Booth v. HairstonBooth v. Hairston
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Clarkson, Stacy, Adams
A deed of gift of lands from a mother to her son is void ab initio unless registered in two years under the provisions of our statute,
And where the son has failed to register his deed as the statute requires, for whatever reason, he may not successfully claim the lands against a devise thereof to his sister‘s child under the will of her grandmother, it appearing that the mother continued for more than two years to exercise absolute ownership over the lands until the date of her death.
3. Same—Curative Statutes.
Where a mother has made a deed of gift of her lands to her son, who has failed to have it registered in the time required by
STACY, C. J., and ADAMS, J., dissenting.
No error.
The material facts will be set forth in the opinion.
CLARKSON, J. This action was brought by plaintiffs against the defendant to set aside a deed made by Mrs. A. E. George to her son Samuel Hairston, defendant, to certain land in the city of Greensboro. Mrs. George‘s first husband was George Hairston, father of defendant. The deed in controversy bears the date of 21 February, 1921, and purports to convey to the defendant, Samuel Hairston, the land in litigation in fee simple. The deed was acknowledged before J. L. Bagby, commissioner of deeds of North Carolina, in Richmond, Va., on the above date, and was filed for registration in the office of the register of deeds of Guilford County on 15 January, 1924.
It was alleged in the complaint that the deed was without consideration, void and of no effect, and a cloud on plaintiffs’ title and prayer that it be canceled of record. The defendant in regard to the circumstances of the execution of the deed to him, in his answer says: “At the same time she produced a deed to this defendant, which paper she had and which had never been seen by this defendant before, and as to which this defendant had no sort of knowledge of any kind or character, and Mrs. A. E. George then stated that as he, the defendant, knew, she had always intended to give to him a fair proportion of her estate that she greatly appreciated his lifelong consideration of her and her feelings; that she had had this deed prepared for the purpose of carrying out her
In the court below it was tried out on an issue found by the jury against the defendant. The defendant assigned numerous errors in the trial below and appealed to this Court. The plaintiffs, appellees in this Court, filed a supplemental brief and contend that the deed was one of gift and void because not registered within two years, and cites
The deed which plaintiffs are attacking bears date and was signed on 21 February, 1921, and was recorded on 15 January, 1924—two years, ten months and 25 days after the record evidence discloses that it was signed, and ten months and 25 days after the time allowed by the statute for recording.
It is contended by plaintiffs, therefore, that it had been void under the foregoing statute ten months and twenty-five days at the time it was put on record. Plaintiffs further contend that if the deed under which defendant is claiming title had been a valid and bona fide deed of gift, as contended by defendant, and even if it were not absolutely void by reason of the way it was obtained, as contended by plaintiffs in the court below, then the deed became void by the very terms of the statute in consequence of the defendant keeping it in his lock box for more than two years after its delivery without placing it on record. That it was necessary in order for the defendant to obtain title under this deed of gift to place it upon record. The statute made that a condition precedent and title to the property did not vest in him until it was recorded in accordance with the terms of the statute, and plaintiffs insist that by reason of defendant‘s failure to comply with the statute
The defendant, in answer to the position taken by plaintiffs in their supplemental brief contends that the plaintiffs cannot for the first time upon appeal raise the question as to the application of
It is said in Shipp v. Stage Lines, 192 N. C., p. 478: “A party is not permitted to try his case in the Superior Court on one theory and then ask the Supreme Court to hear it on another and different theory. Warren v. Susman, 168 N. C., 457.”
This position is sound and wise, but has no application to the facts in the present action. The pleadings, both complaint and answer, show that the deed in controversy was one of gift. The plaintiffs allege it was without consideration, void and of no effect. If it was one of gift and under the statute void, as contended by plaintiffs why consider defendant‘s assignments of error in the court below on the issue there tried out. Cui bono? If error should be found and a new trial granted, how would it profit the defendant? On the entire record the facts are admitted and a question of law alone arises. If a new trial was awarded, no different result could follow. By analogy where a charge of the trial court is erroneous, but the entire testimony relevant to the inquiry was before the court, it being perfectly apparent that in no aspect of it is there any defense available, our decisions are to the effect that a new trial should not be granted. Our system of appeals is founded on public policy and appellate courts will not encourage litigation by granting a new trial which could not benefit the litigant and the result changed upon a new trial, and the nongranting was not prejudicial to his rights. Bateman v. Lumber Co., 154 N. C., p. 253; Rierson v. Iron Co., 184 N. C., p. 363; Davis v. Storage Co., 186 N. C., 676. “They will only interfere therefore, where there is a prospect of ultimate benefit.” Cauble v. Express Co., 182 N. C., p. 451.
The defendant further contends that the statute, Public Laws 1924, Extra Session, ch. 20, ratified 20 August, 1924, extends the time of registration and cures the defect. “That the time is hereby extended until September first, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six, for the proving and registering of all deeds of gift, grants from the State,” etc. It further provides: “All such instruments which have heretofore been or may be probated and registered before the expiration of the period
Before and after the deed of gift was executed, and until her death, the rents of the property were paid each month to Mrs. A. E. George. The insurance on the building was in her name. The property was on the tax books listed in her name. Thus, after the deed was made, and up to her death, Mrs. George exercised dominion over the property—all with the knowledge and adverse to defendant. For example:
“Checks of Armour & Company, payable to Mrs. Ann E. George, the first of said checks being in words and figures as follows, to wit:
| Auditor‘s No. 203834. | Treasurer‘s No. 73009. |
| Chicago, Ill., 23 December, 1920. | |
| Pay to the order of Mrs. Ann E. George | $150.00 |
| One hundred and fifty and | 00/100 dollars. |
| (H.W.) | Armour & Company |
| To Continental & Comml. Nat. Bank, | Cummings. |
| Payable at Chicago, Ill. | |
| Messrs. Kountz Bros. Bankers. | |
Endorsed: Mrs. Ann E. George, also endorsed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and Commercial Bank of Danville, Va., C. L. Booth, Cashier.”
The last check “dated Chicago, Ill., 21 November, 1924. Armour & Co., to Mrs. Ann E. George, amount $150.00—To Continental and Commercial Nat. Bank, Chicago, Ill. Payable to Messrs. Kountz Bros. Bankers, N. Y. C. Endorsed by Mrs. Ann E. George,” etc.
There are forty-four of these checks for $150.00, each payable to Mrs. Ann E. George and endorsed by her, in the record.
Walker, J., in Dew v. Pyke, 145 N. C., p. 303, points out the difference between the two statutes as to grants and gifts and construes them and says: “It is provided that a deed of gift shall be proved and registered within two years after its execution. So far the statute is like that in the case of grants. But the Legislature did not think this language sufficient to invalidate the deed of gift if the provision as to registration was not complied with by the donee, so it took the precaution to add that if the deed is not registered within two years it shall be void, ‘and shall be good against creditors, and purchasers for value, only from the time of registration.’ If the requirement that the deed of gift should be registered within two years after its execution was intended as a condition, noncompliance with which should invalidate it, why superadd the words ‘or otherwise (it) shall be void‘? Revisal, sec. 986. (
In the case of Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N. C., p. 420, the feme covert was never privately examined, and the law declares the deed a mere nullity and void. The Legislature passed an act confirming the title
In Hicks v. Kearney, 189 N. C., p. 319, it was said: “And in Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C., 473: ‘But the Legislature of North Carolina is restrained by
No law can be held valid which divests property out of one and gives it to another, without consent of the owner. This is a universal rule in the states of the union. Stanmire v. Taylor, 48, N. C., 207; Lowe v. Harris, supra. In certain exceptional cases of necessity and for public purposes, private property may be taken upon payment of ‘just compensation.’
‘Judge Patterson, in the case of Vanhorner, lessee, v. Dowance, 2 Dallas, 310, says: “The Legislature has no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it in another, without a just compensation; it is inconsistent with the principles of reason, justice and rectitude; it is incompatible with the comfort, peace and happiness of mankind; it is contrary to the principles of social alliance in every free government, and lastly, it is both contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. In short, it is what every one would think unreasonable and unjust in his own case.“’ Robinson v. Barfield, supra; Hicks v. Kearney, supra.
It will be interesting to call attention to some of the cases in regard to vested rights and retrospective or retroactive statutes, other than those already referred to.
In University v. Foy, 5 N. C., p. 58: “The 41st section of the Constitution declares that ‘schools shall be established by the Legislature for the convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to the masters, paid by the public, as may enable them to instruct at low prices, and all useful learning shall be duly encouraged and promoted in one or more universities.‘—In obedience to this injunction of the Constitution, the Legislature established the University, and in the year 1789, granted to the trustees of the University, ‘all the property that had theretofore or should thereafter escheat to the State.’ In the year 1800, the Legislature repealed this grant.—(Locke, J., for the Court held in sub
Jones v. Sasser, 14 N. C., p. 378, the facts. “The plaintiff claimed the slave in dispute under a deed of gift from his father, Arthur Jones, Sr., dated 5 April, 1827, which was not registered until 20 February, 1830. The defendant claimed under a deed from the same person, dated 5 August, 1829, which was registered 10 January, 1830. His Honor instructed the jury that, as the plaintiff claimed under a deed of gift, no title passed by it until it was registered, and, until that took place, that the title remained in his father; that if the latter retained the possession until the deed of August, 1828, the execution of that deed, and its prior registration, gave the defendant title which would not be divested by the subsequent registration of the deed to the plaintiff. A verdict was returned for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.” Ruffin, J., said: “By the act of 1806, R. c., 701, no gift of slaves is good or available unless made in writing. ‘Neither,’ the act continues, ‘shall such act be valid unless the writing shall be proved or acknowledged, and registered within one year after the execution thereof.’ These words seem to denote a purpose in the Legislature, then, to make the registry acts effectual, at least in reference to the gift of slaves.” The judgment of the court below was affirmed. Gregory v. Perkins, 15 N. C., p. 50.
In the case of Tooley v. Lucas, 48 N. C., p. 146, the headnote discloses the nature of that action: “Parol evidence of the contents of a deed conveying a slave, is not admissible, if it was not proved and registered, although full proof has been made of the loss or destruction of the instrument, and proper notice given of the intention to offer secondary proof of its contents.”
In Spivey v. Rose, 120 N. C., p. 165, Montgomery, J., said: “The plaintiff further objected to the admissibility of the deed on the ground that it was void in law, in that it appeared to be voluntary on its face, being a deed of gift and had not been registered within two years after its execution. His Honor committed no error in overruling this objection. The General Assembly has regularly, every two years, enacted statutes extending the time for the registration of conveyances of real estate, since the execution of this deed up to the time of its registration, the first one on 31 March, 1871, before the death of the testator—even before the will was made. Such acts have been declared by this Court to be in the discretion of the Legislature, and deeds of gift embraced in their provision. Jones v. Sasser, 14 N. C., 378; Scales v. Fewell, 10 N. C., 18.”
The enabling act was ratified 20 August, 1924, and extended the time until 1 September, 1926. The deed in question had been void one year, five months and twenty-nine days at that time and we think that this statute has no retroactive operation and that the Legislature has no power to pass an act affecting vested rights.. “Especially will a statute be regarded as operating prospectively when it is in derogation of a common-law right, or the effect of giving it retroactive operation will be to destroy a vested right or to render the statute unconstitutional. 25 R. C. L., 787; Black on Interpretation of Laws, 252.” Hicks v. Kearney, supra.
In Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S., p. 623, it is said: “It may, therefore, very well be held that, in an action to recover real or personal property, where the question is as to the removal of the bar of the statute of limitations by a legislative act passed after the bar has become perfect, such act deprives the party of his property without due process of law. The reason is, that, by the law in existence before the repealing act, the property had become the defendant‘s. Both the legal title and the real ownership had become vested in him, and to give the act the effect of transferring this title to plaintiff, would be to deprive him of the property, without due process of law.” See Dunn v. Beaman, 126 N. C., p. 770.
These secret gifts by deed, most frequently to a member of a family, often to the exclusion of others, a good sound public policy enacted into law requires that within two years they should be recorded so that notice be given to the world—“or otherwise shall be void.”
Under the facts and circumstances of this case the enabling or curative statute in regard to registration could not validate the void deed, and the statute had no power to resuscitate so as to affect the rights of Mrs. A. E. George. Upon the record we can find
No error.
STACY, C. J., and ADAMS, J., dissenting.
STACY, C. J., dissenting: The decision in this case, as I understand it, is put upon the ground that the deed of gift from Mrs. A. E. George to her son, Samuel Hairston, is void because not registered within two years after its making, and that the Legislature is without power, following a hiatus of one year five months and twenty-nine days after it was declared void under the terms of
It will be observed that in the case of Scales v. Fewell, above mentioned, the Court held the bill of sale, there registered after the time required for its validity under the act of 1715, good as between the parties, by virtue of the enabling act of 1821, subject only to intervening vested rights of third persons. Hall, J., speaking of the effect of the extending act, said: “I think that that act comprehended and validated the registration of the deed in question as to all future transactions, yet I do not think that it divested rights (of third persons) under the execution which had vested before that time.”
The case of Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N. C., 391, is also cited for the position that a deed by a feme covert, not privately examined as required by the act of 1751, could not be validated by a subsequent act of the Legislature. This case was correctly decided, because in the meantime the feme covert died, and vested rights intervened. The case of Barrett v. Barrett, 120 N. C., 127, on the other hand, where no vested rights of third persons had intervened, is directly opposite: “The Legislature has power to pass, repeal or modify the laws regulating the manner of executing, proving or recording conveyances, and the exercise of such power to cure defective compliance with former statutes cannot be an interference with vested rights as between the parties to such instruments. Tatom v. White, 95 N. C., 453, 459. It only becomes so when third parties have acquired rights which would be impaired by the act which is intended to cure the defective execution, probate or registration. . . . It is competent for the Legislature to provide what mode of
To like effect is the decision in Steger v. Building Asso., 208 Ill., 236, where a mortgage deed, void for want of proper probate, was validated by subsequent statute, the Court saying: “The Legislature may ratify and confirm any act which it might lawfully have authorized in the first instance, where the defect arises out of the neglect of some legal formality and the curative act interferes with no vested rights.” U. S. Mortg. Co. v. Gross, 93 Ill., 483.
“If the thing wanting or which failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is something the necessity for which the Legislature might have dispensed with by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the Legislature to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if the irregularity consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of doing some act, which the Legislature might have made immaterial by prior law, it is equally competent to make the same immaterial by a subsequent law.” Cooley‘s Const. Lim. (7 ed.), p. 531.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S., 687, speaking of the power of the Legislature in such cases, tersely states the same principle, as follows: “It may, therefore, cure irregularities, and confirm proceedings which, without the confirmation, would be void because unauthorized, provided such confirmation does not interfere with intervening rights.”
See, also, Fibre Co. v. Cozad, 183 N. C., 600; Anderson v. Wilkins, 142 N. C., 157; Janney v. Blackwell, 138 N. C., 437; Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C., 472; Board of Education v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 300.
The last sentence of the quotation made by the Court from Justice Walker‘s opinion in Dew v. Pyke, 145 N. C., 300, is very significant: “This may be considered as a legislative construction of the words ‘shall be registered within two years after its execution,’ to the effect that if the instrument is not so registered it shall not be evidence, unless the time for registration is extended and a new authority to register it is thereby given.”
There is a distinction made in some of the cases between the force and effect of an act which undertakes to validate a deed, void ab initio, and one which simply extends the time for registering a deed, but for which it would be declared void under the statute requiring its registration. Dever v. Cornwell, 10 N. D., 123, 6 A. & E. Enc. of Law (2 ed.), 940; 24 A. & E. Enc. of Law (2 ed.), 111; Cooley‘s Const. Lim. (7 ed.), 528 et seq.
The status of unregistered deeds and those registered under extension acts is thus succinctly stated in Phifer v. Barnhart, 88 N. C., 333 (second and third head-notes) :
“2. The bargainee in an unregistered deed has a legal title which, though incomplete, cannot be defeated by the mere act of the bargainor in executing another deed to a third party, without notice and whose deed is registered.
“3. Although such deed cannot be given in evidence until registered, and does not therefore convey a perfect legal title, yet, when registered, it relates to the time of its execution, and the title becomes complete.”
These conclusions are supported by numerous authorities cited in the opinion, and the case itself has been followed and cited with approval in a number of later decisions. See Shephard‘s Citations and Allen‘s Reported & Cited Cases, 1926.
Speaking to the question in Tooley v. Lucas, 48 N. C., 146, Nash, C. J., said: “To the legislative department of the government, belongs the power to enact laws, by which the people are to be governed, and to the judiciary, the right to expound them. While acting within the scope of their legitimate authority, their will is to be obeyed; none have a right to disobey it. Where the language of an act is plain and perspicuous, the act must speak for itself, unless its enactment transcends the power of the Legislature. In this case the Legislature has left no doubt upon the question presented to us. ‘All sales of slaves shall be in writing, attested by at least one credible witness, or otherwise shall not be deemed valid; and all bills of sale of slaves shall within twelve months after the making thereof, be proved in due form, and recorded; and all bills of sale, and deeds of gift, not authenticated and perpetuated in manner by this act directed, shall be void and of no force whatever.’ Rev. Stat., ch. 37, sec. 19. I need not refer to the proviso in that section. In the succeeding section provision is made for the registration of such conveyances. Here, there is no ambiguity; no room for construction. If not authenticated and perpetuated as directed, that is, duly proved and recorded as directed, the conveyance is declared not to be deemed valid,
In 12 C. J., 1097, the law on the subject of curative acts is summarized as follows: “Deeds, probates, or other instruments void because of lack of registration or defective registration may be made valid by subsequent legislation as between the parties, but not for the purpose of impairing rights acquired by third persons before the passage of the statute.”
I think the act of 1924 is valid, and that, under it, the deed in question is good as between the parties. The fact that Mrs. George, in the meantime, had executed a will, devising the property to others, ipso facto vested no right in them, and cannot affect the present suit, for she was living at the time of the passage of the extending act, and under the law, as now written, a will speaks and takes effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.