In 1985, thе Borough of Berwick decided to upgrade and refurbish its sewage treatment plant. The borough did this through the Municipal Authоrity of the Borough of Berwick (the Authority). The Authority owned the plant, and leased it to the Borough of Berwick. The Authority entered into construction contracts with the defendants. The borough was not a party to any of the Authority’s contracts with defendants; it was a guarantor on one of the contracts with Bueharfc-Horn, an engineering firm.
The plant experienced significant problems, and in 1990 the Borough of Berwick sued defendants for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligence. The borough filed a complaint in 1992. One of the defendants, the subcontractor Innova-Tech, demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer, and the borough appealed.
Our prior decision reviewed the borough’s relationship with the Authority and this construction in great detail. We closely examined the contracts. We concluded that the borough was not a party to Innova-Tech’s subcontract with thе Authority, nor was it a third-party beneficiary. The borough could state no cause of action against Innova-Tech.
After we returned jurisdictiоn to the trial court, it addressed the demurrers and motions for judgment on the pleadings of the other defendants. The trial сourt applied the holding of our decision to the other defendants, and granted their motions, thus dismissing the ease. Sensing thаt this would be the inevitable result, the borough brought a last-minute motion to amend its pleadings or to add the Authority as a second plaintiff. The Authority had originally refused to get involved with the borough’s litigation, but now apparently acquiesced to being joined in this suit. The trial court denied these orders, holding that amendment would have been futile.
The borough now challеnges the dismissal of defendant Buchart-Horn, the engineering firm which designed the plant and oversaw its refurbishment. On the present аppeal, the borough has scarcely acknowledged our prior decision — it has not even bothered tо include it in its reproduced record. The previous decision, however, is the controlling law of the case. There, we noted that although the borough signed the contract between the Authority and Buchart-Horn, it did so only as a guarаntor. It appeared to us (and we stated in dicta) that the borough was not a party to the contract. Berwick v. Quandel, supra at 7, n. 2.
The bоrough presents no reasons why we should not follow our previous dictum on the present appeal. The same test for third-party beneficiary status applies now that did in the earlier appeal. See Scarpitti v. Weborg,
In light of this, the borough attempted to amend its complaint and join the Authority as second plaintiff on the eve оf dismissal. The trial court acknowledged that it may liberally allow the amending of complaints, but held that to do so at this stage would be futile. Id. at 6. We agree. The borough does not specify how it would amend its complaint except to state that “[t]he pleadings could have been amended so as to include the Municipal Authority so there is no quеstion as to contract privity.” Appellant’s brief at 20. Hence, we interpret both the borough’s motion to amend thе complaint and its motion to join the Authority as requests to cure its standing problem by substituting the Authority as the plaintiff in this action.
A nеw party may be substituted when the effect is to correct a name, but a new and distinct party may not be added. Jaсob’s Air Conditioning and Heating v. Associated Heating and Air Conditioning,
This law conсerning substitution of parties has usually arisen in the context of adding defendants after the statute of limitations has run against them. Here the action was initiated in 1990, and the four-year statute of limitations for contract actions had dearly expired by the time the borough sought to bring in the Authority. The twist is that the borough does not seek to. add a new defendant, but to substitute thе correct plaintiff for itself. A plaintiff without standing may not commence a suit and then attempt to substitute the proрer plaintiff after the statute of limitations has run.
At the same time, we must acknowledge that this question of plaintiff substitutiоn has never arisen in the context of a municipality and its own municipal authority. Because this appears tо be a novel, although obscure question, we do not consider the borough’s appeal to be frivolous. We thеrefore decline appellee Philadelphia Mixer Corporation’s application for counsel fees pursuant to Pa. RAP. 2744.
Orders affirmed.
WIEAND, J., concurs in the result.
Notes
. This suit was filed before the new version of Pa.R.A.P. 341 went into effect, which prevents such piecemeal appeals.