59 Wash. 610 | Wash. | 1910
This cause was formerly before this court on an appeal from a judgment ‘of dismissal. Boothe v. Summit Coal Min. Co., 55 Wash. 167, 104 Pac. 207. After a hearing, the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded, instructing the trial court to appoint a receiver for-the corporation, to take an accounting between the stockholders thereof, to require the defendant R. J. Linden to return to the corporation all money received by him as-salary in excess of $125 per month, and to wind up the business of the corporation and dissolve it. After the remand of the case, the court appointed a receiver, who took possession of the corporate property. Thereafter the, receiver made a report to the court, whereupon an order was made directing all parties to the action to appear on a date named
The reason suggested for denying the application is that the order sought to be appealed from is not in itself an appealable order, but must be reviewed, if reviewed at all, by an appeal from the order confirming the sale of the-property. But the question we think is no longer an open one in this court. In State ex rel. Newland v. Superior Court, 16 Wash. 444, 47 Pac. 965, we denied an application for a writ of prohibition to restrain a receiver’s sale, ordered by the court, on the express ground that the order directing the sale was so far final as to permit an appeal therefrom, holding expressly that the remedy to review such an order was by appeal. As further touching the question, although perhaps not directly in point, see the cases from this court collected in Bennett v. Thorne, 36 Wash. 253, 78 Pac. 936, 68 L. R. A. 113, more particularly on pages 260 and 261 of the opinion. On the other hand we have expressly held that the only question that can be reviewed under our statute on an appeal from an order of confirmation is the regularity of the proceedings concerning the sale. Krutz v. Batts, 18 Wash. 460, 51 Pac. 1054; Harding v. Atlantic Trust Co., 26 Wash. 586, 67 Pac. 222; Lewis v. Mauerman, 35 Wash.. 156, 76 Pac. 737.
Since the order appealed from is an appealable order, the appellant was entitled to a supersedeas. The writ will theiefore be granted.