Bolinger v. StateBolinger v. State
Evidence presented at the suppression hearing failed to establish that officers of the Lakeland Police Department had a founded suspicion at the time they stopped the appellant. Officer Giddens, while conducting surveillance in an area known for drug activity observed the appellant, a white female, driving a pickup truck through the area. A black male flagged down the truck and caused the appellant to stop. The man talked with the appellant for a few moments and then crossed the street and talked to another black male. Both men then returned to the truck where the man who had first approached the truck moved his hands in front of his body with his back towards Officer Giddens. He then reached into the truck with his left hand and pulled the hand back out. The officer did not see anything exchanged between the appellant and either of the men.
The appellant then drove away and was stopped by another police officer based on the description he received from Officer Giddens. The officer approached the vehicle and saw that the appellant‘s hand was clenched down along her left side. He opened the door, grabbed the appellant by the wrist, and brought her out of the truck causing her hand to open. After the appellant was removed from the truck, a third police officer with a flashlight found two pieces of rock cocaine on the floorboard next to the driver‘s seat.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the appellant‘s motion to suppress the rock cocaine. The appellant then pled nolo contendere and reserved her right to appeal the denial of her motion. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence imposed upon her on the basis of her plea.
We agree with the appellant‘s contention that the officer‘s observations, even in the light of his experience and knowledge, were insufficient to constitute a founded suspicion that the appellant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime justifying a stop pursuant to
We, accordingly, reverse and remand with instructions to discharge the appellant on this charge.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHEB and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.