Bolger v. LanceBolger v. Lance
This case involves a public records request made by David F. Bolger (Bolger) upon the Office of the Attorney General (AG). The AG denied the request, and this action ensued. The district court denied Bolger’s petition for disclosure of the records, finding that they were exempt from disclosure as investigatory records of a law enforcement agency. Bolger appealed, challenging the procedures employed by the AG and the district court related to the hearing on his petition and the district court’s finding that the documents were exempt.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 6, 2000, Bolger, through his attorney, made a written request to examine
The AG denied the request by a written letter to Bolger’s attorney, which stated: “Your Public Records Request dated October 6, 2000, on behalf of your client, David F. Bolger, is hereby denied pursuant to
On November 29, 2000, after reviewing in camera the documents submitted under seal and hearing oral arguments, the district court signed an order and judgment denying Bolger’s request to examine and copy the records submitted under seal. On December 14, 2000, Bolger moved the district court for an order directing disclosure of the first affidavit and for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. In response, the AG filed an ex parte Affidavit of Counsel (second affidavit), describing the documents submitted under seal in more detail than it had in its pleadings in response to the order to show cause. The second affidavit was not disclosed to Bolger, and the court reviewed it in camera. At that point, the AG also provided Bolger with a copy of the first affidavit, which had previously been submitted under seal. On March 26, 2001, the district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Judgment, explaining that the issue of disclosure of the first affidavit was mooted by the AG’s voluntary disclosure and further explaining its reasons for denying Bolger’s petition as to the other documents submitted under seal. Bolger has appealed from the district court’s decision, arguing that the court erred in viewing the affidavits in camera; that his due process rights were violated when he was not given access to a detailed index of the nature and content of the documents submitted under seal; that the court erred in considering the second affidavit submitted by the AG in making its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Judgment; and that there was not substantial and competent evidence to support the court’s ruling that the documents were exempt from disclosure.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, which is to say that findings that are based upon substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.
DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith,
ANALYSIS
Title 9 of the Idaho Code is entitled “Evidence.” Chapter 3 of that Title is entitled “Public Writings.” Section 9-338 provides the basic right of a citizen to view public records:
Public records — Right to examine
(1) Every person has a right to examine and take a copy of any public record of this state and there is a presumption that all public records in Idaho are open at all reasonable times for inspection except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.
Access to records about a person by a person
(1) A person may inspect and copy the records of a public agency or independent public body corporate and politic pertaining to that person, even if the record is otherwise exempt from public disclosure.
....
(3) The right to inspect and amend records pertaining to oneself does not include the right to review:
(a)Otherwise exempt investigatory records of a public agency or independent public body corporate and politic if the investigation is ongoing;
....
(d) Information which is otherwise exempt from disclosure by statute or court rule;
....
The following records are exempt from disclosure:
(1) Investigatory records of a law enforcement agency, as defined in section 9-337(6), Idaho Code, under the conditions set forth in section 9-335, Idaho Code.
(1) Notwithstanding any statute or rule of court to the contrary, nothing in this chapter nor chapter 10, title 59, Idaho Code, shall be construed to require disclosure of investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes by a law enforcement agency, but such exemption from disclosure applies only to the extent that the production of such records would:
(a) Interfere with enforcement proceedings;
(b) Deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication;
(c) Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(d) Disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement agency in the course of a criminal investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source;
(e) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures; or
(f) Endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
....
Section 9-335 also provides the following definitions:
(2)....Investigatory record as used herein means information with respect to an identifiable person or group of persons compiled by a law enforcement agency in the course of conducting an investigation of a specific act or omission....
....
As used herein, the term “law enforcement agency” means the office of the attorney general, the office of the state controller, the Idaho state police, the office of any prosecuting attorney, sheriff or municipal police department.
Section 9-337 also provides definitions of “investigatory record” and “law enforcement agency,” for the purposes of sections 9-337 through 9-347.
Bolger argues that the district court erred in exempting the records because the AG is not a law enforcement agency and because the AG failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the records are exempt from disclosure under all of the other requirements of
In support of his argument, Bolger points to this Court’s holding in
Newman v. Lance,
Bolger’s arguments overlook the fact that the definitions contained in
Under
Next, we address Bolger’s argument that the AG failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the records are exempt from disclosure under all of the other requirements of
Based on our review of the withheld documents, we conclude that the documents themselves were substantial and competent evidence to satisfy the AG’s burden of persuasion and to support the district court’s finding that the withheld records were “investigatory records,” under
Consequently, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Bolger’s petition for an order granting him access to the documents.
Bolger argues that the district court abandoned its judicial function, and thus erred, by accepting verbatim the proposed findings of fact submitted by the AG. We disagree. After entering its initial order, and upon Bolger’s request, the court agreed to enter more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court directed both parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The fact that the district court’s findings closely parallel the arguments and proposed findings submitted by the AG simply reflects that the AG had the winning arguments in this case. The Idaho cases cited by Bolger do not support his argument that “Idaho’s appellate courts have consistently disapproved” of the practice of adopting findings verbatim. Rather, the courts in those cases upheld the lower court’s findings:
To adopt verbatim a party’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is not the best practice, even if both sides have submitted proposals. However, it is not reversible error where, as here, those findings and conclusions essential to the decision reached are sufficient and are supported by the evidence.
Cheney v. Jemmett,
C. The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Bolger’s Motion For Attorney Fees In The Proceedings Below.
In the proceedings below, Bolger sought an award of attorney fees under
Bolger points out that, three days before the hearing, the AG disclosed documents that had previously been withheld under a claim of exemption. He argues that he was therefore the prevailing party with regard to the bulk of the requested documents as a result of his efforts in bringing this action. However, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) sets the standard to be used in determining the prevailing party. Rule 54(d)(1)(B) directs the court to consider, among other things, the extent to which each party prevailed relative to the “final judgment or result.” As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, it may be appropriate for the trial court, in the right case, to consider the “result” obtained by way of a settlement reached by the parties.
Sanders v. Lankford,
We affirm the district court’s ruling on the merits of Bolger’s petition. The result would not have been altered if the district court had proceeded in the manner Bolger argues it should have. Therefore, the additional allegations of procedural error, even if valid, would be harmless error. On appeal, harmless error — error that does not affect a substantial right of the parties — is disregarded. I.R.C.P. 61;
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
IV.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Bolger seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal under
V.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err by determining that the withheld records were exempt from disclosure under