102 Ga. 387 | Ga. | 1897
Lead Opinion
The evidence in the case was sufficient to support the finding of the jury that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, and there was no error-in overruling the motion for a new trial on the general grounds set out in the original motion. By the amended motion’exceptions are taken to several parts of the charge given.to the jury by the presiding judge, which we will consider seriatim. The third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth grounds of the motion are not certified by the judge, and therefore can not be considered by this court. The first and second grounds-being the general grounds which, as said above, were properly overruled, we are only to consider the errors alleged to have-been committed by the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth grounds of the motion, and do so in the order indicated by the headnotes to this decision.
Jibdgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. We'are unable to concur in the judgment rendered by the majority of the court in 'this case. In our opinion, an error which required the granting of a new trial was committed by the trial court in its charge to the jury. An examination of the evidence shows that there was an outrageous robbery committed upon the public streets-of the city of Atlanta. About this there can be no question. The pressure of the case was upon the question of the identity of the accused, and upon this the evidence was at least doubtful, though it might be sufficient to authorize a conviction. That the jury must have had some doubt on this point is illustrated by the fact that the verdict contained a recommendation that the accused be punished as for a misdemeanor. Had the jury been entirely satisfied that the accused were the perpetrators of a robbery of the character described in the record, such a recommendation would never have been made. In the trial of a case of this character, it is all important to the accused that the charge upon the law of reasonable doubt should he clear and unequivocal. After stating the case to the jury and defining the offense charged in the indictment, the court charged as follows: “If you believe from the evidence in this-case that these defendants themselves, or acting and participating with others, did in this count)1-, within four years from the date of the finding of this bill of indictment, wrongfully, fraudulently and violently take from the person of Klassett any sum of money which was in his custody, control or possession, of which he had the right to the possession, and by
The three decisions of this court cited in the opinion of Mr. Justice Little as bearing upon the subject do not seem to us to be controlling upon the matter. In the case of Giles v. State, 6 Ga. 276, 285, the headnote uses this language: “ On the trial of criminal cases, moral, and not mathematical or metaphysical certainty, is all that the law requires, or that is attainable,” and in the opinion Judge Lumpkin says: “Now it is conceded, that in all criminal cases whatsoever, it is essential to a verdict of condemnation, that the guilt of the accused should be fully proved; and that neither a mere preponderance of evi
Except as to the proposition above discussed, we concui in the rulings of the majority.