151 Ga. App. 21 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1979
The appellants appeal from judgments entered in favor of the appellee on several special interrogatory jury verdicts. Their primary contention is that the trial court allowed the jury to deliberate for an excessive length of time.
The trial lasted two weeks. The jury retired to
The appellants do not contend that the jurors were forced to deliberate against their will. In fact, the trial court instructed them that the decision as to how long to deliberate and when to recess was theirs. It is the appellants’ contention, however, that in doing so the judge erred because he failed to exercise his discretion to control the proceedings in his court. Held:
1. The appellants did not object to the length of the delay, nor did they move for a mistrial, until after the verdict was rendered. It is so well settled as to be axiomatic that a party cannot ignore what he considers to be an injustice during the trial of the case in hopes of obtaining a favorable verdict and then enumerate that alleged injustice as error on appeal when the verdict proves to be adverse to him. See Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435 (2) (67 SE2d 221) (1951); Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 163 (193 SE2d 19) (1972); Camp v. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 590 (2) (200 SE2d 332) (1973). It is also well settled as a general rule that the trial judge has the discretion to permit the jury to deliberate into the early morning hours. McBrayer v. Ballenger, 94 Ga. App. 620 (8) (95 SE2d 718) (1956); American Family Life Assur. Co. v. Welch, 120 Ga. App. 334, 341-342 (170 SE2d 703) (1969); Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763 (4) (1979). This enumeration of error is without merit.
2. The appellants allege that the trial court also erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on an alleged conflict of interest on the part of one of the appellee’s attorneys. They contend that the attorney had represented appellant Bolton Road Hospital in previous matters and that he thereby became privy to certain unspecified confidences of the hospital. Again, the motion for mistrial was not made until after the jury had returned
3. Appellant Lewis contends that the court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when, prior to the time a final verdict was reached in his case but after a verdict had been reached in the other cases, the court engaged in a conversation with a representative of the appellee in the presence of the jury. The court denied that such a conversation had taken place, and there is nothing in the record or transcript to show that it did. Accordingly, no error has been established. See Continental Nut Co. v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 142 Ga. App. 509, supra.
Judgments affirmed.