11 Pa. Super. 24 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1899
Opinion by
“ Boroughs have equal power with cities to impose a license tax for the poles of an electric light company erected in the borough streets: ” Ridley Park v. Light and Power Co., 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 615. The determination of the reasonableness of the amount of the license fee to be charged lies in the discretion of the borough authorities in the first instance. It is not for the courts to determine whether a license fee is reasonable, but whether it is so unreasonable as to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on the part of the authorities fixing the fee: Allentown v. W. U. T. Co., 148 Pa. 117; North Braddock Borough v. Traction Co., 8 Pa. Superior Ct. 233.
The affidavit of defense in this case has been drawn with professional skill in the light of the reported decisions. We are not convinced, however, that the defendant company has presented a state of facts* which takes the cause out of the adjudicated cases. The allegation that the imposition of the license tax is a regulation of interstate commerce in violation of the provisions of the federal constitution is not a defense: Allentown v. W. U. T. Co., supra. The fifth paragraph of the affidavit alleges that the license fees of $1.00 for each pole, and $2.50 for each mile of wire are unreasonable. To support this allegation several statements of fact are made. It is said (1) that the license fees are not based upon the cost of inspection but are “ thirteen times more than a sum sufficient to defray all expenses and charges that may have been or might be incurred by said borough by the most careful, thorough, and efficient inspection and supervision that might be made of the subject.” In the light of the decision in Phila. v. A. U. T. Co., 167 Pa. 406, we are of opinion that this is not sufficient to prevent judgment. In that case the allegation was that the charges imposed were more than ten times the cost of the regulation of the poles and wires, and of all extraordinary expenses including liability for damages, loss and expenses of every nature.
In many, if not in all of the cases cited herein, the amounts of the fees imposed have been the same as those in the present case. These have been held either to be reasonable, or not so unreasonable as to warrant the interference of the court. This does not mean that such a charge is under all circumstances reasonable. It may be that a case will arise in which the facts will demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the imposition of fees of similar or less amounts. The present case is, however, controlled as we believe by the judicial precedents found in the authorities cited.
The judgment is affirmed.