Boone v. StateBoone v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Birdsong
The Boone brothers, Aubry and Barry, were convicted of two counts of terroristic threats and sentenced to serve five years on each count. They appeal, and we affirm. Held:
1. Appellants assert that the trial court erred in denying their motion for directed verdict of acquittal because the corroboration requirements of the terroristic threats statute (Code Ann. § 26-1307 (a)) were not met. The two victims were GBI agents conducting an undercover narcotics investigation in Washington County. One agent testified that in the course of this investigation they went to the house where they believed Barry Boone to reside and were invited inside by a young woman. While they were sitting in the living room waiting for Boone, the door crashed open violently and Barry and Aubry Boone “came storming” in brandishing a rifle and a shotgun. “They screamed that everyone was to keep their seats and as Barry Boone went . . . running through the room, waving the thirty thirty rifle around, telling everybody to keep their seats, nobody was to move, he ran towards the rear portion of the room to a door at the rear and as he turned around, he asked, ‘where are the rest of the pigs?’... At that time, he, not finding anyone back there, he then proceeded to ask us what we were doing there. .. At this time, he said, T know who you are. I know what you’re doing here,’ and . . . Aubry Boone spoke up and said that he knew who we were and that we had come to get his little brother. At that time ... he made some comments as to drugs, saying if we were interested in any drugs, we could come to him. We
This testimony was corroborated by the other agent. We do not agree that the statutory requirement of corroboration “of the testimony of the party to whom the threat is communicated” demands corroboration by some evidence other than another party to
2. Our review of the victims’ testimony likewise convinces us that the statements and actions of the appellants constituted terroristic threats as contemplated by the statute, and were not “conditional threats” made merely to preserve the status quo while the appellants determined who the strangers were in Barry Boone’s house. Direct evidence that the threats were made for the purpose of terrorizing another is not necessary if the circumstances surrounding the threats are sufficient for a jury to find the threats were made for such a purpose. Moss v. State, 139 Ga. App. 136 (228 SE2d 30). Appellants’ argument that this issue is important because it goes directly to the question of the degree of fear into which the victims were placed is without merit because the crime of terroristic threats focuses solely on the conduct of the accused and is completed when the threat is communicated to the victim with the intent to terrorize. Wilson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 501, 503 (6) (260 SE2d 527). The evidence here was ample to support a finding by the jury that the threats of the appellants were made with the requisite criminal intent.
3. Nor did the charge of the court improperly shift the burden of proof to appellants so as to provide cause for reversal. Taken as a whole with the qualifying instructions which were given that the presumption of criminal intent was rebuttable, a “permissive” rather than “mandatory” presumption was presented. Such presumptions are not inherently unconstitutional. Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 (260 SE2d 900); Whisenhunt v. State, 152 Ga. App. 829 (264 SE2d 271).
Judgment affirmed.
Deen, C. J, and Sognier, J, concur.