17 Ala. 696 | Ala. | 1850
When this cause was here at a previous term, we held that a plaintiff in an action of detinue had six years, within which he might sue in the courts of this State, where the cause of action accrued here, and that the time the defendant was absent from the State, whilst the statute of limitations was running, must be deducted in computing the time necessary to form the bar.^-Bohannon v. Chapman, 13 Ala. 641. That the defendant herself has always resided in the State affords her no protection, for in ascertaining the time, during which suit could have been brought, we must deduct the time, *that .those, through whom she claims, have been absent from the State and could not be sued. There must be an adverse possession of a chattel for six years within this State, in order to give a title by the statute of limitations.. (¿Thus, if A. converts a chattel of B. and removes without the State, and afterwards returns, and sells it to C., when C. is sued, he can add to bis own possession only the time that A. held it adversely in this State, deducting the time he was absent.^ Applying this rule to the evidence, to which the defendant demurred, it is clear that the bar was not complete when, the suit was brought. The cause of action accrued first against Randolph Mailett, who took the slave from the possession of the plaintiff’s intestate in February 1836. He, however, went directly to Mississippi, carrying the slave with him, and has never since returned to this State.— About the first of November 1838, as we infer from the evidence, Isaac N. Mailett brought the slave back to Alabama and had him in possession, until the fall of 1840, when he sold him to Young F. Bohannon. In'January 1.843, Bohannon, through whom the defendant claims title, went to Texas, carrying the
But it is insisted that the court ought to have visited the demurrer to the replication to the sixth plea back upon the first count in the declaration, as this count was defective. We do not think it necessary to examine the sufficiency of the first count, for if it were admitted that the court should have sustained the demurrer as to this count, yet the second count is clearly good, and the evidence fully sustains it. The judgment would, therefore, have been the same, had the court held
Let the judgment be affirmed.