139 Ark. 595 | Ark. | 1919
The issues presented by the pleadings in this case involve the validity of an act of the General Assembly of 1919 (Act No. 302) creating road improvement district, designated as the Des Arc-Hazen Road Improvement 'District of Prairie County.
It is also contended that the act is unconstitutional because the description of the lands in township 4 north, range 5 west, is indefinite and uncertain. The lands in said township and range embraced in this district are designated by sections and parts of sections. The particular description complained of in section 1 of the act is as follows :
“All of the territory embraced within this district lies west of White River and shall include the following described property, to-wit:
“All of sections 2-36, both inclusive, township 4 north, range 5 west, west of White River. ’ ’
A like provision in a similar statute was upheld as constitutional in the recent case of Sallee v. Dalton, 138 Ark. 549. But it is said the Sallee case should not rule the instant case because it did not appear in the Sallee case that the way was obstructed by houses and other improvements. This, however, can make no difference, as there is no inhibition against the opening of public roads over improved lands. Again, it is provided in the act that the commissioners, with the approval of the county court, may vary the route. Even under the restricted construction placed upon a grant of such power in the case of Rayder v. War rich, 133 Ark. 491, 202 S. W. 831, the route might be varied so as to pass around houses or other obstructions. It goes without saying that the route, as varied, must remain within the boundaries of the district. Appellant has called attention to the fact that Livermore street, in the town of Hazen, is not open to the corporate limits, and that the county court has no jurisdiction to approve a plan for a new street or route within the corporate limits of a town, and, for that reason, it is contended the act is void. This conclusion is reached on the theory that the city council is vested by the Constitution, of the State with the exclusive jurisdiction to open highways through a town. No such exclusive power is granted to the agencies of towns.
It is insisted the act is void because the route or roads, designated for improvement, are separated for the distance of a mile by a road being constructed by another district from the southeast corner of section 10 to the northwest corner of block 25, W. S. Des Arc. It is said that the roads are so disconnected and remote from each other as to constitute separate or independent improvements, and that the legislative determination that they constitute a single improvement is an arbitrary exercise of power. The section of the act assailed is as follows: “It is found and declared by the General Assembly that the road now being constructed by Road Improvement District No. 4 of Prairie County, connects the roads hereinabove described, making a single improvement, and for the purposes of this act,, it is hereby declared that the connection extending from the southeast corner of section 10 to the northwest corner of block 25 W. S. Des Arc, shall operate to' constitute the lines of road mentioned in this act as a single improvement.”
The last contention of appellants, that the broad powers conferred upon the Board of Commissioners is an infringement upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the county court over roads, is contrary to the doctrine announced in Sallee v. Dalton, supra, and approved by Cumnock v. Alexander, supra, and Reitzammer v. Commissioners of Desha Road Improvement District No. 2 et al., 139 Ark. 168.
No error appearing, the decree of the learned chancellor is affirmed.