181 Mich. App. 752 | Mich. Ct. App. | 1989
This appeal is taken from an order of the circuit court granting partial relief on a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Plaintiff Booth Newspapers, Inc. requested and was denied copies of the tenure charges concerning allegations of sexual misconduct against an unnamed teacher and the settlement agreement between that teacher and the school district. The agreement ended the tenure proceedings without any formal resolution of the charges. After plaintiff brought suit to compel disclosure of the requested information, the circuit court decided that the identities of the teacher and those students involved in the allegations of the teacher’s sexual misconduct were not subject to disclosure pursuant to the privacy exemption provided by MCL 15.243(1)(a); MSA 4.1801(13)(1)(a), but that the requested information, redacted to exclude personal identities, should otherwise be disclosed. Defendant Kalamazoo School District and intervening defendant Kalamazoo Education Association/MEA-NEA, acting on behalf of the teacher’s interests, seek by their appeals to overturn the decision requiring any disclosure at all of the requested matters. Plaintiff cross appeals, seeking further disclosure of the identity of the teacher. We affirm.
The lead opinion by Justice Cavanagh, with which Justices Levin and Archer concurred, would not require that actions under the privacy exemption be determined by balancing the extent of the intrusion upon privacy against the public interest in disclosure. This view expressly precludes our consideration of the requesting party’s identity or the purpose for which the information will be used because these matters are deemed to be irrelevant to the determination of whether the disclosure of the information would be a "clearly unwarranted invasion” of privacy. Whether the privacy exemption should be applied is to be determined in light of the following principles:
The Legislature made no attempt to define the right of privacy. We are left to apply the principles of privacy developed under the common law and our constitution. The contours and limits are thus to be determined by the court, as the trier of fact, on a case-by-case basis in the tradition of the common law. Such an approach permits, and indeed requires, scrutiny of the particular facts of each case, to identify those in which ordinarily impersonal information takes on "an intensely personal character” justifying nondisclosure under the privacy exemption. [Id., p 123.]
Applying the approach advanced by Justice Cavanagh, we find ourselves in agreement with the position taken by the circuit court that disclosure of the requested information, if redacted of personal identities, does not amount to an intrusion upon privacy, given the evolving concepts of common-law privacy. The embarrassment derived from disclosure is its stigmatization of specific persons affected by allegations of wrongdoing; it follows that disclosure of the factual content of the requested information redacted of identities has little, if any, potential for embarrassment resulting from public disclosure. By the same token, we agree with the circuit court that disclosure of the teacher’s identity would be intrusive of his or her privacy. It is hard to imagine anything more embarrassing than allegations pertaining to personal sexuality, particularly if the allegation is compounded by illicit and possibly criminal misconduct in sexual behavior. See Pennington v Washtenaw Co Sheriff, 125 Mich App 556, 567; 336 NW2d 828 (1983). In this case, however, it is more than merely the subject matter of the disclosure that
Other opinions issued in State Employees, supra, favor variations of a balancing test to resolve privacy exemption questions. An exemption pursuant to the view expressed by Justice Brickley must satisfy a twofold test: (1) whether the information is "of a personal nature” and (2) whether disclosure would amount to a "clearly unwarranted” invasion of privacy, i.e., whether the balance of private and public interests favor nondisclosure. State Employees, supra, pp 127-128. According to Justice Boyle, "where it is determined that the request seeks information of a personal nature . . . the intensely personal characteristics of the information sought must be balanced against the purpose for which the information is
As we have previously observed, an accusation of sexual misconduct against an identified person employed as a public teacher is intensely personal in nature, although the contents of the accusation without reference to any individuals would not appear to implicate substantial privacy concerns. Regardless of what factors are weighed as public interests — plaintiffs interests in publishing newsworthy items, the readers’ interests in being apprised of newsworthy matters, or the school district constituents’ interests in the governance of public schools — the public interest does not outweigh the invasion of privacy that would follow from disclosure of the identity of the accused. Under any of the balancing tests advanced in State Employees, we conclude that the circuit court decision to disclose the information redacted of identities achieved the striking of a proper balance.
Defendant school district further argues that, even assuming that all requested information except personal identities was subject to foia disclosure, the circuit court lacked power to redact the requested documents of the names. However, MCL 15.244(1); MSA 4.1801(14)(1) permits the school district, as a public body, to distinguish between
Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in awarding attorney fees intended to reimburse plaintiff for seventy-five percent of those fees incurred in this action. The court found that this award represented a reasonable apportionment of plaintiffs fees to the nonexempt portion of the information requested. MCL 15.240(4); MSA 4.1801(10)(4) confers discretion upon the court to award an appropriate portion of the requesting party’s reasonable attorney fees when that party has prevailed in part. A plaintiff prevails when the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure and the action had a substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information to the plaintiff. Schinzel v Wilkerson, 110 Mich App 600, 602; 313 NW2d 167 (1981), lv den 417 Mich 863 (1983). When the plaintiff prevails only as to a portion of the request, the award of fees should be "fairly allocable” to that portion. Dawkins v Dep’t of Civil Service, 130 Mich App 669, 674; 344 NW2d
Affirmed.