Booker v. StateBooker v. State
Office of the Attorney General by Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Marvin L. White, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Charlene R. Pierce, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.
BANKS, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. This matter is before the Court on the appellant-petitioner‘s appeal of the circuit court‘s denial of post-conviction relief as to his guilty plea, and an appeal of his sentence. We are compelled to reverse the sentence under Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), and its progeny. We also conclude that Booker‘s attack on his guilty plea is not time-barred.
I.
¶ 2. John Earl Booker pled guilty to the capital murder of O.M. Martin and was sentenced to death by judgment entered in the Circuit Court of Tate County, Mississippi1, which judgment and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal with rehearing denied in Booker v. State, 449 So.2d 209 (Miss. 1984). His petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was initially denied, Booker v. Mississippi, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 230, 83 L.Ed.2d 159 (1984), but on rehearing that Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of this Court and remanded the matter for consideration in the light of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). Booker v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 1023, 105 S.Ct. 3493, 87 L.Ed.2d 626 (1985). Upon that review, this Court again affirmed the conviction and sentence. Booker v. State, 511 So.2d 1329 (Miss. 1987). Thereafter, certiorari was denied in the United States Supreme Court. Booker v. Mississippi, 485 U.S. 982, 108 S.Ct. 1281, 99 L.Ed.2d 492 (1988), reh‘g. denied, 486 U.S. 1027, 108 S.Ct. 2006, 100 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988).
¶ 3. The direct appeal process completed, Booker, within two months following denial of rehearing in the United States Supreme Court, presented an Application for Leave to File a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence which combined points challenging the guilty plea with others addressing the sentence. On motion of the Statе, the Court dismissed those claims addressing the plea without prejudice to the right of the defendant to refile them in the trial court and
II.
¶ 4. In the Circuit Court, Booker raised two issues assailing the entry of his guilty plea. The trial court denied these claims under the bar of
It is further ordered that further consideration of the remaining claims before this Court is stayed pending consideration and resolution of these claims relating to the guilty plea by the Circuit Court of Tallahatchie County. Nothing in the pleadings filed in this Court or in this Order should be construed to prevent either party from raising any claims or defenses available to it under the post-conviction relief act or elsewhere. Should either party be aggrieved by the resolution of the issues by the circuit cоurt, an appeal may be taken if desired and the appeal of that matter shall be considered along with the presently pending Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence.
¶ 5. Booker correctly points out that he filed his post-conviction petition with the trial court within three years of thе completion of the direct appeal of his death sentence. He argues that by doing so he fully complied with
A motion for relief under this chapter shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the prisoner‘s direct appeal is ruled upon by the supreme court of Mississippi, or in case no appeal is taken, within three (3) years after the time for taking an appeal from the judgment of conviction or sentence has expired, or in the case of a guilty plea, within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of conviction.
¶ 6. Booker presently argues that the limitations did not begin to run in this сase until the close of his direct appeal, which was finally adjudicated on May 23, 1988. We agree. The statute clearly provides three years in which to file a petition for post-conviction relief where a direct appeal has been taken. In this case, as in all death cases, a direct appeal was taken pursuant to
¶ 7. The fact that the death sentence in this case was followed by a plea of guilty to the charge does not alter our understanding of the statute. Although the Post-Conviction Relief statute provides that: “in the case of a guilty plea, [a petition for relief must be filed] within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of conviction,” that provision is clearly directed toward guilty pleas that are not attended by direct appeals, since cases in which direct appeals have been taken are subject to the express language tolling the running of the time limitation during the pendency of such appeals. Indeed, the entire range of non-capital cases in which defendants plead guilty are not attended by direct appeal, since those convictions are nоt entitled to any direct appeal.
¶ 8. Thus, under
III.
¶ 9. In addition to Booker‘s appeal of the circuit court‘s dismissal of his petition for relief from his guilty plea, Booker petitioned this Court to consider several issues that arose during his sentencing trial. We will address the two which are central to our disposition of his petition for relief from the death sentence.
A. The “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstances, which the trial court failed to define or limit for the jury, was vague and over broad as applied, and is inapplicable in this case, all in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article III, Sections 14 and 28 of the Mississippi Constitution. (Claim C of original petition)
¶ 10. The trial court submitted this aggravating factor, taken from
¶ 11. Our pronouncements on this issue since the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Clemons have been clear and consistent: Clemons claims are excepted from procedural bars. King v. State, 656 So.2d 1168, 1173 (Miss. 1995); Irving v. State, 618 So.2d 58 (Miss. 1992); Gilliard v. State, 614 So.2d 370 (Miss. 1992); Pinkney v. State, 602 So.2d 1177 (Miss. 1992), and Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004 (Miss. 1992).
¶ 12. Here, as before in similar cases, the State urges this Court to either reweigh the remaining aggravating and mitigating factors, disregarding the offending factor, or to review the sentence applying harmless error standards. We have repeatedly refused to do so for reasons enunciated at length in Wilcher v. State, 635 So.2d 789 (Miss. 1993). See also Wiley v. State, 635 So.2d 802 (Miss. 1993); Woodward v. State, 635 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1993). As declared in Hill v. State, 659 So.2d 547, 549 (Miss. 1995):
Our task in death penalty cases where, as here, an unconstitutionally vague aggravator is submitted to the jury, is to review, nоt reweigh. By virtue of
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 , the weighing of aggravating circumstances is a jury function. Wilcher compels us to remand ... for a new sentencing hearing.
See also Davis v. State, 655 So.2d 864 (Miss. 1995).
¶ 13. The Court is not unmindful of the legislature‘s amendment in 1994 of
B. The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the “robbery” and “pecuniary gain circumstances“, in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article III, Section 14, 26, and 28 of the Mississippi Constitution. (Claim O)
¶ 14. In Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660 (Miss. 1991), we held that the trial court in a sentencing proceeding should not submit as
¶ 15. Booker presently complains that he was subjected to the same double weighing of these factors. The State responds that Willie is to be given only prospective application, and, having been decided after Booker‘s sentencing trial, it does not govern that hearing. While it is true that the Willie rule was not effective at the time of Boоker‘s sentencing trial and would not be a basis for reversal, it is applicable to the resentencing process which will result from today‘s ruling, and the circuit court is directed to instruct the jury in accordance with its holding.
¶ 16. The remaining issues which addressed specific conduct in the prior trial and instructions specifiс to the evidence there presented no longer require attention. We have spoken to many of them in the several decisions that we have issued since Booker‘s initial sentencing hearing. With every confidence that the circuit court will preside over Booker‘s resentencing proceeding in accord with the guidance of our intervening decisions, we decline to reach them today.
¶ 17. DECISION OF TRIAL COURT DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ON GUILT PHASE ISSUES IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. DEATH SENTENCE REVERSED, TO BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING TRIAL PENDING OUTCOME OF PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM GUILTY PLEA.
PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, J., concur.
McRAE, J., concurs in result only.
¶ 18. The majority writes that the three-year statute of limitations which controls petitions for post conviction collateral relief begins to run from the conclusion of Booker‘s direct appeаl rather than from the entry of his guilty plea to capital murder. Thus, the majority holds that Booker‘s attack on his guilty plea is not time-barred. In arriving at such a conclusion, it is noteworthy that the majority fails to cite any case authority. I reject outright the majority view.
¶ 19. The majority also reverses Booker‘s sentence of death under the authority of Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), and its progeny. I have previously stated my view that this Court could re-weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and/or apply harmless error analysis where applicable. I have also expressed views about the finality of criminal judgments. Therefore, in the case sub judice, I re-adopt those previous views as heretofore expressed. Wilcher v. State, 635 So.2d 789, 794-801 (Miss. 1993). See also Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246 (Miss. 1996); Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767 (Miss. 1995); King v. State, 656 So.2d 1168 (Miss. 1995); Hill v. State, 659 So.2d 547 (Miss. 1994); Nixon v. State, 641 So.2d 751 (Miss. 1994); Woodward v. State, 635 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1993); Wiley v. State, 635 So.2d 802 (Miss. 1993).
¶ 20. Booker pled guilty to the charge of capital murder on July 20, 1981. The sentencing phase of the proceeding was conducted before a jury and Booker was sentenced to death. On direct appeal tо this Court, Booker only raised issues concerning the sentencing phase and his death sentence. Booker raised no guilt phase issues and could not have done so because of
Any person convicted on an offense in a circuit may appeal to the supreme court, provided, however, an appeal to the supreme court shall not be allowed in any
case where the defendant enters a plea of guilty.
¶ 21. The Court has long adhered to the principles espoused in this statute. Cooper v. State, 175 Miss. 718, 168 So. 53 (1936). Equally clear is that Booker could have, and in fact did appeal the sentence imposed although he plead guilty to capital murder and failed to raise issues concerning guilt. Trotter v. State, 554 So.2d 313 (Miss. 1989).
¶ 22. This Court has held that trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions for post-conviction relief filed by a convicted defendant who is precluded from taking a direct appeal by virtue of having entered a guilty plea. McDonall v. State, 465 So.2d 1077 (Miss. 1985). The majority ignores the October 24, 1988, order of this Court wherein we noted our lack of jurisdiction and therefore dismissed without prejudice those portions of Booker‘s post-conviction petition relating to his guilty plea in order that he could properly file his petition with the lower court. We clearly recognized thаt no jurisdiction existed over the claims relating to Booker‘s guilty plea.
¶ 23. Thereafter, Booker filed his petition in the trial court and the State raised the statute of limitations defense. Booker pled guilty on July 20, 1981.
¶ 24. Regarding finality of criminal cases, if Booker had initially filed his petition in a timely manner, this Court would not now be faced with deciding this claim sixteen years after the fact. Booker‘s actions clearly illustrate the seemingly endless appeals process in death penalty cases. The Post-Conviction Relief Act clearly states that the proper procedure is to file such claims with the trial court. Booker failed to follow the proper statutory procedure in filing his petition first with this Court. Such action resulted in the unnecessary remand of the case and a stay in proceedings while the trial court considered Booker‘s claims. It is also noteworthy that at least one of Booker‘s attorneys, the Hon. Robert McDuff, first appeared as counsel on October 12, 1984, long before the statute of limitations ran on Booker‘s guilty plea. Surely counsel of the outstanding status and excellent legal reputation of McDuff was well aware of this situation and the potential pitfalls for Booker if a petition were not filed within the three-year time frame. Booker has simply chosen to challenge his guilty plea too late. The time bar applies.
¶ 25. I respectfully dissent.
DAN LEE, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and MILLS, JJ., join this opinion.