20 Wis. 602 | Wis. | 1866
Tbe material question arising on this appeal, and the only one about which I have had any difficulty, 'is that which relates to tbe amount of tbe special property of tbe officer in the goods taken by tbe plaintiff; or, in other words, whether interest was due and collectable on tbe judgment in tbe United States district court It is claimed by tbe counsel for tbe defendants below, that interest was due and collectable on this judgment, and that tbe court should have instructed the jury upon the point as asked by him on tbe trial. Tbe instruction in effect was, that in order to ascertain the extent of tbe special property of the officer, the jury should compute tbe amount due and unpaid on tbe judgment on the 9th day of April, 1857, in tbe following manner, namely: by allowing interest on the debt of $1,000, from the day the judgment was docketed up to tbe 24th of February, 1857 ; then deducting $175, tbe amount made on the alias execution; then adding to tbe balance tbe amount of tbe costs, and computing the interest on this last amount from the 24th of February, 1857, to tbe 9th day of April, 1857, which interest added to sucb last amount would give the value of tbe special property of tbe officer in tbe goods when they were taken from his possession under the writ of replevin; and that then interest should be allowed on the amount of such special property from tbe time of the service of tbe replevin writ to tbe day of trial, by way of
Tbe judgment in tbe United States district court was obtained under tbe 9th section of the late Fugitive Slave Act. Tbis section provided that a person aiding in tbe escape of a fugitive slave should forfeit and pay by way of civil damages to tbe party injured the sum of one thousand dollars for each fugitive so lost, to be recovered by an action of debt in any district court within whose jurisdiction tbe offense was committed. There is no express provision in tbe fugitive slave law which allows interest upon judgments recovered under its provisions ; and therefore, whether interest is to be allowed on such judgments must be determined by reference to other statutes, and tbe general analogies of tbe law. By section 8, chap. 188, Laws of Congress 1842 (5 U. S. St. at Large, p. 518), it is provided that on all judgments in civil cases thereafter recovered in tbe circuit or district courts of tbe United States, interest shall be allowed, and may be levied by tbe marshal, under process of execution issued thereon, in all cases where, by tbe law of tbe state in which such circuit or district court shall be held, interest may be levied under process of execution on judgments recovered in tbe courts of such state, to be calculated from tbe date of tbe judgment, and at such rate per annum as is allowed by law on judgments
It is objected, however, that the judgment in this case, being for a penalty, did not draw interest either at common law or under our statute, but is governed in this respect by the principles applicable to a judgment where the cause of action is for a tort. It is undeniable that many of the cases make this distinction; but in the language of the annotator to Sellech vs. French, (1 American Lead Cases, 507 — 537), it is difficult to see why the character of the original cause of action should affect the right to interest on a debt liquidated and due by verdict and judgment. For, as remarked by Sutherland, J., in Sayre vs. Austin, 3 Wend., 496, “it cannot be contended with any show of reason or authority, that a judgment is a debt not due until a demand of payment is made, after the original cause of action has not only been demanded, but has been ¡n’osecuted to judgment, the highest evidence of debt known to the law, and which authorizes the plaintiff immediately to issue an execution and seize either the property or the person of the defendant. It certainly savours somewhat of extravagance to maintain that the judgment is not a debt due in every jaossible sense of the term. It is a debt due with interest from the time of its rendition: ” and this, as it appears to me, irrespective oí the question whether the cause of action was ujaon contract or for a tort. Whatever may have been the doctrine in former times, the spirit and tendency of modern decisions upon the subject of interest manifestly are, that whenever the debtor knows the precise amount he is to pay, and where he is to pay, but makes default, justice requires that he should indemnify the creditor for the wrong which he has done him ; and a just indemnity, though it may some times be more, can never be less than the •specified amount of money, or the value of the property or services at the time they should have been paid or rendered, with interest from the time of the default until the obligation is discharged.” (BeONSON, J., in giving the opinion in Van
We were referred to sec. 42, ch. 102, R. S. 1849 (now sec. 14, chap. 134 of the present revision), for the purpose of showing that interest could be collected on execution only where judgment had been rendered on contract or upon a prior judgment. The interpretation put upon a like provision in Sayre v. Austin, supra, was, that it was not by virtue of such a statute that judgments bore interest, but that the intention of the act was to authorize its collection upon execution. If we are right in the view that the judgment of the district court draws interest, then in an action of debt upon it, the court and jury would have no discretion to allow or not to allow interest, but must assess a sum of money by way of damages equivalent to the interest. And as the law thus allows interest on the judgment, there would not seem to be any substantial objection to
Tbe objection that tbe execution was not authorized by tbe laws of this state because it contained an attachment clause, is removed by reference to section 118, chap. 102, R. S. 1849.
The instruction asked by the plaintiff’s counsel, that the payment made by Blair to Arnold was to be treated as a payment in satisfaction of the judgment in the United States district court, was properly refused. — This court has already decided, in Pratt v. Donovan, 10 Wis., 378, that where judgment is rendered against a plaintiff in an action of replevin, tbe judgment may be entered up, as well against the principal as against tbe sureties wbo signed tbe undertaking. W e therefore do not feel called upon to enter upon a re-examination of that question at tbe present time.
Tbe majority of tbe court are of opinion that interest should be given to tbe appellants on the judgment in their favor in an action of tort in the United States court, by way of damages. I differ from them on this point. There is some conflict of authority whether judgments on contracts at common law drew interest or not; but none as to judgments in actions of tort. No interest could be recovered on judgments in such actions. Tbe United States have by statute adopted the laws of tbe state as to interest on judgments ; and the only law of tbe state altering or modifying the common law is sec. 14, cbap. 134, R. S., which provides that “ whenever a judgment shall be rendered upon contract or upon any prior judgment, and execution shall be issued thereon, it shall be lawful to direct upon such execution tbe collection of interest,” &g. This expressly authorizes interest to be collected on judu-
By the Court. — The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded for farther proceedings according to law.