237 Pa. 297 | Pa. | 1912
Opinion by
This was an amicable action of assumpsit to recover the price of eighty-six bonds issued by the Western Pennsylvania Hospital and secured by a mortgage on its property.
The hospital is a charitable corporation of this State created and existing under an act of the general assembly approved March 18, 1848, P. L. 218, and its supplements, and the decree of the Court of Common
The plaintiff being the owner of eighty-six of the said mortgage bonds of the hospital agreed to sell them to the defendant at par and accrued interest, if the bonds were a first lien on the mortgage premises. The defendant refused to accept and pay for the bonds, and this action was brought to enforce payment.
The defendant denies that the bonds are a first lien on the property of the hospital because of the alleged prior lien created in favor of the Commonwealth by reason of the provisions of the Act of 1909, making the appropriation. The learned judge of the court below held that the part of the appropriation act creating the lien was unconstitutional, because (a) it offends against Section 3, Article III, of the Constitution, which provides that “no bill except general appropriation bills shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title,” and (b) that it offends against Section 7, Article III, of the Constitution, which provides that “the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law authorizing the creation, extension, or impairing of liens.” The court thereupon entered judgment for the plaintiff from which the defendant has taken this appeal.
We do not agree with the learned court below that the Act of May 13, 1909, P. L. 835, offends Article III, Section 3 or Section 7, of the Constitution. The act cannot be successfully attacked because it contains more than one subject, or that the subject is not clearly expressed in the title. The subject of the act is the appropriation of a certain sum to a charitable institution. The act had in view a single purpose and that was the appropriation of the money for the charity administered by the hospital. It is claimed, however, that the provisions for the security and the lien constitute additional subjects which invalidate the act, but we are not favorably impressed with this position. The
The title, like the act itself, we think is sufficient. It is not misleading, and gives notice of everything contained in the act. In making the appropriation there is no presumption that the State will not designate the purpose for which it is to be used and protect itself
We are of the opinion that Section 7, of Article III, of the Constitution, prohibiting the enactment of any local or special law authorizing the creation, extension or impairing of liens did not prevent the passage of the Act of 1909, nor invalidate any of its provisions. Mr. Buckalew, an eminent lawyer and a leading member of the constitutional convention says in his work on the Constitution that “this clause can hardly apply to liens of the State.” It is a maxim of the common law that the King is not bound by any statute, if he be not expressly named to be so bound.. It is inferred, prima facie, that the law made by the Crown, with the assent of the Lords and Commons, is made for subjects and not for the Crown: per Alderson, B. in Attorney General v. Donaldson, 10 M. & W. 117, 122. The same doc
The' State when acting in its sovereign capacity occupies a position entirely different and superior to that of the citizen. It cannot be sued without its consent. The statute of limitations, without it is expressly so declared, cannot be invoked to defeat its claim as a creditor. It takes precedence over other creditors. It may forego its rights as a sovereign power and place itself on the same footing as one of its citizens, but unless the statutory language affecting the subject so declares it will not be presumed. The State cannot be deprived of its rights as a sovereign by inference, it must be done by appropriate constitutional or legislative action.
McLeod v. Central Normal School Association, 152 Pa. 575, decided since the adoption of the present Constitution, recognizes the validity of such legislation. There the general assembly appropriated money and specified the particular educational purpose to which it was to be applied with a proviso for a lien similar to that in the act under consideration. While the constitutionality of the act in that case was not attacked,
If, however, the contention of the appellee be correct, that the provision for a lien on the premises of the hospital is unconstitutional and void, we see no escape from the conclusion that the whole act must fall and that the hospital has no right to any part of the appropriation. The first section of the act makes the appropriation, the second section prevents the payment of any part of the fund until the managers of the hospital have certified that exclusive of State aid three hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars have been expended on the building, and Section 3 provides that no part of the appropriation shall be available until the managers give an obligation to the State that the building shall not be abandoned or converted to a private úse, and providing that the appropriation shall be a non-interest bearing lien on the premises. These are dependent provisions, and are in no sense separate and
It follows that Article III, Section 7, has no application to the Act of 1909, and that therefore the provision in the act creating a lien for the money appropriated is a valid exercise of the legislative power and the lien thus created is effective. This lien is prior to the xnortgage given to secxxre the bonds which are the sxxbject of this litigation, and, therefore, in accordaxxce with the stipulation of the parties, the court below should have entered judgment for the defendant.
The judgment of the coxxrt below is reversed and judgment is now entered for the defendant.