53 S.C. 232 | S.C. | 1898
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This appeal is from the decree of his Honor, R. C. Watts, presiding Judge, at the spring term, 1897, of the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County in the above stated action, by which decree it is adjudged that the bill of sale, mortgage, and confession of judgment,
The defendants, except H. F. Means, appeal from Judge Watts’ decree on twenty-two exceptions. These exceptions may be grouped as follows: First. Error in the Circuit Judge in deciding from the testimony that the bill of sale, mortgage, and judgment from Albert G. Means, the
The next error alleged in the Circuit Judge is in holding that this action was commenced in 1891 instead of July, 1895, when an amended complaint was filed. Our answer to this will be brief: The parties to this case have agreed by their “Case,” now before us, “This action was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County on the ®8d day of December, 1891 f &c.
The tenth exception complains that the Circuit Judge erred in holding that, by means of instruments apparently bona fide, and for valuable consideration, A. G. Means placed his property beyond the reach of his honest creditors. We must say the testimony supports the Circuit Judge. As to the concluding sentence, that the Circuit Judge erred in further holding that the badges of fraud are numerous and convincing; the Circuit Judge was, no doubt, as we are, impressed with the high character of Mr. Means and Mr. Beaty — all he meant was to state frankly that proofs, in the case at bar, were numerous and convincing that the transactions of 30th December, 1887, could not stand in a court of equity, because wanting in bona fides.
The twelfth and thirteenth exceptions are covered by what we have already held.
As to the fourteenth exception, imputing error to the Circuit Judge in appointing Wm. Munro, esq., as receiver; we see no error here, either in the person appointed or in the fact that a necessity for a receiver existed.
The sixteenth and seventeenth exceptions are too general.
The facts of this case are at variance with the conclusion that any valuable consideration supported the transaction.
The twenty-first exception is too general.
And, lastly, the twenty-second exception is covered by our previous views herein expressed.
Before concluding, however, it does seem to us that inasmuch as the defendants, appellants, except H. F. Means and A. G. Means, sr., have received from their grand-father by assignment the honest bona fide debt of $2,726.25, with interest from 16th September, 1887, held by their grandfather, Robert Beaty, sr., against their father, A. G. Means, that they ought to be allowed to prove their debt against their father under these proceedings, but not as a judgment. No doubt the Circuit Judge meant this, for he finds that this was an honest indebtedness of A. G. Means to Robert Beaty, sr.
It is the judgment of this Court, that’ the judgment of the Circuit Court be modified to the extent of allowing the appellants, except H. F. Means and A. G. Means, sr., to prove their debt of $2,726.25 against the estate of A. G. Means, sr., but not in the form of a judgment, and, with this modification, that the decree of the Circuit Court be affirmed.