights. After further questioning he was read his rights twice more; the second time was audio taped. In that taped statement appellant confessed that he was in the Escort when its occupants targeted the victim; that he accompanied Jones to the victim’s vehicle; and that he was present when Jones shot and killed the victim. See generally
Walsh v. State,
We hold that the evidence adduced at appellant’s trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the charged crimes.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and admitting his taped statement in which he confessed his participation, as a party to the crime, in the killing of the victim. Appellant concedes that when the police officers came to his home in regard to the statements he had made to his friend, appellant voluntarily accompanied them to the police station. The evidence adduced by the State authorized the trial court to find that appellant *357 was not viewed as a suspect at the time and that it was not until after 30 minutes of questioning that the investigating officer, Walden, suspected appellant had been personally involved in the shooting. 3 Walden then read appellant his rights and appellant orally acknowledged his understanding of those rights. When appellant continued to claim that he had only learned of the shooting from others, Walden left the room. Without prompting by the police, appellant’s uncle went and talked to appellant. Fifteen minutes later, the uncle asked Walden to return, relaying that appellant “was ready to talk, and then he want[s] to go home.” Appellant then admitted his involvement in the shooting to Walden and agreed to repeat his statement on tape. Walden went over appellant’s rights for a second time and obtained his signature on a waiver of rights form just minutes before the taped interview was conducted. This interview began approximately four hours after appellant first arrived at the police station. Walden read appellant his rights for a third time at the start of the taped interview, which shows that appellant responded “yes” when asked “Do you understand these rights?” The evidence also authorized the trial court to find that appellant’s uncle was present during most of the questioning; appellant was able to speak privately with his uncle on occasion; appellant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and was not threatened or offered any hope of benefits; and appellant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained prior to confessing to his participation in the shooting.
Appellant asserts that his statement was not knowing and voluntary, in that it was the result of his prolonged and coercive detention compounded by his limited intellect, which rendered him unable to understand the critical language in the rights read to him, and by his susceptibility to police pressure.
*358
Height v. State,
*357 Whether a defendant’s waiver of rights is knowing and intelligent is to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances. [Cit.] The mere fact of below average intelligence or even moderate mental retardation is not by itself sufficient to justify exclusion of an inculpatory statement, without additional evidence that the defendant lacked the capacity to understand and knowingly waive his rights. [Cits.]
*358
“This Court is to accept a trial court’s factual and credibility findings as to the voluntariness of custodial statements unless they are clearly erroneous, and in this case, there is evidence to support the trial court’s determination that [appellant’s] inculpatory statements were voluntarily made. [Cit.]”
Lyons v. State,
3. Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that another individual confessed to the crime. In order to prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness, a defendant must show both prongs of the
Strickland
test, i.e., that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Strickland v. Washington,
On appellant’s motion for new trial, trial counsel testified by deposition that the focus of the defense was to challenge the volun-tariness of appellant’s taped statement in which he confessed to all of the essential elements of his guilt as party to the crime of murder. “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.”
Strickland v. Washington,
supra,
“The fact that appellant and his present counsel now disagree with the difficult decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy made by trial counsel does not require a finding that appellant received representation amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel.” [Cit.]
DeYoung v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes occurred on December 18,1990. Boseman was indicted March 12,1991, along with Rodriquez Antonio Jones and Robert Lee McIntyre, in Richmond County on charges of malice murder, felony murder (aggravated assault), armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In
Boseman v. State,
Jones was tried separately and convicted of malice murder. His conviction was affirmed in
Jones v.
State,
Walden testified that appellant’s answers included a detailed identification of all of the parties involved in the shooting except for the occupant of the Escort’s rear seat. Walden knew, from the eyewitness’s account, that the rear seat occupant was involved in the shooting. Appellant’s inability to identify that one individual made Walden suspect that appellant was the person in the Escort’s back seat.
The psychologist testified both at the 1992 hearing on appellant’s motion and at the 1994 trial.
Appellant has not enumerated any error on appeal regarding that ruling.