*1 payment at Miller to take election Mrs. city notes
her residence on $5000 al., Appellants, Leslie L. BOOMHOWER et provide minimum con- corporation, all with the state of Iowa. tact CERRO GORDO COUNTY BOARD OF foregoing The trial court considered SUPERVISORS, Appellees. concluding notice under section factors in over- conferred 617.3 The con- special appearance.
ruling the Supreme Court of Iowa. performable in whole or tract was play fair Traditional notions of by allowing the parties are met to both seek contracting redress developed.
under the factual situation evidence. on substantial
ruling was based applies spe
V. What has said
cifically Corporation. to defendant Vitalife claims he in a dif
Defendant Weaner position
ferent all he did was to
buy corporation. This stock in the new Iowa, his own attor
overlooks his visit to
ney purchase handling the details organization corporation, down checks, fact
payment personal with his supplement signed
he the contract and individually president
thereto as well as corporation.
the new It also overlooks
plaintiff’s allegations conspiracy be corporation and the
tween Weaner and allegation
further that Weaner induced
corporation contract with to break its
plaintiff. applicable de Section 617.3 well as defendant Vi-
fendant Weaner as
talife. myriad following
VI. The cases v. Wash-
wake of International Shoe Co. analyzed. supra, need be here
ington, facts. The
Each case rests on
complications growing out the various the ex- are considered in
fact situations 20 A.L.R.3d
haustive annotation at this case the facts in
1201. We conclude constitu-
fall well within the jurisdic- rules to extend
tional these defendants. Nelsen, City, for Mason concur, Boomhower & except All Justices appellants. takes no *2 96 10, City, did not start Pappas, Mason until December
William They maintain that it 1968. is lees. for them to possible exhaust administrative court, remedies before direct resort to LARSON, Justice. they may pur- or that elect which to rights sue without loss relief in of to seek 12, 1966, the Board of Su- On December court. Iowa, County, re- pervisors Cerro Gordo of property reflecting the zoned certain real The trial agree court did not on de- zoning recommendations of commission. motion, plaintiffs’ peti- fendants’ dismissed group objectors of resident Thereafter tion. gave appeal the board ad- notice of to of justment. hearing, the Pursuant board Although II. we have recognized the adjustment appeal of dismissed doctrine of of exhaustion administrative it ground was without that remedies, applied have it preclude appeal such not authorized was judicial determination of issue which By certiorari, statute. that action was re- might presented could be or have viewed the district court the writ agency. usually administrative The issue is Upon appeal was annulled. to this court raised when resort is first taken adjustment it was held board of court. Independent v. Valentine School hear does not have District, 555, 334, 187 Iowa 174 6 A. appeals. See Boomhower Cerro Gordo 1525; Baumhover, L.R. Knowlton v. 182 Iowa, County Adjustment, of Board 163 691, 202, 841; 5 A.L.R. 75, N.W.2d 77. In this decision rendered Department Safety, Hitchcock v. of Public 1968, 10, it stated: December was “Parties 1016, 1; 250 Iowa 98 N.W.2d Hohl v. claim such ordinance or amendment Education, 502, 94 arbitrary capricious thereto is 787; Lehan by petitioning seek relief in the courts 823, 830, 135 N.W.2d 84. In other a writ of certiorari.” The have at- words, held, we have not one claims where tempted suggestion, and the to follow that jurisdic administrative given is agency only question presented by appeal this is matter, certain subject ques timely. whether their action is tion is in the first instance for the admin agency istrative and thence party must I. Rule Iowa Rules of Civil Pro- exhaust the claimed cedure, provides: before resorting to the courts. Both before adoption our Rules “No writ shall of certiorari issue or be Civil Procedure rejected we have that so- petition sustained is unless filed within procedure called exclusive referred months from the time inferior tri- 2 bunal, Am.Jur.2d, jur- Law, board or officer exceeded its Administrative illegally.” isdiction otherwise acted pp. 441. Even the cases cited therein do not hold is exclusive under The resolution of the Gordo Coun- Cerro all circumstances. See Jensen, Sohns ty Supervisors, Board 11 Wis.2d 84 A.L.R. claim illegal, adopted was on December 2d citations; Jorgensen v. Penn petition Plaintiffs’ writ of sylvania Co., R. 138 A.2d N.J. 2, 1969, certiorari January herein was filed 72 A.L.R.2d over years two complained after the action of. It is their contention that the In Valentine v. Independent School Dis- period set forth in Rule tolled 319 was while trict, supra, it held, where it appears they were exhausting their administrative public rule of school authorities is remedies, and that the six month limitation unreasonable, relief is not to admin- limited appeals istrative certiorari court’s action in sustaining defendants’ Likewise, in motion to barred. Knowlton v. Baum- dismiss must be affirmed. hover, supra, recognizing while admin- remedies, held,
istrative alleged that board directors of school jurisdiction, without the court acts *3 MOORE, SNELL, STUART, C. has the to set unauthor- aside LeGRAND, JJ., MASON concur. open ized remedy act and either com- plainant. BECKER, J., dissents. supra,
In Lehan v. we cited approval and Hohl with and con- Hitchcock would lie even properly cluded certiorari JJ., RAWLINGS no provided
though the had another so, especially review. This method of said, R.C.P., provides: because Rule BECKER, or “The writ shall not be denied annulled Justice. plain, plaintiff speedy has another * * respectfully I dissent. adequate remedy; or I acknowledge should first failure of Furthermore, pointed as out Hohl the discuss basis for this the Education, supra, the rights Board of However, dissent. important seems original complaints consider enough to require argument a further jealously guarded the courts. writ are may fully presented the matter to this be therefore, differently, majority opin- court. Put the must, be concluded that ion is reasonable when considered within compelled pursue were not the propositions context argued. of the they what believed was an administrative Code, But section been has remedy, had certiorari under but available ignored and I therefore must dissent. test the of the legality Rule 319 to board’s action as well as its to act sought Plaintiffs have action the They not elected to do so. matter. Supervisors Board of reviewed Adjustment. It turned Unless, then, out their authority some III. action was mistaken. should have They justification appears will authorize which sought by way direct in the courts suspension month limitation six original action, certiorari. though Their plaintiffs’ provided in Rule mistaken, was not unreasonable. Certain- expired. rights thereunder have findWe ly it negligent. they But while authority except for ex- no such innocently the wrong took route the statute clusive claim above discussed (six limitations months) ran its course. II, appellants Division cite none. theOn difficulty choosing proper forum hand, unjust it would seem and unfair is well by Brightman illustrated v. Civil to those interested and affected Commission, Iowa, Service compel delay board’s actions to them to im- provements pending the exhaustion of alleged “Unless, We now in the instant case: finally then, determined to be without merit. some authority justification ap- delay pears We are satisfied by which will authorize suspension lants have chosen not pursue month period pro- six limitation afforded them Rule that time vided by Rule plaintiffs’ rights there- that remedy passed, has and that the trial under have expired.” I cannot why see Code, in Iowa authority “If, the com- 614.10: WHITE, Appellant, section Donald action, plaintiff,
mencement prosecu- in its except negligence any cause WILKES, also known as R. J. Robert F. brought one is therein, a new tion, fails Wilkes, Appellee. Wilkes and R. F. thereafter, the second months within contemplated, herein purposes shall, first.” held a continuation Supreme Court on the books. is still The above purpose for which used for
It has Moore, intended, Weisz
it was *4 purpose analysis of
excellent reference to found with
statute legal states and statutes
similar also. Mc See
encyclopedia statements. 1364, 4 (1936),
Intire v. Gordon hand the statute has been the other
On since, construed, narrowly before practically abandoned lawyers have they feel the statute was Perhaps
it. literally, if removed from
figuratively, interpretation. narrow See
the books
Cooley (1918), v. Maine purpose is not the of this dissent all of the cases section 614.10 Suffice to we have never detail. inapplicable
said the statute was a case public policy kind. The
of statute, litigant which I a be to allow where he has thrown out new chance procedural point
of court due on negligence, recognized
to his public policy this court. first This predecessor
articulated Statutes, 1843, chapter (Terr.),
Revised through 9 and carried our state Codes in form, present commencing
its the 1851 with
Code, to date. day litigant should have his procedural
and not be eliminated issues. this end the
To has done its passing section 614.10. We should do part by construing liberally
our the statute purpose effectuate and assist the in obtaining justice. Section
Code, 1966.