13 Neb. 121 | Neb. | 1882
This is an action to foreclose a mortgage on real estate.
The question to be determined turns upon the construction given to section 3 of “ An act to exempt homestead from judicial sale,” approved February 19th, 1877, which reads as follows: “A conveyance or encumbrance by the. owner is of no validity unless the husband and wife, if the owner is married, concur in and sign the same joint instrument.”
The attorney for- the plaintiffs contends that this section is unconstitutional because its provisions are not within the title of the act, and therefore contravene sec. 11, art. 3 of the constitution, which provides that: “No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” " The authorities cited to sustain this position arc The State, ex rel. Jones, v. Lancaster County, 6 Neb., 485, and the B. & M. R. R. Co. v. Saunders Co., 9 Id., 511.
In the case cited from 6 Neb. the title of the act was, “An act to provide for township organization.” Under this title the act provided for county organization and defined its corporate powers, and provided for the election of county officers, defined their duties and fixed the terms of office. It was held that the act was void.
In the case of the B. & M. R. R. Co. v. Saunders Co.,
The title was held to be too restrictive to authorize the levying of a tax for the payment of school district bonds. We adhere to those decisions because the objects sought to be accomplished in each case were entirely beyond the scope of the title of the act.
The attorney for the plaintiffs has made a very plausible and ingenious argument in support of the proposition that the third' section of the act of 1877 is not within the title of the act. .In the case of Barton v. Drake, 21 Minn, 299, the same objection was made. The court say (page 303): “ The second section of the homestead act (Gen. Stat., ch. 68): provides that any mortgage or other alienation of such land by the owner thereof, if a married man, shall not be valid without the signature of the wife to the same,” etc. It is objected that' this section is not germane to the subject of the act, which is, to provide for the exemption of a homestead from seizure and sale on execution or other process; and that in respect to this section the act is repugnant to see.
Under the title to exempt the homestead, the legislature may make any provision in relation to protecting such homestead that it sees fit. And so long as such legislation is confined to exempting the homestead from forced sale, whether upon execution or upon a mortgage declared to be void by the statute, it can make no difference. It certainly is just as important that the wife should be protected from a mortgage executed by the husband alone, as that she should be permitted to claim the exemption in case of failure of her husband to do so. The law proceeds upon the theory that.both husband and wife are entitled to the benefit of the homestead act, and this right cannot be waived except by the consent of both. The law therefore requires the assent of both to a conveyance or incumbrance of the homestead. In our opinion, sec. 3 is not in conflict with the constitution. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.