Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of their negligence claim, in ruling that plaintiffs could not recover attorney fees as damages, in ruling that plaintiffs’ claim of slander of title was time-barred, and in dismissing their claim alleging abuse of process against defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company. We affirm.
Plaintiffs own land in Eveline Township, Charlevoix County, Michigan. On October 1, 1970, Claud and Edith Gill, who owned land adjacent to plaintiffs’ property, sold their lаnd to Alex and Jean Pomnichowski under a land contract. On October 24, 1977, the Gills gave the Pomnichowskis a warranty deed to the property, which also conveyed to the Pomnichowskis an easement across plaintiffs’ property. However, plaintiffs never granted an eаsement to the Gills or their predecessors in title. The Pomnichowskis’ title was insured by defendant Chicago Title after a title examination was performed by Chicago Title’s agent, defendant Charlevoix Abstract & Engineering Company.
In the fall of 1985, plaintiffs discovered that the Pomnichowskis were cutting trees on plaintiffs’ *465 property. Plaintiffs obtained an injunction preventing the further destruction of their property, and on October 28, 1985, plaintiffs commenced suit against the Pomnichowskis to clear the cloud on their title. As required by the title insurance contract between Chicago Title аnd the Pomnichowskis, Chicago Title defended the Pomnichowskis in the suit brought by plaintiffs. In May 1987, plaintiffs and the Pomnichowskis settled the suit by stipulation and agreement, and the Pomnichowskis quitclaimed to the plaintiffs whatever right they claimed to have in the easement and paid for the damage to the trees.
On August 11, 1988, plaintiffs filed this suit against defendant Chicago Title in the Oakland Circuit Court. The complaint alleged that Chicago Title had negligently insured the Pomnichowskis’ title when they should have discovered the illegal easement, thereby causing plaintiffs to incur legal expenses of $29,000 to clear the title to their property. The second count of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged abuse of process by Chicago Title in vigorously defending the Pomnichowskis in the prior suit. Plaintiffs alleged that Chicago Title knew that its position was indefensible, but that it hoped to use its suрerior economic power to prolong the litigation and thereby force plaintiffs to abandon the suit.
Chicago Title moved for summary disposition on October 3, 1988, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Oakland Circuit Judge James S. Thorburn granted partial summary disposition with regard to the claim of abuse of process.
After Judge Thorburn’s retirement, the suit was transferred to Oakland Circuit Judge Edward Sosnick. On June 27, 1989, plaintiffs amended their complaint by leave granted, adding defendant *466 Charlevoix Abstract and adding the allegation of slander of title.
On September 26, 1989, Judge Sosnick transferred the suit to thе Charlevoix Circuit Court, finding venue to be proper there. Both defendants moved for summary disposition of all counts of plaintiffs’ complaint, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). The Charlevoix Circuit Court granted defendants’ motions and, in an order dated February 23, 1990, dismissed all counts of plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
Plaintiffs first claim that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of their negligence claim. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in ruling that defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs because plaintiffs had not relied upon the title insurance policy.
A motion for summary disposition basеd on MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim by the pleadings alone.
Terrell v LBJ Electronics,
The elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) general standard of care, (3) specific standard of care, (4) cause in fact, (5) legal or proximate cause, and (6) damage.
Moning v Alfono,
Plaintiffs claim that they were harmed by defendants’ action in negligently searching and issuing the title insurance policy to the Pomnichowskis and that defendants owed plаintiffs a duty of care because they were within the class of those who foreseeably could be injured by defendants’ negligent conduct.
Whether an abstract company or a title insurance company owes a duty of care to anyone in the class of those who foreseeably could be injured by the negligence of the abstract company or the title insurance company has not been determined in Michigan. In an analogous situation, however, in
Williams v Polgar,
In
Friedman v Dozorc,
In this сase, Chicago Title insured the Pomnichowskis’ title after a title search was performed by Charlevoix Abstract. The Pomnichowskis apparently relied upon the title search and policy, and believed that they had an easement across plaintiffs’ property. As a rеsult, plaintiffs incurred legal expenses to remove this cloud from their title. Plaintiffs do not claim to have had any contractual relationship with defendants, nor do plaintiffs claim to have relied upon the title policy issued by defendants.
In view of Williams, Friedman, and Stockler, we conclude that the trial court correctly held that defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs because plaintiffs did not rely on defendants’ allegedly negligent misrepresentations. The grant of summary disposition was proper.
Plaintiffs’ second claim is that the trial court erred in ruling that they could not recover attornеy fees as damages.
Generally, attorney fees are not recoverable in litigation, either as costs or as an item of damages, unless expressly allowed by statute or court rule.
Matras v Amoco Oil Co,
Plaintiffs argue that they should be able to recover the attorney fees incurred in prosecuting the prior action against the Pomnichowskis because that action was necessitated by defendants’ wrongdoing, namely, the negligent misrepresentation that the easement was properly conveyed. Having determined that summary disposition of plaintiffs’ negligence claim was proper, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that plаintiffs could not recover attorney fees as damages. Plaintiffs cannot show that defendants’ wrongdoing caused the prior litigation.
Plaintiffs’ third claim is that the trial court erred in ruling that their claim of slander of title was barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7).
When reviewing a motiоn for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and construe them most favorably to the plaintiff.
Haywood v Fowler,
The cause of action for slandеr of title occurs when there is a false and malicious statement made to disparage a person’s title to real estate.
Glieberman v Fine,
The question of what statute of limitations applies to slander of title actions has not been answered in Michigan. Plaintiffs argue that the three-year limitation period in MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8) applies. The trial court ruled that the one-year limitation period in MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7) applies.
MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
(7) The period of limitations is 1 year for an actiоn charging libel or slander.
(8) The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property.
Although there is authority to the contrary, we conсlude that the majority of jurisdictions have adopted the view that, in the absence of a statute expressly referring to actions for slander of title, the statute of limitations applicable to actions for libel and slander applies to actions for slander of title. See
Lehigh Chemical Co v Celanese Corp of America,
Thаt section comprehends all actions for slander or for libel, and is not limited, in terms, to slander or libel against the person only; nor is it confined to any particular kind of slander — slander of the person rather than of property; nor can we see any legislative purрose in making such a distinction. [Id., p 271.]
We, too, can see no reason to make a distinction between an action alleging defamation of title to property and an action alleging defamation of the person.
We agree with the view adopted by the jurisdictions mеntioned above and hold that the one-year period of limitation for an action charging libel or slander applies to an action for slander of title. Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed more than one year after they settled their lawsuit against the Pomnichowskis. See
Chesebro v Powers,
Plaintiffs’ last contention is that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim alleging abuse of process against Chicago Title.
Initially, we note that defendants’ argument
*472
that plaintiffs failed to preserve this issue fоr review because they did not file a separate claim of appeal from the November 21, 1988, order is without merit. Where a party has claimed an appeal from a final order, the party is free to raise on appeal issues related to other оrders in the case.
Dean v
Tucker,
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim of abuse of process beсause it believed that plaintiffs could not allege more than one claim with regard to the same set of facts. The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs were not entitled to allege more than one claim. MCR 2.111(A)(2)(b). Nevertheless, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim of abuse of рrocess. This Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision where it reached the correct result, but for the wrong reason.
McCaslin v Hartford Accident & Indemnity,
To recover pursuant to a theory of abuse of process, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) an act in thе use of process that is improper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding.
Friedman, supra,
pp 30-31. In
Vallance v Brewbaker,
In this case, plaintiffs alleged in their original *473 complaint that Chicago Title abused the legal process by vigorously presenting groundless defеnses in defending the Pomnichowskis in their earlier lawsuit. However, plaintiffs did not allege an act by Chicago Title that demonstrates that the defenses raised were raised with the alleged improper ulterior motive. Thus, the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim of abuse of process was proper.
Affirmed.