OPINION
{1} Plaintiff Christina Boradiansky filed a civil action against Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance in the First Judicial District Court on December 22, 2005, alleging causes of action arising out of a car accident in Santa Fe, New Mexico. State Farm removed the matter to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico on January 20, 2006. Both Plaintiff and Defendant filed dispositive motions in the federal district court. Based on those motions, United States District Judge Black certified two questions to this Court pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 39-7-4 (1997), and Rule 12-607 NMRA. They are:
(1) Whether Defendant’s insurance policy provision, excluding all government-owned vehicles from the definition of an “uninsured motor vehicle,” is unenforceable because it violates public policy as established by New Mexico’s Uninsured Motorist Act, NMSA 1978, § 66-5-301 (1983);
(2) Whether an insured carrying underinsured-motorist coverage is “legally entitled to recover” damages exceeding the limits established by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-19 (2004), when the insured is injured by a government employee driving a government-owned vehicle and makes a claim against her insurer for damages that exceed those limits.
{2} We conclude that the exclusion of all government-owned vehicles from the definition of an “uninsured motor vehicle” is unenforceable because it violates the public policy illustrated within New Mexico’s Uninsured Motorist Act. Further, we conclude Plaintiff is legally entitled to recover damages in this case within the meaning of Section 66-5-301, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the Tort Claims Act on recovery against the State. We therefore answer both questions in the affirmative.
I.
{3} On November 5, 2000, Plaintiff was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident when a Sandoval County Sheriffs deputy ran a red light, while driving a government vehicle, and broad sided her vehicle. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff carried uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage of $500,000 as a part of her motor vehicle policy and an additional $2,000,000 under her umbrella policy. Plaintiff settled her claim against the governmental defendant for less than the cap under the Tort Claims Act, and she requested additional payments from Defendant in excess of the limits imposed by the Act. See § 41-4-19.
{4} Defendant denied coverage. Defendant argues, as it did in federal district court, that Plaintiffs policies contained an express exclusion; the policies provided that an “uninsured motor vehicle” does not include a vehicle “owned by a government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies” and, in addition, the New Mexico Tort Claims Act does not allow a plaintiff to recover any amount of damages greater than the limits set forth in the statute. Therefore, Defendant reasons, Plaintiff was not “legally entitled to recover” damages greater than those limits, and she should not recover under the Uninsured Motorist Act. See § 66-5-301 (providing that uninsured motorist coverage is offered “for the protection of persons insured ... who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff contends that the government-owned vehicle exclusion is unenforceable because it violates public policy. Further, she argues that the phrase “legally entitled to recover” simply means that she must establish fault on behalf of the other driver.
II.
{5} These are questions of first impression in New Mexico and are reviewed de novo. “Appellate courts review questions of law de novo.” Hasse Contracting Co. v. KBK Fin., Inc.,
A.
{6} Over the years, our courts have considered various exclusions listed in insurance policies. See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Welch,
{7} Our rationale has varied, or seems to have varied, perhaps because we were considering in some cases whether applying New Mexico law was appropriate because the law of the place where the contract was formed was contrary to New Mexico public policy, see, e.g., Ballard,
{8} This Court in Chavez took the opportunity to discuss the legislative intent and purpose behind the Uninsured Motorist Act. In Chavez, State Farm argued that in ascertaining the object of uninsured motorist statute, the court need look no further than the text of the statute.
{9} Because this Court has cautioned on several occasions against reading the Uninsured Motorist Act to create unintended gaps in coverage, we believe seeking to avoid such gaps is an appropriate rationale on which we may rely in resolving the certified questions before this Court. “[T]he Legislature did not intend to allow the creation of a gap in coverage which is contrary to the purpose of the statute.” Id. at 330,
{10} A majority of the other states that have dealt with government-owned vehicle exclusions have found them contrary to the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage statutes. Cropper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
B.
{11} Since the enactment of the Uninsured Motorist Act, our courts have had some time to address the issues presented by the phrase “legally entitled to recover.” See, e.g., State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ovitz,
{12} Our courts have not been consistent or clear in defining the standard. In Wood, this Court held “that the phrase [legally entitled to recover] merely requires that the determination of liability be made by legal means.”
{13} Defendant suggested in oral argument that we need not look to the law of other jurisdictions because our own cases controlled the result in this case. We are not persuaded. The phrase “legally entitled to recover” seems something of a chameleon, varying with the facts and procedural context in which the need to define the phrase arises. Under these circumstances, we think cases from other jurisdictions, particularly when they are as unifoz'm in result as they seem to be on the issues in this appeal, are helpful.
{14} Many jurisdictions have held that the phrase “legally entitled” means “the injuries must result from the negligent conduct of an uninsuz-ed motorist.” 1 Alan I. Widiss & Jeffery E. Thomas, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance § 7.2, at 363 (3d. ed.2005). However, if the court determines that the insured is not legally entitled to recover, notwithstanding the negligence of the motorist, typically he or she is precluded from uninsured motorist benefits. Id. at 367. Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot recover the damages she seeks because the Tort Claims Act, which caps recovery from governmental defendants, precludes her from being legally entitled to recover. Plaintiff claims she is legally entitled to recover damages because the sheriffs deputy pled guilty in municipal court, and there has never been a dispute over who was at fault. Defendant claims that the text of the Tort Claims Act resolves the issue; the Act provides that Plaintiff is not “legally entitled to recover” damages beyond that contained in the Tort Claims Act.
{15} However, it seems unlikely to us that the Legislature intended to pz-event an insured’s access to insurance proceeds from uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage when the amount available under the Tort Claims Act cannot compensate fully for the injury. The purpose behind the Tort Claims Act is stated in the language itself.
The legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the other hand, the legislature recognizes that while a private party may readily be held liable for his torts within the chosen ambit of his activity, the area within which the government has the power to act for the public good is almost without limit, and therefore government should not have the duty to do everything that might be done. Consequently, it is declared to be the public policy of New Mexico that governmental entities and public employees shall only be hable within the limitations of the Tort Claims Act and in accordance with the principles established in that act.
NMSA 1978, § 41^4-2 (1976) (internal citation omitted).
{16} The Tort Claims Act seeks not only to protect the government, but to insure that there will be some recovery for those injured by negligent government employees. In this case, the Uninsured Motorist Act must be read in conjunction with the Tort Claims Act. The Legislature did not intend for the government and government employees to have absolute protection when someone is injured by their negligence. Further, it seems that the purpose of the Uninsured Motorist Act is much like the purpose of the Tort Claims Act, that is, to provide compensation to the injured party. In this case, by virtue of the Tort Claims Act, the government is underinsured with respect to the injuries sustained by Plaintiff. However, the Legislature has provided a “fix” through the Uninsured Motorist Act in motor vehicle accidents where the negligent party is not adequately insured. If the Legislature had intended limitations, we think the Legislature would have been explicit. Construing Chavez, the Court of Appeals in Sandoval stated “the only limitations under the New Mexico Uninsured Motorist Act shall be those specifically set out in the act itself.”
{17} That general statement may be another way of expressing the view that the Legislature did not intend gaps in coverage that were inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. Chavez,
{18} This case is similar to Borjas and West American Insurance Co. v. Popa,
{19} In Popa, the plaintiffs’ son was killed when his vehicle was struck by a Maryland State Police officer.
{20} The facts in our case correspond. Plaintiff in this case was injured by a police officer protected by the Tort Claims Act, which limited her recovery against New Mexico. Like Borjas and Popa, which both found that immunity was not a bar to the right to “legally recover” in those eases, we conclude the cap in the Tort Claims Act is not a bar to Plaintiffs right to legally recover within the meaning of Section 66-5-301. We perceive no inconsistencies between the policies of the two statutes and the interests protected. We therefore answer the second certified question in the affirmative.
III.
{21} We conclude Plaintiff is entitled to recover uninsured motorist benefits. Our answers to the questions certified to this Court are as follows: (1) on the first question, we conclude that the government-owned vehicle exclusion violates the public policy of New Mexico because it creates an unintended gap in coverage; and (2) on the second question, we conclude Plaintiff is “legally entitled to recover” underinsured motorist damages beyond the limits established by the Tort Claims Act because the cap applies to recovery against the State. Thus, we answer both questions in the affirmative.
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.