182 Iowa 1319 | Iowa | 1918
“Contracts may be made by a wife and liabilities incurred, and the same enforced by or against her, to the same extent and in the same manner as if she wrnre unmarried.”
See Spafford v. Warren, 47 Iowa 47. Moreover:
“A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, and maintain an action therefor in her own name, and hold the same in her own right, and may prosecute and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her rights and property, as if unmarried.” Section 3162, Code.
These statutes leave no doubt as to the wife’s right to the fruits of her own independent contracts and the “wages for her personal labor” when rendered other than for her husband in pursuance of her own engagement therefor. As observed in Mewhirter v. Hatten, supra:
“ ‘Wages for her personal labor,’ as here used, refer to cases where the wife is employed to some extent in performing labor or services for others than her husband, dr where she is carrying on some business on her own behalf; such, for instance, as dressmaking, or the millinery business, or school teaching.”
Here, she was employed by the Independent School District, and her earnings belonged to her alone, and not to the husband. Aultman Engine & Thresher Co. v. Greenlee, 134 Iowa 368; Lindsey v. Lindsey, 116 Iowa 480; Hutcheis
Notwithstanding this, counsel argue that her independent earnings were exempt, under Section 4011 of the Code, which declares that :
“The earnings of a debtor who is a resident of the state and the head of a family for his personal services, or those of his family, at any time within ninety days next preceding the levy, are exempt from liability for debt.”
The earnings contemplated in this statute are those belonging to the debtor; for none other might be seized under execution against him, and therefore, there was no occasion to exempt earnings due to others. The' exemption is of the earnings of the debtor: that is, .of such earnings as belong to him, whether “for his personal services or those [i. e.. personal services] of his family.”
He is entitled to the services of minor children in his family, but compensation therefor is exempted the better to assure their proper maintenance. But, as seen, the “wages for her personal labor” belong to the wife, and for this reason are not within the terms of this statute, not being of “the earnings of the debtor.” Counsel for appellant argue that the word “those,” in the expression “those of the family,” has for its antecedent “earnings,” instead of “personal services;” but this would not be a grammatical construction, nor in harmony with the manifest design of the statute to exempt the earnings only of a debtor who is the head of a family. To none other is the exemption extended. The “earnings” exempted from liability are only those owing to debtor, and are for the personal services not only of himself, but his family as well. His wife’s earnings, when in an independent business, or on her engagement for others than her husband, are not owing to him; and therefore the application for the discharge of the garnishee was rightly denied.