Thе deceased was fatally injured on the evening of Christmas, 1884, by defendant’s cars, which came in cоllision with the sleigh in which he was riding at the place where the tracks of the company cross Third street, in the city of St. Paul. The accident is alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant, particularly in running its ears at a dangerous rate of speed, and in failing to give аny proper signal or warning of their approach at the crossing. The evidence tended to show that the cars in question were box cars, which were being backed or pushed acrоss the street at the time; that they were running at a higher rate of speed than allowed by the city ordinance; that it was after dark, being past 6 o’clock in the evening; that the street was in use as оne of the thoroughfares of the city; that there was then no watchman or flag-man at the crоssing;- and that the driver of the vehicle saw or heard no signal, and had no notice of the approach of the cars in time to escape.
The evidence was undoubtedly sufficient to sustаin a finding of negligence on defendant’s part by the jury. When the situation at the crossing, and the manner оf running the train, the number and duties of the employes in charge, the rate of speed, the extent оf travel upon the street, and the opportunity for observation, were shown, it was peculiarly for the jury to determine whether the rate of speed was reasonable, and the defendаnt’s management of the train otherwise reasonably prudent. Howard v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 214, (
It was also for the jury to determine whether a flag-man or other precautions not used were necessary for the safety of trаvellers at the particular time and place, and how far any negligence which might rightfully be imputеd to the defendant in any of the particulars we
2. It is not so clear upon the evidence thаt there may not have been contributory negligence on the part of the driver of the sleigh but thе testimony in plaintiff’s behalf presented a case for the jury. The jury would consider to what extent thе position of the freight-house, or cars standing on the street, as shown by some of the testimony, obsсured the vision of the parties in the sleigh as they were approaching the track, in connеction with other facts above referred to, and also tbe evidence of the driver, and thоse with him, that they looked and listened for the cars, and that he caused the horse to walk slowly for this purpose when he came near the crossing, and that they heard or saw nothing to warn them of danger until too late to retreat. It was for the jury to say, if they believed the witnesses, whether these precautions on the part of the deceased were, under the circumstances, rеasonably sufficient. Faber v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co.,
3. The jury gave round damages, but the trial judge, on the motion for a new trial, has found nо cause to interfere with the verdict on this ground, and we do not think this court warranted in declaring them excessive under the evidence in the ease. The deceased was a strong, healthy man, 48 years of age, who earned good wages as a day laborer. He left a wife and three children, two of whom were under the age of 21 years. The statute authorizes an action for damages for the benefit of the widow and next of kin. The jury, in such cases, may consider prospectivе advantages of a pecuniary nature which have been cut off by the premature deаth (in this case) of the husband and father. The value of the services of the head of a family in a pecuniary sense cannot be limited to the amount of his daily wages earned for their support. His constant daily services, attention, and care in their behalf, in the relation which he sustained tо them, may be considered as well, and the jury must judge of the circumstances of each case. In such cases damages for mere loss of
“At the best,” as remarked by Allen, J., in Green v. Hudson River R. Co.,
The statute is tо be construed as a remedial one, and must have a liberal interpretation to effectuate the evident purpose of its enactment. The determination of the amount of damаges, however, must be a judicial one, and is not left to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury; and vеrdicts have not infrequently been set aside or reduced in this class of cases; but very rarely, we think, in а case like this, where the deceased is the head of a family, in middle life, apparently able to care and provide for them, and in various ways render them valuable assistance and-service. Carey v. Berkshire R. Co.,
Order affirmed.